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Abstract
When verifying software one can make use of several verification techniques.
These techniques mostly fall in one of two categories: Static Verification and
Dynamic Verification. Static verification deals with the analysis of either
concrete source code, or a model of it. These kinds of techniques can verify
properties over all possible runs of a program. Dynamic verification is concerned
with the monitoring of software, providing guarantees that observed runs comply
with specified properties. It is strong in analysing systems of a complexity that is
difficult to address by static verification, e.g., systems with numerous interacting
sub-units, concrete (as opposed to abstract) data, etc. On the other hand, its
major drawbacks are the impossibility to extrapolate correct observations to
all possible runs, and that the monitoring of a property introduces runtime
overheads.
It is quite clear that static and dynamic verification have largely disjoint
strengths. Therefore, their combination can allow the verification process to
deal with richer properties, with greater ease. The work presented in this
thesis addresses this issue by introducing some manners to combine static and
dynamic verification, where partial proofs are used as a means to accomplish
the combination. The main novelty in these combinations consists in the fact
that all of them consider the use of the partial proofs in the verification process,
whereas, in general, other verification approaches discard them right away.
The main contributions of this thesis are: (i) ppDATE, an automata-based
formalism to specify both data- and control-oriented properties; (ii) structural
operational semantics for ppDATE; (iii) a translation of ppDATE to DATE
together with a proof of correctness; (iv) StaRVOOrS, a tool for combin-
ing (static) deductive verification and runtime verification of object oriented
software; (v) a testing focused development methodology which integrates
deductive and runtime verification in its workflow; and (vi) a methodology
to infer global trace conditions for a system, from partial proofs local to the
transitions of a model, obtained by performing low effort verification attempts
to properties.
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1CHAPTER
ONE
INTRODUCTION
During the last decade, the integration of technology into our ordinary activities
has been growing at a fast pace. Desktop computers, laptops, netbooks, tablets,
smart phones, and smart watches represent just a short list of devices which
are used on a daily basis all around the globe. In addition, the use of online
services, e.g., home banking, instant messaging, TV streaming, tax payment,
e-education, etc., have become a trend. Even though these devices and services
are really different, all of them have one aspect in common: they all operate
by running software.
In general, software developers provide as part of the documentation of
their products an informal description regarding the intended behaviour of
their programs. However, they do not usually offer any guarantees about the
accomplishment of such a behaviour. In fact, it is a common practice for
them to include in the installation mechanism of their programs a Terms and
Conditions section, where they add disclaimers saying, for instance, that they
do not take any responsibility if the use of their products leads to a malfunction
of the devices running them.
Unexpected software behaviour may be a real headache for everyone. It
is true that if a program which checks the weather forecast fails during its
execution, it may not represent any harm. However, if the software in a self-
driven car fails, the result of this failure may be a catastrophe as people’s lives
can be in danger. In addition, an error in a home banking system could cause
the loss of all the savings of the customers of a bank.
Fortunately, efforts by developers to avoid unexpected behaviour on their
programs are increasing. Among the different measures that developers are
taking to avoid the presence of errors in their products, one can highlight the
use of formal verification.
Formal verification consists on proving the correctness of the program under
scrutiny by showing that it fulfils a formal specification of its intended behaviour
through the use of verification techniques. These techniques may be divided
into two categories: static verification techniques, and dynamic verification
techniques.
Static verification techniques deal with the analysis of either concrete
source code, or a model of it. These techniques can verify properties over
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all possible executions of a program. However, their application may require
a high computational effort. In addition, one may have to introduce special
annotations, e.g., loop invariants, to deal with certain properties. This fact may
increase the complexity of achieving a full automation of the whole verification
process.
Regarding the dynamic verification techniques, they are concerned with the
monitoring of software, i.e., the program has to be executed in order to check
the properties. These techniques, which in general are fully automated, provide
guarantees that observed executions of a program comply to the specification.
However, it is impossible to extrapolate results of correct observations to all
possible executions. In addition, monitoring introduces runtime overheads
which may be prohibitive in certain systems.
It is quite clear that static and dynamic verification have largely disjoint
strengths. Therefore, their combination can allow the verification process
to deal with richer properties, with a greater ease. This work presents a
novel approach to address the combination of static and dynamic verification
techniques, by using partial proofs, i.e., an unfinished proof of a property, as
a means for accomplishing the combination. The novelty in this approach
consists in the fact that we consider the use of partial proofs in the verification
process, whereas, in general, other verification approaches discard them.
As a result, we were able to enhance both the verification of correctness
properties, and the development of software through the use of techniques
based on verification.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 1.1 introduces several
verification techniques of interest for this work. Section 1.2 introduces the
verification tools used in this thesis, and their specification languages. Section
1.3 discusses the notion of partial proof. Section 1.4 briefly elaborates on the
combination of static and dynamic verification through partial proofs. Section
1.5 describe possible continuations for the work developed within this thesis.
Finally, section 1.6 describes the contributions of this thesis, which are properly
reflected on its different chapters.
1.1 Verification Techniques
Verification techniques are mainly used to analyse whether a program satisfies
certain properties. Such properties usually describe the behaviour of the system
under test (SUT). In general, these techniques are divided into either static
or dynamic verification techniques, depending on whether the SUT is run
to be verified. Below, several of the most widely used static and dynamic
verification techniques are briefly described. In addition, we make a (brief)
general comparison between the use of both kind of techniques, and we discuss
the benefits which may be obtained by combining them.
1.1.1 Static Verification Techniques
In this section we analyse two of the most widely used static verification
techniques: Deductive Verification, and Model Checking.
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Deductive Verification
Deductive verification [56] focuses on turning the correctness properties of a
program into logical formulae, e.g., first-order logic, high-order logic, program
logic, etc., and then verifying these formulae by deduction in a (logic) calculus.
In general, there are three main approaches that one may adopt to perform
deductive verification. Let us call these three approaches Proof Assistants,
Program Logic, and Verification Condition Generation.
Proof Assistants are interactive theorem provers which, in general, target
some high-order logic. These provers are not language-oriented. Instead, they
provide a language in which both the syntax and the semantics of the SUT
have to be described. In addition, correctness properties have to be modelled
within the logic handled by the proof assistant. Thereby, one can use the proof
assistant to develop the proof of the properties. Note that, even though proof
assistants are interactive, they may present a certain degree of automation. As
an example, the Coq [28] proof assistant targets intuitionistic logic, introduces
the language Gallina to describe the syntax and the semantics of the SUT, and
uses a sequent calculus to verify the correctness properties.
In relation to Program Logic, Hoare Logic [66] may be the most well-known
program logic to analyse programs. Hoare logic offers both a clear notation
to describe programs and their properties, and a set of axioms and inference
rules which may be used to verify the properties [81]. In this logic, properties
are described by using Hoare triples. A Hoare triple is an expression of the
form {P} S {Q}, where S is (a unit of) the SUT, P is the precondition of
S, and Q is the postcondition of S. In addition, one may consider the use of
some language-oriented modal logic, e.g., dynamic logic [62], in order to reason
about the correctness properties of the SUT. As an example, the KeY [9] tool
uses Java dynamic logic to deal with the correctness properties, and a sequent
calculus to verify them.
On the Verification Condition Generation approach, programs are annotated
with assertions representing the correctness properties. Then, this assertions are
used to generate first-order logic conditions which later may be discharged by
using some automatic theorem prover. As an example, one may refer to Dafny
[71] or Why3 [29]. Dafny is a programming language which natively supports
specification constructs to describe the specification of procedures. Such
specifications are used to generate first-order conditions which are discharged
by using Z3 [50]. Regarding Why3, it is a deductive program verification
platform which provides its own language for specification and programming.
On this platform one can use both automated theorem provers, e.g., Z3, and
interactive theorem provers, e.g., Coq, to discharge verification conditions.
Model Checking
Model Checking focuses on verifying properties about a system by analysing
a finite state abstraction of it, which is usually referred as the model [40].
This technique determines whether a model fulfils the specified property by
performing an exhaustive search over the entire state space of the system,
aiming at finding an execution trace which violates it. If no such a trace is
found, then the property is satisfied by the model.
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As this technique deals with finite state systems, the tools implementing it,
a.k.a. model checkers, automatically analyse all of the possible executions of
the system, always terminating with a yes or no answer depending on whether
the specification is fulfilled or not (if enough resources are available of course).
However, when dealing with a real world problem the model checkers have
to deal with the state explosion problem [41]. In short, when the amount of
state variables in the system increases, the size of the system state space grows
exponentially.
Whenever the specification is not fulfilled, i.e., a property is violated, model
checkers return the execution trace which has violated the property, usually
referred as error trace. Such a trace serves as a counter-example for the
property.
An example of a model checker is SPIN [67], a popular model checker which
uses the language PROMELA for the description of the models, and Temporal
Logic as the specification language for the properties.
1.1.2 Dynamic Verification Techniques
In this section we analyse three dynamic verification techniques: unit testing,
model-based testing, and runtime verification. It is important to remark that in
this work we use the term dynamic verification to refer to any of the previous
techniques, and not as a synonym for runtime verification.
Unit Testing
Unit Testing [65] aims at analysing particular executions of a program to
determine whether they produce certain expected values, i.e., the program
behaves as expected. Such executions are based on test cases. A test case
represents a particular initial state of the SUT, and the expected state of the
program once its execution is complete. It is defined by assigning particular
values to the different variables and parameters associated to the program.
Two traditional manners of applying unit testing are Black-box testing and
White-box testing. Below, we elaborate on them.
Black-box testing focuses on the analysis of the functionality of the SUT,
treating it as a ’black box ’, i.e., without looking into its source code. Instead,
it is enough having only some idea of what the program is supposed to do. For
instance, if the program is sorting an array, then one only has to know that
the array has to be sorted after executing the program, without the need of
knowing which sorting algorithm the program is implementing. In addition,
this kind of testing is quite useful whenever (part of) the source code of the
program is not available, e.g., the code belongs to a third party library.
Among the different black-box testing techniques, Input Space Partitioning
is usually one of the most highlighted ones. This technique consists in, first,
defining the input space of the program, i.e., the set of all possible inputs that
may be fed to the program. Next, the input space is divided into several disjoint
partitions, such that the values on each partition test different functionalities
of the SUT. Then, test cases are generated by selecting a value from each
partition. Finally, these test cases are used to execute the program, and the
obtained results are analysed.
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Regarding White-box testing, it analyses the structure of a program to trace
possible execution paths through its code. Therefore, one needs to have access
to the complete source code of the SUT to perform this kind of testing.
There are many criteria which can be followed when using white-box testing
such as, for instance, Code Coverage criteria. Within these criteria, one
can highlight the Statement Coverage criterion, where all the test cases are
generated in such a manner that all the statements of the SUT are executed,
or Condition Coverage criterion, where all the test cases are generated in such
a way that every condition of the SUT is evaluated both to true and false.
Model-Based Testing
While unit testing focuses on writing tests cases in order to analyse the com-
putation performed by a unit of the SUT on the data, model-based testing
(MBT) [91] provides better support for testing control -oriented aspects, e.g.,
the flow of execution through the procedures in the SUT.
In general, most of the models used to generate tests for control-oriented
aspects are based on variants of finite-state machines. From these models,
MBT tools can automatically generate test cases, which might also contain
the expected output in order to automate the decision on whether the test
is successful or not [6, 90]. Coverage criteria to generate test cases in MBT
include Transition Coverage, where the test cases have to traverse all of the
transitions in the model, and State Coverage, where the test cases have to visit
all the states in the model. In addition, these tools may generate failing traces
which simplify the detection of errors in the SUT.
More concretely, MBT involves performing the following steps:
(i) Writing an abstract model, which may be annotated to capture the
relation between tests and requirements;
(ii) Generating abstract tests from the model. This implies defining both a
test selection and coverage criteria;
(iii) Generating concrete test cases. This implies creating an adaptor which
converts abstract tests into concrete test cases;
(iv) Executing the tests on the SUT and assigning verdicts;
(v) Analysing the results of the tests and taking a corrective action (if
necessary).
Note that a failing test case might not necessarily mean that there is an issue
with the implementation. A test case may fail due to a fault in the adaptor, or
in the model as well.
Among the benefits of using MBT it is usually mentioned [91] that this
technique increases the possibility of finding errors in the SUT; it reduces
testing cost and time, as programmers spend less time and effort writing tests,
and analysing their results; it improves the quality of the tests by considering
coverage of the model and the SUT; it gives traceability between requirements
and the model, and between informal requirements and generated test cases;
and it helps to update the test suites when requirements evolve.
On the other hand, MBT cannot guarantee finding all of the differences
between the model and the SUT, and it needs skilled model designers, among
other things. In addition, unless a table relating requirements with the model
is kept up-to-date, one might get the wrong model from outdated requirements.
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Finally, it is indeed an overhead writing the model (which might be wrong)
and developing the adaptor (which might also introduce errors).
Runtime Verification
Runtime verification [25,63,74] is concerned with the monitoring of software
executions. This technique detects violations of properties which occur during
the execution of the SUT. Due to this fact, runtime verification gives the
possibility of reacting to incorrect behaviour of a program whenever an error is
detected.
Properties to be verified using this technique are usually described in
two possible manners. One possibility is annotating the source code of the
SUT with assertions. An assertion is a logical formula which is expected to
be true whenever the execution of the annotated program reaches it. The
other possibility is using a high-level specification language. For instance,
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [78] is one of the most popular formalisms in
use. In addition, another approach which is increasing in popularity is writing
properties using automaton-based specification languages [10,45].
To verify the properties runtime verification introduces the use of monitors.
A monitor is a piece of software which runs in parallel to the SUT, controlling
that the execution of the program does not violate any property. In addition,
monitors usually create a log file where they add entries reflecting the results
which are obtained whenever they attempt to verify a property.
In general, monitors are automatically generated from either the annotated
assertions, or the (high-level) specification of the properties. Regarding monitor
generation from annotated assertions, one may refer to openJML [42], or
jml4c [82], which are tools that allow to perform runtime verification over Java
programs annotated with assertions written in the Java Modelling Language [72].
Regarding monitor generation from specifications, one can refer either to
LARVA [46] and MarQ [80] as examples of tools which apply runtime verification
by generating monitors from the high-level specification languages DATE [45]
and Quantified Event Automata [23], respectively.
One downside of the use of runtime verification is that it introduces some
overhead to the execution of the system. Thus, one of the main objectives
of the developers of tools which use this technique is to reduce as much as
possible such overhead.
1.1.3 Comparing Static and Dynamic Verification Tech-
niques
Static verification techniques are good to analyse the correctness of software.
These techniques come with strong guarantees to verify properties over all
possible executions of a program, or a model of it. In addition, as these
techniques are used pre-deployment, they do not affect the behaviour of the
programs at runtime.
However, full static verification may be hard to achieve automatically (not
to say impossible). Among other things, loop invariants usually have to be
provided by the developers. Therefore, one has to rely on code annotations,
or interactive proof construction. In addition, the use of libraries generally
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represents a challenge for static techniques, as source code of the libraries is
not always accessible. Thus, either some data abstractions may have to be
introduced in many of the properties, or some specification has to be provided
for the library, in order to verify the properties using static verification. These
constraints may require highly trained experts to handle them, they may
increase the computational effort required to apply the techniques, and the
techniques working with abstractions from the real code may loose accuracy
when they analyse a property involving the use of the concrete data of the
system.
Regarding the dynamic verification techniques, they are lightweight tech-
niques which are usually strong in analysing programs of a complexity which
is difficult to address by the static verification ones, like programs interacting
with several other systems, heavy usage of mainstream (external) libraries,
and concrete (as opposed to abstract) data. For instance, dynamic verification
techniques can directly access the results of the calls to procedures of a library,
whereas the source code of the libraries is not usually accessible to the static
techniques.
Nonetheless, dynamic techniques cannot be used to guarantee the correctness
of a program, mainly due to the fact that they cannot extrapolate the results
of correct observations to all possible executions, as oppose to static techniques
which verify properties over all possible executions of a program. In addition,
dynamic techniques may induce overheads to the system which can be a problem
in certain settings.
Static and dynamic verification have largely been applied to disjoint areas.
For instance, deductive verification has been extensively used to verify properties
focusing on a system’s data, e.g., [9, 54, 69, 73], whereas runtime verification
has been extensively used to verify control-flow properties with reasonable
overheads [24, 35, 45, 79]. Still, from the comparisons above one can realise
that these techniques are complementary. They both have advantages and
disadvantages, and a natural question which can arise is whether they may
be combined in a manner where one can get the advantages of both kinds of
techniques, but without inheriting too much from their disadvantages. This
work addresses this challenge, providing a positive answer to it (see Sec.1.4).
1.2 Selected Tools
This section briefly introduces the main tools used in this thesis, and their
specification languages. Sec. 1.2.2 introduces the deductive verifier KeY and
the Java Modelling Language (specification language). Sec. 1.2.3 introduces
the runtime verifier Larva and DATE, its specification language. Both tools
are used to verify Java programs.
1.2.1 Preliminaries: Dynamic Logic
Before introducing the deductive verifier used in this thesis, we need to introduce
the notion of dynamic logic. Dynamic Logic (DL) [62] is a modal logic which is
used to reason about programs. Due to the many differences between different
programming languages, it is not possible to have one single version of DL to
analyse them all. A DL is therefore specific for the programming language at
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hand. For instance, the version of DL used by KeY to analyse Java programs
is referred as Java DL.
In particular, DL includes two modalities [ ], a.k.a. box, and 〈〉, a.k.a.
diamond. Given a DL formula φ and a program p, [p]φ means that if p
terminates its execution, then it is in a state where φ holds; and 〈p〉φ means
that p terminates its execution and φ holds in the final state reached by p. For
deterministic programs p, the only difference between these two modalities is
that termination is stated in 〈p〉φ, and assumed in [p]φ.
In addition, DL formulae are written using the traditional logical operators
∧,∨,→, and ¬, and both universally and existentially quantifications over
logic variables.1 Note that as DL is specific for the programming language
under scrutiny, the syntax used for describing programs will depend on the
programming language in use. For instance, assuming that p1 and p2 are
sequences of program statements, the following expressions are all examples of
Java DL formulae:
 [x=x*x;y=x+20;y=y+1;] x > 0
 〈x=y-x;if(y>0){p1}else{foo()};p2〉 x 6= y
 ∀ l · l > 0→ [x=l; p1; ] x > 0
 x > y ∧ y > 0 → 〈x=y*x;〉 [y=y+x;] y > x
Note that the DL formula φ→ [p]ψ is valid if whenever formula φ holds, and
the execution of p terminates, the formula ψ is fulfilled afterwards. Therefore,
the previous formula could be regarded as the Hoare triple {φ}p{ψ}.
1.2.2 Deductive Verification using KeY
In this thesis we heavily use the deductive verifier KeY [9]. KeY is a tool for
data-centric functional correctness properties of Java programs which, given a
Java program annotated with Java Modelling Language (JML) [72], generates
proof obligations (i.e., formulae) in Java DL, and attempts to prove them.
JML is a specification language which primarily focuses on the description
of pre/post-conditions of methods and class invariants. This language is
compatible with Java expression syntax, a fact that simplifies its use. Fig. 1.1
illustrates a JML specification (from line 1 to 5) for Java a method named foo.
Line 1 describes which one is the behaviour expected for method foo (either
normal as in this example, or exceptional); line 2 describes the precondition of
foo; line 3 describes the postcondition of foo; and line 4 lists the variables of
the class which are modified by executing foo.
Coming back to KeY, Fig. 1.2 roughly illustrates how this tool would
generate the dynamic logic proof obligation in the column of the right, from
the Java method foo which is annotated with JML in the column of the left.
Similarly to many other verification tools, KeY has a few restrictions: it
does not support concurrency and floating-point arithmetic, and the generic
types are expected to be compiled away. However, it is also worth mentioning
that KeY fully covers Java Card, and that Java integer types, exceptions, and
static initialization are accurately modelled on it [9].
At the core of KeY is a prover using a sequent calculus to construct proof
trees for the generated proof obligations, by following the symbolic execution
paradigm [64, 70]. Here, we will not introduce this calculus. However, we
1Logic variables never occur in programs.
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/*@ public normal_behaviour
@ requires n > 0 && y > 0;
@ ensures x == n && y > x;
@*/
public void foo (int n) {
x = n;
y = y + x;
}
Figure 1.1: JML specification for a particular Java method.
/*@ public normal_behaviour
@ requires n > 0 && y > 0;
@ ensures x == n && y > x;
@*/
public void foo (int n) {
x = n;
y = y + x;
}
n > 0 ∧ y > 0→
〈x := n ; y := y + x; 〉 x = n ∧ y > x
Figure 1.2: Rough example of a DL proof obligation generated by KeY.
will show a simple example on how its sequent look like. Given a set of
formulae Γ, the sequent Γ ` 〈p〉φ holds if p, when starting in a state fulfilling
all formulae in Γ, terminates in a state fulfilling φ. In addition, due to the use
of symbolic execution, DL has to be extended by explicit substitutions, e.g.,
{x:=x*x}[y=x+20;y=y+1;] x > 0. While symbolically executing p, its effects are
gradually, starting from the front, turned into explicit substitutions. Thereby,
after some proof steps, a certain prefix of p has turned into a substitution
σ, representing the effects so far, while a remaining program p′ is yet to be
run. During the verification of p, an intermediate proof node may look like
Γ ` σ〈p′〉φ. Such a node tells us that, if Γ was true before the original program
p, and σ is the accumulated effect up to now, then φ will be true after the
execution of the remaining program p′.
1.2.3 Runtime Verification using Larva
In this thesis we also use the runtime verification tool Larva [46]. This tool
automatically generates a runtime monitor from a property written in the
automaton-based specification language DATE [45]. In order to do so, Larva
transforms the set of properties into monitoring code together with AspectJ
code, to link the system with the monitors.
Regarding DATE, it is a specification language to describe properties as
finite state automata. Transitions in this language are tagged with labels of the
form e | cond 7→ act, where e represents a system event (primarily either an
entry point e↓ or an exit point e↑ of a method), cond is a condition that must
be true in order for the transition to take place, and act is is a code snippet to
be performed when the transition is taken. Note that this description does not
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qstart
q′
bad
brew↓ | cups < limit 7→ skip
cleanF↓ | true 7→ skip brew↓ | true 7→ skip
brew↑ | true 7→ skip
Figure 1.3: A DATE controlling the brew of coffee
mention many of the features offered by DATE. We refer to [45] for a more
detailed introduction to this language.
Fig. 1.3 illustrates an example of DATE describing a property about the
system of a coffee machine. This DATE ensures that whenever the coffee
machine is not active (i.e., is not brewing coffee) and the method brew starts
the coffee brewing process, then it is not possible either to execute this method
again or to execute the method cleanF, which initialises the task of cleaning
the filter, until the current brewing process terminates.
1.3 Partial Proofs and the Power Behind Them
In general, whenever a verification attempt of a property fails, its proofs is
immediately discarded. However, having a partial proof, i.e., a proof which
is obtained from a failed verification attempt and does not fully verify the
property under scrutiny, can still be worthy.
Partial proofs are one of the most fundamental concepts for this thesis, as
they will be used as a means for combining static and dynamic verification.
Thanks to the use of partial proofs one can obtain significant results towards the
verification of software correctness, even from low effort verification attempts,
e.g., failing at automatically proving a property, and then not performing any
interactive step in an attempt to finish the proof. Most of the contributions of
this work are examples which can be used to justify this claim.
Below, we elaborate in more detail on the notion of partial proof, and the
power behind their use.
1.3.1 Partial Proofs
To elaborate on the notion of partial proof, let us consider a proof for the Java
DL sequent below, using the the sequent calculus which is part of the deductive
verifier KeY (see Sec. 1.2.2):
x > 0 ` 〈x=y;y=x+42;x=y-x;if(y>0){p1}else{p2};q〉φ (1.1)
(where p1, p2, and q are (sequences of) program statements and φ is some
postcondition). Sequent (1.1) says that in each state where x is positive, the
program provided in the modality will terminate, and result in a state where φ
holds.
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The proof for the sequent above would start by, in some of steps, turning
the three leading assignments into explicit substitutions, apply the first to
second one, apply the result of this substitution to the third, and then perform
some simplifications, arriving at
x > 0 ` (x← y ‖ y← y+42 ‖ x← y-x)〈if(y>0){p1}else{p2};q〉φ (1.2)
where (x ← y ‖ y ← y+42 ‖ x ← y-x) represents the explicit (parallel) sub-
stitution obtained as a result from the symbolic execution of the first three
statements. When clashes occurs in parallel substitutions, as it is the case for
x in (1.2), a ’right-win’ semantics is adopted in order to resolve them. Thereby,
sequent 1.2) is reduced to:
x > 0 ` (y← y+42 ‖ x← 42)〈if(y>0){p1}else{p2};q〉φ (1.3)
In general, most proofs branch over case distinctions, often triggered by Boolean
decisions in the source code. This branching occurs when applying rules like
the following, simplified,2 if rule:
if
Γ, σ(b) ` σ〈s1 ω〉φ Γ, σ(¬b) ` σ〈s2 ω〉φ
Γ ` σ〈if b s1 else s2 ω〉φ
In our example, applying the if rule to sequent (1.3) results in splitting the
proof into two branches, with the following sequents, respectively:
x > 0, (y← y+42 ‖ x← 42)(y>0) ` (y← y+42 ‖ x← 42)〈p1;q〉φ
x > 0, (y← y+42 ‖ x← 42)(¬(y>0)) ` (y← y+42 ‖ x← 42)〈p2;q〉φ
Applying the substitution on the left side of either sequent results in:
x > 0, (y+42)>0 ` (y← y+42 ‖ x← 42)〈p1;q〉φ (1.4)
x > 0,¬((y+42)>0) ` (y← y+42 ‖ x← 42)〈p2;q〉φ (1.5)
Once all proof branches are closed, i.e., they are verified, we have a complete
proof of the root sequent. However, a proof attempt may result into a proof
object where not all the branches are closed. We refer to this kind of proof
as a partial proof. In addition, we refer to the set of formulae in a sequent,
e.g., ’x > 0, (y+42)>0’ in sequent (1.4), as branch condition. In other words, a
branch condition is a set of formulae leading the proof to one of its branches.
1.3.2 Partial Proof Capabilities
In the example above, consider a partial proof where sequent (1.4) is fully
proved, but sequent (1.5) is only partially proved. From this partial proof, we
can conclude that the following modification of the root sequent (1.1) is valid:
x > 0, (y+42)>0 ` 〈x=y;y=x+42;x=y-x;if(y>0){p1}else{p2};q〉φ (1.6)
(We added (y+42)>0 to the left side of (1.1), as additional assumption). This
sequent can be proven by replaying the original proof, where now both branches
2The simplified rule assumes the absence of side effects or exceptions which might be
caused by b.
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would close. The path leading to the closed proof of sequent (1.4) replays
identically. In addition, sequent (1.5) now can be proved because the following
variant of sequent (6) is closed immediately, due to contradicting assumptions:
x > 0, (y+42)>0,¬((y+42)>0) ` (y← y+42 ‖ x← 42)〈p2;q〉φ
An interesting remark is that if we were using a perfect prover, i.e., a prover
that only returns false whenever the program under scrutiny does not fulfil
the property being analysed, then in sequent (1.6) the set of formulae ’x>0,
(y+42)>0’, would correspond to the weakest precondition of the program in the
modality. However, in an ordinary set up the prover may fail to close a proof
branch even if the sub-goal on that branch is valid. This may happen because
of, for instance, lack of ’proving power’, the strategies being used, or lack of
code annotations (e.g., loop invariants). Still, even if the proof attempt fails,
one can get close branches out of it. Thus, the branch condition of a closed
branch forms a sufficient precondition, which is not necessarily the weakest
precondition. Thereby, the true power behind partial proofs resides in the
possibility of finding sufficient preconditions by extracting branch conditions
from closed branches.
1.4 Combining Static and Dynamic Verification
Through Partial Proofs
Enhancing verification techniques by combining them with other verification
techniques is a practice that is getting more and more attention. In this work,
we are mainly interested in the combination of static and dynamic verification
techniques.
Combining static and dynamic verification techniques can allow the verifica-
tion process to deal with properties with a greater ease. For instance, instead
of possibly adding complicated abstractions to a property in order to statically
handle the result of a call to a procedure belonging to an external library, one
can attempt to verify such properties by using a dynamic verification technique
that directly checks the results of such procedure calls at runtime.
In addition, such combinations can introduce benefits regarding the verifi-
cation performance. For instance, by using static verification techniques one
can improve the performance of the dynamic ones by ignoring at runtime the
verification of all the properties which were proved correct statically.
1.4.1 Combining Static and Dynamic Verification Tech-
niques
There are several possible technique combinations which can be analysed. The
combination of testing and static verification techniques is one of the most
explored ones, e.g., [13, 19, 47, 57, 59, 77, 89]. Here, static verification can be
used, for instance, to limit the dynamic efforts by filtering test cases, or to
accomplish high coverage of the test cases.
Another possibility is the combination of runtime verification and static
verification techniques. For instance, in [30] a static verification technique
which reduces runtime instrumentation is used to improve the efficiency of
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runtime monitoring based on tracematches, and in [83] runtime verification
is integrated with static code analysis in order to generate monitors which
will allow to both check for possible faults in the system under scrutiny, and
eliminate false positives obtained statically.
In particular, in this work we pay special attention to the combination of
runtime verification and deductive verification, the combination of testing and
deductive verification, and the combination of testing and runtime verification.
For instance, before using runtime verification, one may attempt to prove some
of the properties in the specification of the SUT by using deductive verification.
Then, all the properties proved correct statically can be removed from the
specification. This would result in an improvement on the performance of
the runtime monitoring, as the monitor generated using runtime verification
would only focus on the properties which were not proved correct statically. In
addition, whenever a deductive verification proof attempt for a certain property
in the specification does not succeed, i.e., the proof is not close, one can use
testing to analyse why it was not possible to statically verify that property,
e.g., one can test whether a procedure is actually returning the result expected
in its specification. As result one may get hints towards finding either issues in
the code of the SUT, or issues in the specification.
1.4.2 Partial Proofs as a Means for Combining the Tech-
niques
The previously mentioned examples for combining verification techniques can
be extended by considering the use of partial proofs in the verification process.
If the deductive verification of a property results in a partial proof, then
one can extract sufficient preconditions from them and use their negation to
strengthen the properties. Then, in the case of the first example, one can
strengthen the properties in such a manner that the runtime monitor will verify
(at runtime) only the parts of the properties which were not proved correct
statically, instead of verifying the whole property (task which may be more
expensive to accomplish). Regarding the second example, one can strengthen
the properties in such a manner that the test cases will be focused only on
analysing the parts of the code in the SUT which do not comply with the
property in the specification.
In this work we study how one can use partial proofs as a means for the
combination of verification techniques. The ideas described above are, in fact,
two examples of combinations which we have explored. Below, we briefly
describe three results achieved as an outcome of this study. Note that we
elaborate on these results in the different chapters of this work.
Combining Static and Runtime Verification
This thesis has been mainly developed in the context of the research project
Unified Static and Runtime Verification of Object-Oriented Software, or StaR-
VOOrS for short. This project, which was funded by The Swedish Research
Council (Vetenskapsrdet), had as a main purpose the development of a method-
ology for specifying and verifying both data- and control-oriented properties of
object-oriented software systems, in a unified manner.
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As a starting point to address this objective, Ahrendt et al. proposed in [14]
a verification framework which combines the use of runtime verification with
deductive verification. In short,
(i) Low effort deductive verification is used to verify those parts of the
properties which may be confirmed statically;
(ii) the previous results, even if they are only partial, are used to refine the
original specification of the properties such that the monitors generated by
using runtime verification will not have to check at runtime the statically
verified parts of the properties.
Furthermore, [14] presents initial ideas about an automaton-based specification
language, called ppDATE, which captures both the description of control-
oriented and data-oriented properties. Basically, this language consists of a
transition system alike the DATE formalism, whose states may include Hoare
triples describing properties about the methods of the SUT.
One of the main contributions of this thesis consists in the full development
of the syntax (both abstract and concrete), the grammar, and the formal
semantics of ppDATE. Moreover, as a first approach on the use of the framework
described above, this thesis introduces the combination of the deductive verifier
KeY, and the runtime verifier Larva, in order to verify Java programs. Such
combination is accomplished with the implementation of a verification tool
which automatically combines the use both of the previous tools. Regarding
the use of partial proofs, they play a fundamental role in this work, as they
work as a means to combine KeY and Larva in a manner that the monitor
generated by Larva only has to check the parts of the properties which were
not statically verified by KeY. This reduces the overhead added to the system
by the monitors.
Combining Testing with Static and Runtime Verification
Test-driven development (TDD) [20] is a development technique where test
cases are used in order to guide the development of a system. Considering that
the properties of a system capture both data- and control-oriented aspects, the
use of TDD can be extended by including MBT (model-based testing) as part
of its workflow.
In this work we integrate the use of deductive and runtime verification into
the workflow of a testing focused development methodology based on TDD
and MBT, with the help of partial proofs. In particular, TDD is integrated
with deductive verification as an aid in the development of the data-oriented
aspects, whereas model-based testing is integrated with runtime verification as
an aid in the development of the control-oriented aspects.
As a result of such integration, the extended testing development methodol-
ogy features the benefits of TDD and model-based testing, but enhanced. For
instance, thanks to the use of deductive verification, one has an early detection
of bugs which may be missed by the traditional used of TDD. In addition,
thanks to the use of runtime verification, one can validate the overall system
with respect to the model.
Regarding the role of partial proofs in these combinations, they are used
to (automatically) generate test cases for the parts of the proofs which were
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not closed by performing deductive verification in the properties featured for
developing the system while considering data aspects. These test cases are
used to enhance the (traditional) application of TDD.
Combining Deductive Verification with Dynamic Verification
This works also contributes in the combination of verification techniques by
presenting a new methodology which uses partial proofs local to the transitions
of a provided model, in order to infer global trace conditions which impose
restrictions over the execution of the SUT.
Given a property associated to a state of the model, this methodology starts
by performing reachability analysis, i.e., analysing which transitions can be
taken to reach this state.
Next, the methods associated to the incoming transitions are used to stati-
cally verify that these transitions have the desired property as a postcondition.
This results in local (possibly) partial proofs for them.
Then, closed-path conditions are extracted from the partial proofs, and are
backwards propagated through the transitions of the model. Such conditions
guarantee that, if any of these transitions is taken, a system trace fulfilling
them will lead the system towards the desired state in the model, and the
provided property will hold when that state is reached. Therefore, closed-path
conditions come as a generalisation of the idea of weakest precondition for the
methods. These steps are repeated until the initial state is reached.
Finally, the property is backwards propagated to the initial state, together
with a system trace going from the initial state of the model to the desired
state, which is created using the results of the reachability analysis previously
performed, represent a trace condition for the system.
Applications for the use of trace conditions include (global) test case gener-
ation, state invariant verification, and runtime verification.
1.5 Perspectives
Section 1.4 presents different achievements of this work. Here, we discuss
possible manners in which one can move forward in the same direction.
It is true that considering the use of partial proofs in the verification process
has given us many interesting results. Still, one may wonder to what degree
the property is covered by such a proof. In the context of StaRVOOrS,
understanding such a coverage degree can give us a notion of the optimality
of the monitor generated by this tool. Regarding the inference of global trace
conditions, when using the trace conditions for testing, having some coverage
metrics can allow us to introduce the notion of, for instance, global trace
coverage, i.e., how much of the overall system is covered by the trace conditions.
To estimate how much of a property is covered by a partial proof, we consider
the possibility of integrating into our work the results obtained by Beckert et
al in [27]. That work introduces the notion of state space coverage for partial
proofs and uses it to compute an estimation of the percentage of a property
covered by a partial proof of it. In addition, the fact that these ideas were
implemented in a prototype tool which uses the same deductive verifier as we
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do in this thesis, i.e., KeY, makes this integration more appealing to extend
our work.
In addition, one can also focus on individual extensions. For instance, in the
case of StaRVOOrS, one can opt to extend the workflow of its framework by
integrating it with other verification techniques, e.g., testing, model checking.
Another possibility is extending the semantics of ppDATE by including the
use of timers on them. This would require to extend the semantics rules, and
to adapt the proof of correctness for the translation of ppDATEs to DATEs.
Regarding the proposed testing focus development technique, one can look
for systems developed using TDD and analyse them using our technique instead.
This can give us more experience on how to use our technique, and further
evidence on its benefits.
Regarding the inference of global trace conditions, as at the moment the
different tools used to develop our case studies are manually connected, imple-
menting a complete tool chain which automatically applies our methodology
would be a great step forward. This would make the use of our methodology
more appealing. In addition, one can elaborate in the analysis of the appli-
cations to fully explore the potential of the usage of our methodology. For
instance, one can expand the theory about coverage by proposing and analysing
global coverage methodologies. Moreover, one can perform experiments to
compare, in terms of coverage, how the test cases generated from global trace
conditions perform w.r.t. test cases generated with more standard testing
techniques. Finally, we consider the possibility of introducing code annotations
to modularise the inference of trace conditions. For instance, given a system
divided into several layers of application, if we already know some sufficient
preconditions for certain methods in a particular layer, we can annotate them
in the source code to lift those results to another layer. This can be of a great
aid to infer sufficient preconditions describing necessary conditions to go from
one layer of the system to another one.
1.6 Contributions of the Thesis
The contribuitions of this thesis have been disseminated in the following
documents: three peer reviewed conference papers [10,37,38], one peer reviewed
journal article [11], one user manual [5], and one technical report [36]. This
section presents a brief description of each one of these works, and outlines the
contributions of Mauricio Chimento in all of them.
Note that [11], [5], [38], and [36], correspond to the chapters 2, 3, 4, and
5 of this thesis, respectively. Regarding [10] and [37], as they are subsumed
by [11], we decided not to include them as part of this thesis. Anyhow, below
we describe the contributions of Mauricio Chimento in these works. In addition,
the format of all [5, 11, 38] were adapted to suit the required format for this
thesis, all their references were unified and moved to the bibliography of the
thesis, some typos were fixed, and some minor changes were introduced to
improve the readability of the text and to clarify some explanations (but
without affecting the contributions of the material that is already published).
1.6. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THESIS 17
A Specification Language for Static and Runtime Verification of
Data and Control Properties
Paper [10] presents the development and formalisation of a notation language,
called ppDATE, as an extension of the control-flow property language DATE,
which is used in the runtime verification tool Larva, and shows how speci-
fications written in this notation can be analysed both using the deductive
theorem prover KeY and the runtime verification tool Larva. In addition, by
using ppDATE to describe the corresponding specification, the StaRVOOrS
verification framework is applied to Mondex, an electronic purse application.
Statement of contribution: The contributions of Mauricio Chimento on this
paper are: (i) collaborating on the formalisation of the ppDATE notation to
describe the Hoare triples associated to the states of a ppDATE; (ii) formalising
the Hoare triples which are part of the ppDATE specification for the Mondex
case study; (iii) applying the StaRVOOrS verification framework to the
Mondex case study; and (iv) performing some experiments to analyse (and
compare) the overhead added to Mondex by the monitor generated using
StaRVOOrS, and by the monitor that would be generated without using
static verification to analyse the Hoare triples.
StaRVOOrS - A Tool for Combined Static and Runtime Verification
of Java
Paper [37] presents the tool StaRVOOrS, which aims at both the specification
and verification of properties by combining the use of runtime verification
and static verification. This tool is fed with a Java program and a ppDATE
specification of the program, and automatically generates a monitor in order
to runtime verify the provided program. In order to do so, StaRVOOrS
combines the deductive theorem prover KeY and the runtime verifier Larva.
In addition, the effectiveness of this tool is demonstrated by applying it to
Mondex, an electronic purse application.
Statement of contribution: The contributions of Mauricio Chimento on this
paper are: (i) a refinement of the original verification framework proposed
in [14]; (ii) full development and implementation of the tool StaRVOOrS; (iii)
and demonstrating the effectiveness of the tool by applying it to the Mondex
case study.
Verifying Data- and Control-Oriented Properties Combining Static
and Runtime Verification: Theory and Tools
The journal article [11], which corresponds to the second chapter of this thesis,
is an extension of the material presented in both [10] and [37]. In this paper,
ppDATE is introduced as a proper specification language, and not just a
simple notation. This is accomplished by introducing its syntax, grammar,
and formal semantics. In addition, in order to cover new features of the
ppDATE specification language, this paper introduces minor modifications
into the algorithm used to translate a ppDATE specification into a DATE
one, and provides the proof of correctness of such algorithm. Moreover, it
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demonstrates the advantages of using the StaRVOOrS tool in two case studies.
Statement of contribution: The contributions of Mauricio Chimento on this
paper are: (i) defining the syntax, the grammar (except the grammar of the
templates), and the semantics (except the semantics of actions) of ppDATE;
(ii) upgrading the translation algorithm to cover new features of the ppDATE
specification language; (iii) proving the correctness of the translation algorithm;
(iv) and using the StaRVOOrS tool to verify the SoftSlate case study. Note
that in (i), Mauricio Chimento proposed initial versions for the definitions,
and refined then with input from the co-authors. In addition, regarding
(iii), Mauricio Chimento developed the whole proof of correctness on his own.
However, some high level ideas related to the formalisation of the correctness
theorem and its proof, in particular the introduction of the coupling invariants,
were proposed by the co-authors.
StaRVOOrS User Manual (release 1.7)
The StaRVOOrS user manual (release 1.7) [5], which corresponds to the
third chapter of this thesis, gives a high level explanation about how the
StaRVOOrS tool works, provides an intuitive description of the ppDATE
specification language, shows how to write a ppDATE specification in the input
language of this tool by introducing its concrete grammar, and provides a
complete example on how to use the tool.
Statement of contribution: The contributions of Mauricio Chimento in this
work are: (i) the introduction of the concrete grammar to write ppDATE
specifications as a script, fact which is essential to use the tool; (ii) the
introduction of timers in ppDATE; (iii) the introduction of AspectJ features
in ppDATE, which allows the use of StaRVOOrS in the presence of active
objects.
Testing Meets Static and Runtime Verification
Paper [38], which corresponds to the fourth chapter of this thesis, introduces
a testing focused development methodology which is based on a combination
of test-driven development (TDD) and model-based testing. This technique
is enhanced by integrating static and runtime verification into its workflow.
In particular, TDD is integrated with (static) deductive verification, and
model-based testing is integrated with runtime verification. As a result of this
integration, the proposed methodology features the benefits of TDD and model-
based testing, but enhanced with better test coverage in the former, and a
validation analysis for the overall system with respect to the model in the latter.
Statement of contribution: Mauricio Chimento is the main author of this work.
His principal contributions to it are: (i) full analysis and development of a
testing focused development methodology combining TDD and model-based
testing; (ii) enhancement of this development technique by integrating deductive
and runtime verification on its workflow; and (iii) application of this technique
in all its extent to develop a concrete example consisting of a small bank system.
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Inferring Global Trace Conditions From Local Partial Proofs
The technical report [36], which corresponds to the fifth chapter of this thesis,
presents a methodology which uses the power of local (partial) proof attempts
to infer global trace conditions for a system. Given a model of the system, a
state of the model, and a property associated to this state, this methodology
is applied by following the next three stages: Reaching Transitions Analysis,
Backwards Reachability Tree Computation, and Trace Condition Inference. In
short, in the first stage one extracts information from the model about the
reachability of its states, i.e., which transitions can be taken to reach each
state. That information is used in the following stage, in addition to sufficient
preconditions extracted from (partial) deductive proofs local to the transitions
of the model, to compute a backwards reachability tree. This tree represents
the manners in which the sufficient preconditions are backwards propagated
through the transitions of the model. In addition, such preconditions guar-
antee that, if any of the transitions is taken, a system trace fulfilling them
will lead the system towards the desired state in the model, and the provided
property will hold when that state is reached. Therefore, sufficient precon-
ditions come as a generalisation of the idea of weakest precondition for the
methods. Finally, in the last stage the backwards reachability tree is analysed
to infer trace conditions for the system. Such trace conditions consists of a
property backwards propagated to the initial state through the transitions of
the model, together with a system trace going from the initial state of the
model to the provided state. Applications for the use of trace conditions in-
clude test case generation, runtime verification, and state invariants verification.
Statement of contribution: Mauricio Chimento is the single author of this
work. The contributions in this work are: (i) full development and analysis
of a new methodology for inferring trace conditions from local partial proofs;
(ii) proposing concrete applications for the use of the methodology; and (iii)
applying the methodology to two case studies. As a remark, some of the ideas
presented in this work evolved from discussions with Wolfgang Ahrendt. In
addition, Wolfgang Ahrendt provided valuable input to improve the presentation
of this work.
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CHAPTER
TWO
VERIFYING DATA- AND CONTROL-ORIENTED
PROPERTIES COMBINING STATIC AND
RUNTIME VERIFICATION: THEORY AND TOOLS
W. Ahrendt, J. M. Chimento, G. Pace, and G. Schneider
Abstract
Static verification techniques are used to analyse and prove properties about
programs before they are executed. Many of these techniques work directly
on the source code and are used to verify data-oriented properties over all
possible executions. The analysis is necessarily an over-approximation as the
real executions of the program are not available at analysis time. In contrast,
runtime verification techniques have been extensively used for control-oriented
properties, analysing the current execution path of the program in a fully
automatic manner. In this article, we present a novel approach in which data-
oriented and control-oriented properties may be stated in a single formalism
amenable to both static and dynamic verification techniques. The specification
language we present to achieve this that of ppDATE, which enhances the control-
oriented property language of DATE, with data-oriented pre/postconditions.
For runtime verification of ppDATE specifications, the language is translated
into DATE. We give a formal semantics to ppDATE, which we use to prove
the correctness of our translation from ppDATE to DATE. We show how
ppDATE specifications can be analysed using a combination of the deductive
theorem prover KeY and the runtime verification tool LARVA. Verification is
performed in two steps: KeY first partially proves the data-oriented part of the
specification, simplifying the specification which is then passed on to LARVA
to check at runtime for the remaining parts of the specification including the
control-oriented aspects. We show the applicability of our approach on two
case studies.
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2.1 Introduction
Runtime verification has been touted as a practical verification technique, and
although it does not provide program analysis before deployment, it can check
correct behaviour post-deployment by observing whether actual execution
paths at runtime conform to the specification. Runtime verification scales up
much more effectively than static analysis both in terms of performance and
in terms of applicability to diverse contexts in which a program may interact
with various other systems, services, and libraries.
Despite the fact that overheads induced by runtime verification might be
regarded as small when compared to the computational effort required for static
analysis, the fact that it is done while the software is live can be problematic
and prohibitive for certain systems. In this paper we present an approach to
address the issue of runtime overheads through the use of static, deductive
verification — an approach which also has the benefit of being able to verify
parts of the specification a priori for all potential execution paths, leaving only
parts which could not be proved before deployment to be checked dynamically.
Apart from the computational power required to perform the analysis,
deductive and runtime verification have largely been applied to disjoint areas
— whereas deductive analysis has been extensively used to verify properties
focusing on a system’s data, e.g., [9, 54,69,73], runtime verification has been
extensively used to verify control-flow properties with reasonable overheads
[24,35,45,79]. Combining the two approaches has the additional benefit that
static analysis might be more effective in proving the parts of a specification
which dynamic analysis might struggle most with. The challenge is thus to
design a specification language which allows the expression of combined data-
and control-flow properties in such a manner that they can be effectively
decomposed for the application of different verification techniques.
The StaRVOOrS framework [14] addresses these issues by identifying
a specification notation for such properties and a verification methodology
combining static and dynamic analysis to verify combined control- and data-
oriented properties. Although one may envisage different ways to combine
static and dynamic analysis tools, a crucial requirement is that the specification
languages used in the tools chosen are either identical, or can be somehow
combined to allow for rich specifications getting the best of both approaches.
Similar to mode automata [75] we have chosen to adopt an automata-based
specification language (for the control-flow properties) but extended with
data-flow properties encoded in the different states of the formalism.
This article is a significantly extended and revised version of two papers.
In [10] we introduced the formalism ppDATE, where parts of the syntax
where left underspecified, and we gave a high-level description of the algorithm
to translate ppDATE into DATE [45], the formalism used in the runtime
verification tool Larva [46]. In [37] we presented the tool StaRVOOrS, a full
implementation of the framework introduced in [10,14].
The novel contributions of this paper, going beyond the results reported
in [10] and [37] are the following: i) We present a complete formal definition of
ppDATE automata, including a formal semantics for the formalism (Sec. 2.5);
ii) A proof of soundness of the algorithm to translate from ppDATE spec-
ifications into DATE ones (Sec. 2.7). iii) The application of our approach
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to SoftSlate Commerce, an open-source Java shopping cart web application
(Sec. 2.9); iv) A description of the results of the case study including an analysis
of the verification process providing evidence that our approach reduces the
overhead of the runtime monitoring (Sec. 2.9).
Structure of the paper Sec. 2.2 provides background information regarding
the verification techniques used on this paper. Sec. 2.3 introduces informally
the specification language ppDATE. Sec. 2.4 introduces the StaRVOOrS
framework and provides a description of its workflow. Sec. 2.5 presents formally
the specification language ppDATE, and Sec. 2.6 provides its operational
semantics. Sec. 2.7 gives a translation algorithm from ppDATEs into DATEs,
and provides a proof of correctness. Sec. 2.8 presents a fully automated tool
which implements the StaRVOOrS framework. Sec. 2.9 and 2.10 discuss two
case studies which illustrate the benefits of using StaRVOOrS for verifying
software. Sec. 2.11 discusses related work. We conclude this paper in Sec. 2.12.
2.2 Preliminaries
The work presented in this article is centred around static and runtime veri-
fication of Java systems. To implement these verification techniques, we use
the deductive verifier KeY and the runtime verifier Larva. In this section, we
introduce these tools at a high level of abstraction, but with sufficient detail to
enable the understanding of the rest of the paper.
2.2.1 The deductive verifier KeY
KeY [9] is a deductive verification tool for data-centric functional correctness
properties of Java source code. KeY generates proof obligations in dynamic
logic (DL), a modal logic for reasoning about programs. DL extends first-order
logic with two modalities, 〈p〉φ and [p]φ, where p is a program and φ is another
DL formula. The formula 〈p〉φ is true in a state s if there exists a terminating
run of p, starting in s, resulting in a state where φ holds. The formula [p]φ
holds in a state s if all terminating runs of p, starting in s, result in a state in
which φ holds. For deterministic programs p, the only difference between the
two modalities is that termination is stated in 〈p〉φ, and assumed in [p]φ.
KeY features (static) verification of Java source code annotated with speci-
fications written in the Java Modelling Language (JML) [72]. JML allows for
the specification of pre- and postconditions of method calls, and class/interface
invariants. The main features of KeY are the translation of JML annotated Java
programs to Java DL, and a theorem prover for validity of Java DL formulae,
using a sequent calculus, covering almost all features of sequential Java (with
the exception of generics and floating-point types currently). Given a set of
formulae Γ, the sequent Γ ` 〈p〉φ holds if p, when starting in a state fulfilling all
formulae in Γ, terminates in a state fulfilling φ. The calculus uses the symbolic
execution paradigm. For that, DL is extended by explicit substitutions. During
the symbolic execution of p, the effects of p are gradually, starting from the
front, turned into explicit substitutions. Thereby, after some proof steps, a
certain prefix of p has turned into a substitution σ, representing the effects so
far, while a remaining program p′ is yet to be executed. While verifying p, an
intermediate proof node may look like Γ ` σ〈p′〉φ. It tells us that, if Γ was
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true before the original program p, and σ is the accumulated effect up to now,
then φ will be true after executing the remaining program p′.
As an example, consider a proof of the following DL sequent:
x > 0, y > 0 ` 〈x=x+y;y=x-y;x=x-y;if(x%2==0){p1}else{p2};q〉φ (2.1)
(where p1, p2, and q are Java fragments and φ is some postcondition). The
sequent says that in each state where x and y are positive, the program given
in the modality (which first swaps x and y using arithmetics) will terminate
and result in a state where φ holds. When proving this sequent, the KeY prover
will first, in a number of steps, turn the three leading assignments into explicit
substitutions, apply the first to the second, the result to the third, and perform
arithmetic simplification, arriving at
x > 0, y > 0 ` (x← x+y ‖ y← x ‖ x← y)〈if(x%2==0){p1}else{p2};q〉φ
where (x ← x+y ‖ y ← x ‖ x ← y) denotes the explicit (parallel) substitution
resulting from symbolic execution of the first three statements. A ‘right-win’
semantics is adopted to resolve clashes in substitutions, such that the above
simplifies to:
x > 0, y > 0 ` (y← x ‖ x← y)〈if(x%2==0){p1}else{p2};q〉φ
In general, most proofs branch over case distinctions, often triggered by Boolean
decisions in the source code. The branching happens by applying rules like the
following, simplified1 if rule:
if
Γ, σ(b) ` σ〈s1 ω〉φ Γ, σ(¬b) ` σ〈s2 ω〉φ
Γ ` σ〈if b s1 else s2 ω〉φ
In our example, applying the if rule to the latest sequent results in splitting
the proof into two branches, with the following sequents, respectively:
x > 0, y > 0, (y← x ‖ x← y)(x%2 = 0) ` (y← x ‖ x← y)〈p1;q〉φ
x > 0, y > 0, (y← x ‖ x← y)(¬(x%2 = 0)) ` (y← x ‖ x← y)〈p2;q〉φ
Applying the substitution on the left side of either sequent results in:
x > 0, y > 0, y%2 = 0 ` (y← x ‖ x← y)〈p1;q〉φ (2.2)
x > 0, y > 0, ¬(y%2 = 0) ` (y← x ‖ x← y)〈p2;q〉φ (2.3)
Note that in this step, by applying the swapping substitution, the branching
condition (x being even or odd) on the state after swapping got translated into
a condition on the prestate of the original program p, before the swapping. The
resulting sequents tell us, among other things, that if y is even (respectively
odd) in the prestate of p, then path p1 (respectively p2) is taken in the execution
of p. In general, when building a proof in such a symbolic manner, the left side
of sequents accumulate conditions on the original prestate through a particular
execution path.
1The simplified rule ignores side effects or exceptions possibly caused by b.
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Once all proof branches are closed, we have a complete proof of the root
sequent. However, a proof attempt may result in a partial proof, only, where
some proof branches are closed and others are not. Such partial proofs are
important for the work presented in this article. In the above example, consider
a partial proof where the left branch, i.e., the sub-proof for sequent (2.2), is
closed, whereas the right branch, i.e., the sub-proof for sequent (2.3), is not
closed. From this partial proof, we can conclude that the following modification
of the root sequent (2.1) is valid:
x > 0, y > 0, y%2 = 0 ` 〈x=x+y;y=x-y;x=x-y;if(x%2==0){p1}else{p2};q〉φ
(2.4)
(We added y%2 = 0 to the left side of (2.1), as additional assumption.) This
sequent can be proven by replaying the original proof, where now both branches
would close. The left branch closes as the sub-proof for (2.2) will replay
identically. The right branch closes because the following variant of (2.3) can
be closed immediately, due to contradicting assumptions:
x > 0, y > 0, y%2 = 0, ¬(y%2 = 0) ` (y← x ‖ x← y)〈p2;q〉φ
2.2.2 The runtime verifier Larva
Larva2 [46] is an automata-based runtime verification tool for Java programs.
As with many other runtime verifiers, Larva automatically generates a runtime
monitor from a property written in a formal language, in its case using Dynamic
Automata with Timers and Events (DATEs) [45]. Transitions in a DATE are
of the form: event | condition 7→ action, where event is what triggers the
transition, the condition is checked and must hold in order for the transition
to take place, and the action is a code snippet to be performed when taking
the transition (after checking the condition). DATEs are an extension of timed
automata — they are effectively finite state automata, whose transitions are
triggered by system events (primarily entry points f↓ and exit points f↑ of
methods) and timers, but augmented with: (i) A symbolic state which may
be used as conditions to guard transitions and can be modified via actions
also specified on the transition; (ii) replication of automata, through which
a new automaton is created for each discovered instance of an object; (iii)
communication between automata using standard CCS-like channels with c!
acting as a broadcast on channel c and which can be read by another automaton
matching on event c?. Full details of the formalisation of DATEs can be found
in [46].
The automata illustrated in Fig. 2.1 represent an example of DATE au-
tomata describing a property which should hold during a connection. The first
automaton ensures that if the connection drops (event connDrop↓) occurs five
times, a message is broadcast (over channel unreliable) to highlight the fact
that the connection port is unreliable. The second automaton (with the foreach
keyword) ensures that every time a file transfer is initiated, an automaton
is created to monitor that transfer. If during the transfer (i.e. between the
events start↓ and end↓) one receives event unreliable?, no further transfers
may occur.
2Logical Automata for Runtime Verification and Analysis.
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start
connDrop↓ | c == 5 7→ unreliable!
connDrop↓ | c < 5 7→ c++
foreach transfer :
start bad
start↓(transfer) | true 7→ unreliable? | true 7→
receive↓ | true 7→
end↓(transfer) | true 7→
receive↓ | true 7→
Figure 2.1: Example of a DATE specification.
In order to monitor a system using Larva, the user must provide the system
to be monitored (a Java program) and a set of properties in the form of a
Larva script (a textual representation of DATEs). Larva transforms the set of
properties into monitoring code together with AspectJ code to link the system
with the monitors. Since the Java byte code is used for instrumentation, it
is possible to monitor third-party software with Larva, though knowledge of
methods names is still required.
2.3 ppDATE: A Specification Language for Data- and
Control-oriented Properties
In many cases, verification tools perform more effectively on a particular style
of specification. In combining two different verification tools which use very
different analysis techniques, one challenge is that if we adopt an off-the-shelf
language, we cannot expect to derive useful verification results from both
tools. Given that deductive verification tools like KeY perform much better on
data-centric properties, while runtime verification tools like Larva perform
better on control-flow properties, we have defined a specification language to
combine the two types of properties. In real scenarios, there is often a need to
specify both, rich data constraints and legal execution sequences.
Data-oriented properties are typically written in expressive formalisms
(like first-order logic), but typically give invariants about specific points in
the execution of a system, rather than properties across traces of execution.
JML is one such language, which focuses primarily on pre/postconditions
of method calls and class invariants, but is not well suited for specifying
which sequences of events or states are correct. In contrast, control-oriented
specification languages specialise primarily on identifying legal sequences of
events or states, for instance using automata or temporal logics. Although
constraints about the data are possible, they are usually cumbersome and
greatly increase the computational complexity required to verify them. DATE
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is one such specification language.
Coding control-flow into data-centric languages, like coding legal execu-
tion traces via model/ghost fields in JML, or including data-flow information
in control-centric languages, like considering variable updates as events in
DATE specification, can lead to substantial increase in the complexity of the
specification from an understandability and/or verification perspective.
In order to address this, we propose ppDATE, a formalism to deal with both
types of properties ensuring understandability and tractability of analysis using
the StaRVOOrS verification framework. ppDATE [10] is an automata-based
formalism to specify both control- and data-oriented properties. ppDATEs
are basically transition systems with states and transitions between states.
Transitions are labelled by a trigger (tr), a condition (c), and an action (a).
Together, the label is written tr | c 7→ a. A transition is enabled to be taken
whenever its trigger is active and its condition holds. A trigger is activated
by the occurrence of either a visible system event such as the invocation or
termination of a method execution, or a ppDATE internal event generated by
certain actions labelling other transitions. If a transition is taken, we will say
that it fires. The conditions may depend on the values of system variables (i.e.,
variables of the system under scrutiny) and the values of ppDATE variables.
The latter can be modified via actions in the transitions. ppDATE states
represent the status of an observer of a system (rather than, directly, the status
of a system itself). Note that each state essentially represents the set of observed
system traces leading to that state. The language also offers parallelism on
the specification side, in the sense that different ppDATEs run in parallel,
possibly communicating which each other through events, and possibly creating
new ppDATEs on demand. This parallelism allows for a strong separation of
concerns in the specification.
In addition to the above, a particular feature of the ppDATE is that states
may be tagged with any number of Hoare triples, to specify the computation of a
method in a history-context sensitive way. For instance, assume that a ppDATE
state q is tagged with the Hoare triple {pi}foo{pi′}. This means that, if foo is
invoked after a system trace which led the observer to q, and if furthermore pi
holds at the time of the invocation, then pi′ should be satisfied upon termination
of this execution of foo. This allows for data-centric specification of individual
methods’ behaviour (Hoare triple), however in a control sensitive manner
(state).
Compared to usual automata based (or temporal logic based) specification
approaches, ppDATE is more expressive concerning the computation on data.
Compared to data-centric pre/post-specification (like, e.g., JML), ppDATE can
avoid the coding of some notion of status into additional data and additional
constraints in the pre/postconditions.
To write a ppDATE, a good approach may be to, first, define the control-
oriented properties, i.e., the automata. Next, one shall proceed to define the
different Hoare triples. Finally, one places the Hoare triples on the appropriate
states of the ppDATE.
Below, we provide a few examples of ppDATE specifications. On these
examples, tr↓ and tr↑ have the same meaning as it was explained above for
DATE.
Example 1. Let us consider a coffee machine system where after a certain
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q :
(i) {cups < limit} brew() {cups == \old(cups)+1}
(ii) {true} cleanF() {cups == 0}start
q′ :
(iii) {cups < limit} brew() {cups == \old(cups)}
(iv) {true} cleanF() {cups == \old(cups)}
bad
t1 : brew
↓ | cups < limit 7→ skip
t4 : cleanF
↓ | true 7→ skip t3 : brew↓ | true 7→ skip
t2 : brew
↑ | true 7→ skip
Figure 2.2: A ppDATE controlling the brew of coffee
amount of coffee cups are brewed, its filters have to be cleaned. If the limit of
coffee cups is reached, the machine should not be able to brew any more coffee.
In addition, while the coffee machine is active (a coffee cup is being brewed), it
is not possible to start brewing another coffee, or to clean the filters.
Fig. 2.2 illustrates a ppDATE describing this part of the system. In other
words, whenever the coffee machine is not active, i.e., the machine is not
brewing a cup of coffee, and the method brew starts the coffee brewing process,
then it is not possible either to execute this method again, or to execute the
method cleanF (which initialises the task of cleaning the filter), until the
initialised brewing process finishes.
The previous property can be interpreted as follows: initially being in state
q, state which represents that the coffee machine is not active, whenever method
brew is invoked and it is possible to brew a cup of coffee (i.e., the limit of coffee
cups was not reached yet), then transition t1 shifts the ppDATE from state
q to state q′. While in q′, state which represents that the coffee machine is
active, if either method brew or method cleanF are invoked, then transitions
t3 or transition t4 shift the ppDATE to state bad, respectively. This indicates
that the property was violated. On the contrary, if method brew terminates
its execution, then transition t2 shifts the ppDATE from state q
′ to state q.
Note that the names used on the transitions, e.g. t1, t2, etc, are not part of
the specification language. They are included to simplify the description of
how the ppDATE works.
In addition to this, the Hoare triples in state q ensure the properties: (i) if
the amount of brewed coffee cups has not reached its limit yet, then a coffee
cup is brewed; (ii) cleaning the filters sets the amount of brewed coffee cups
to 0. Property (i) has to be verified if, while the ppDATE is on state q, the
method brew is executed and its precondition holds. A similar situation stands
for the property (ii) with respect to the method cleanF. Regarding state q′,
the Hoare triples in this state ensure the properties: (iii) no coffee cups are
brewed; (iv) filters are not cleaned. Property (iii) and (iv) are verified if either
method brew and method cleanF are executed, and their preconditions hold,
respectively. Here, remember that this state represents that the coffee machine
is active. Thus, if it occurs that either the method brew or the method cleanF
are executed while the ppDATE is on this state, then, as this would move
the ppDATE to state bad, one would expect the value of the variable cup to
remain unchanged. This is precisely what is verified when either property (iii)
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qstart
q′ :
(i) {true} fileTransfer(f) {bytes == \old(bytes) + size(f)}
(ii) {write ∈ rights(f)} rename(f,n) {name(f) == n}
bad
login↑ | sessionIsOpen() 7→ c = 0
transferFile↓ | c > 10 7→ skip
transferFile↓ | c ≤ 10 7→ c++
logout↓ | true 7→ skip
Figure 2.3: A ppDATE limiting file transfers
or (iv) are analysed.
Note that none of the Hoare triples makes reference to the state of the
coffee machine, i.e. there is no information about whether the machine is
active or not. This is due to fact that the state of the machine is implicitly
defined by the states of the ppDATE. If the ppDATE is in state q, the coffee
machine is not active. However, if it is in state q′, then the machine is active.
Therefore, it is possible to assume that on each state the Hoare triples are
context dependent and thus contain such information. This is the reason
why, we can describe properties with the same precondition, but with different
postconditions depending on the state of the ppDATE in which they are placed.
Example 2. In this example let us consider a file system where only 10 file
transfers can be performed between a log in and log out of a user.
Fig. 2.3 illustrates a ppDATE describing part of the behaviour of this
system. This ppDATE ensures the property: no more than 10 file transfers
take place in a single login session. In other words, once a user logs in the system
(login), she can only perform 10 file transfers (transferFile) before logging
out (logout). This fact is tracked using the ppDATE variable c. This variable
keeps count of the number of files transferred in a single session. Whenever a
user logs in, the ppDATE moves to state q′ and c is set to 0 (zero). While in
q′, this variable is increased by one every time a file transfer is performed. If
at some point the user transfers a file but the value of c is bigger than 10, then
the ppDATE moves to state bad, i.e., the property was violated.
In addition to this, the Hoare triples in state q′ ensure the properties: (i) the
number of bytes transferred increases when a file transfer is done; (ii) renaming
a file works as expected if the user has the sufficient rights.
2.4 The StaRVOOrS Framework
The StaRVOOrS framework (Static and Runtime Verification of Object-
Oriented Software), originally proposed in [14], combines the use of the de-
ductive source code verifier KeY [9] with that of the runtime monitoring tool
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Figure 2.4: High-level description of the StaRVOOrS framework workflow
Larva [46], to analyse and monitor systems with respect to a ppDATE spec-
ification. Note that the definition of the specification language ppDATE,
which enables the effective combination of the results from the two verification
approaches, is a major contribution of StaRVOOrS. ppDATE allows our
framework to naturally address the intrinsic differences between the verification
tools — whereas one typically verifies data-centric properties in deductive
verifiers like KeY, one typically focuses on control-flow properties using runtime
verifiers like Larva.
The abstract workflow of the use of StaRVOOrS is given in Fig. 2.4. This
workflow is applied fully automatically in four consecutive stages: Deductive
Verification, Specification Refinement, Translation and Instrumentation, and
Monitor Generation.
In the Deductive Verification stage, given a Java program P and a
ppDATE specification S, the module Pre/post-Condition Generator transforms
all the Hoare triples—assigned to the various states of S—into JML contracts,
which are textually added to P as annotations of the respective methods. In
this step, the association of pre/postcondition pairs to ppDATE states in
S is lost, which is intentional and natural. Note that each ppDATE state
represents the set of event histories leading to that state. The deductive verifier,
however, offers analysis of the effect of methods in terms of system data, and
has no notion of the history of events preceding a method call.3 Once all JML
contracts are generated, the Deductive Verifier module uses KeY in an attempt
to statically verify each of them. The result is either a complete proof, or a
partial proof where some branches are closed and others are not (see Sec. 2.2.1),
or an entirely open proof, where no branches are closed. In our setting, partial
proofs are the most common case. One reason is that we use KeY only fully
automatically, not employing its interactive features. Also, we do not assume
users to provide loop invariants, or similar annotations which support the
prover. Finally, KeY has no knowledge of the context (ppDATE state) in which
the Hoare triple at hand should hold. To illustrate this point, consider the
Hoare triples (i) and (iii) from our (deliberately primitive) example in Fig. 2.2.
The implementation of brew() is given by:
3There exist approaches to deductive verification which are history-aware, including a
KeY version for the compositional verification of distributed systems [12]. These approaches
are however much more heavyweight, both in terms of specification as well as verification,
than what we are aiming at in this work. The same holds for approaches based on refinement.
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public void brew() {
if (!active && cups < limit)
cups++;
}
KeY will produce partial proofs for these Hoare triples because the specification
does not provide any information on how q and q′ relate to the field active. In
general, the missing information can be an arbitrary condition on the system
state, more than just a Boolean as is the case here.
In the Specification Refinement stage,4 the Partial Specification Eval-
uation module evaluates the results produced by KeY in order to refine S.
This refinement is performed in two steps. In the first step, all fully verified
Hoare triples are deleted, resulting in a ppDATE S’. Any Hoare triple related
to a contract which is not fully verified by KeY is left in the states of S’ to
be verified at runtime. In the second step, S’ is refined into a ppDATE S”
by strengthening the preconditions of those Hoare triples in S’ which were
partially verified by KeY. For that, the partial KeY proofs are analysed, to
extract branch conditions corresponding to the closed branches of the proof.
In the example in Sec. 2.2.1, that ‘closed branch condition’ is y%2 = 0 in
sequent (2.4). Note again that the branch condition is a condition on the
prestate of the code being verified. Let us abbreviate the ‘closed branch(es)
condition’ as cbc for now. A Hoare triple {pi}foo{pi′} that was partially verified
by KeY is clearly equivalent to having two Hoare triples {pi ∧ cbc}foo{pi′} and
{pi ∧ ¬cbc}foo{pi′}. However, as we know that the first one is valid (by the
proof replay argument from Sec. 2.2.1), only the second one needs to be checked
at runtime. For this reason, every Hoare triple {pi}foo{pi′} in S’ that was
partially verified by KeY is replaced by {pi ∧ ¬cbc}foo{pi′}, resulting in S”.
At runtime, checking such an optimised Hoare triple is trivial whenever pi is
false or cbc is true, as the postcondition does not need to be checked then.
For instance, analysis of the partial proof of Hoare triple (i) in Fig. 2.2 will
result in the closed branch condition ¬active. Therefore, (i) is replaced by
{cups < limit ∧ active} brew() {cups == \old(cups)+1} (we simplified
away double negation). Note that, in cases where the history context, i.e.,
ppDATE state, is the only information that was missing to close a partial
proof, cbc actually represents a refinement of the according ppDATE state to a
condition on internal system data, which will always be true when foo is called
in that state. We can remark already here that this is the phenomenon which
made the monitoring speedup particularly dramatic in the Mondex case study,
see Sec. 2.10.
In the Translation and Instrumentation stage, the Specification Trans-
lation module translates S” into an equivalent specification in DATE format
(D), which can be used by the runtime verifier Larva (see the next stage). The
most significant change of this translation is that the Hoare triples are trans-
lated away, using notions native to DATE (see Sec. 2.7.2). This change also
requires to instrument P, through the Code Instrumentation module, in order to
(i) distinguish between different executions of the same code unit, and to (ii)
evaluate Hoare triples in the states of S” at runtime. Regarding (i), method
declarations get a new argument which is used as a counter for invocations
4For readability, we use ∧ and ¬ in this paragraph, instead of the ppDATE syntax &&
and !.
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of this method. Regarding (ii), not every condition in a pre/postcondition
of a Hoare triple can be directly written as a Java Boolean Expression, e.g.,
quantified expressions. Thus, methods which operationalise the evaluation of
those conditions are added to P.
Finally, in the Monitor Generation stage, the instrumented version of P
(P’) and the DATE specification D are used by the Runtime Verifier module to
generate a monitor M. For this, Larva generates M from D by using aspect-
oriented programming techniques to capture relevant system events. Such
events allow to link P’ with M. Later, once deployed, M and P’ are executed
together. If M identifies any violation at runtime, it will report an error trace
for further analysis.
2.5 Formal Definition of ppDATEs
2.5.1 Notation
We will use the following notation to write quantified formulae, based on the
notation used by Gries [61].
∀ x ·R(x) ·B(x)
∃ x ·R(x) ·B(x)
These formulae mean “for all x satisfying R, B is fulfilled” and “there exists x
satisfying R for which B is fulfilled”, respectively. Both R and B are formulae
potentially containing x as a free variable. We will refer to R and B as the
range and body of the quantified formula, respectively. This notation relates to
standard (un-ranged) quantified formulae in the following way:
∀ x ·R(x) ·B(x) ≡ ∀ x · (R(x)→ B(x))
∃ x ·R(x) ·B(x) ≡ ∃ x · (R(x) ∧B(x))
2.5.2 ppDATE
In this section we formally define the notion of ppDATE previously introduced
in Sec. 2.3. In order to do so, we first introduce formal definitions for triggers,
conditions and actions.
Definition 1. Given a set of method names Σ, the syntactic category of
triggers is defined as follows:
trigger ::= systemtrigger
| actevent?
systemtrigger ::= methodname↓ | methodname↑
where methodname ∈ Σ.
In the previous definition, systemtrigger matches a visible system event,
such as the point of entry into a method or the termination of a method
execution. Given a method name σ ∈ Σ, σ↓ represents entering method σ and
σ↑ represents the termination of the execution of σ.
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In addition, actevent represents an event generated by the execution of an
action in a transition of a ppDATE, which we will call action events. This kind
of events can only be generated by bang (“!”) actions (see Def. 2). An action
h! generates the action event h, which in the next step can activate the trigger
h?. This way, action events enable communication among ppDATEs, where h!
and h? mean sending and receiving a message, respectively.
As we have mentioned before, whenever a transition is fired an action can
be executed. The following shows the definition of actions.
Definition 2. Actions are syntactically defined as follows:
action ::= skip
| v = e
| actevent!
| create(template, args)
| action ; action
| if condSys∪V then action
| Program
skip is the effect-less action. The ‘=’ is an assignment operator, v is a
ppDATE variable and e is a (side-effect free) expression that may depend on
system variables and ppDATE variables; actevent! represents the generation
of action event actevent; create represents the creation of a ppDATE, where
template is a ppDATE template to be instantiated (see Def. 8), and args are
the values which the formal parameters of template are instantiated with; the
‘;’ is the sequence operator for actions; if-then is a conditional whose branching
condition depends on the valuations of system variables (Sys) and ppDATE
variables (V ); and Program represents a side-effect free program (see Def. 3),
i.e., it is restricted to not have any effect on the system which could in turn be
observed by the (ppDATE generated) monitor. For instance, a Program could
perform logging of system/monitor behaviour. More powerful Programs, which
would for instance allow error recovery, are relevant, but left for future work.
Definition 3. A side-effect free program has the properties that
 its execution always terminates,
 the method calls on its body do not generate any observable system
event,
 it does not interfere with the system under scrutiny, i.e., it does not
modify the values of system variables.
Boolean expressions are used in different contexts: (i) conditions (c) of
transitions; (ii) conditions of if-then actions, and (iii) pre- and postconditions
(pi, pi′) in Hoare triples. As a syntactic category for such Boolean expressions,
we chose Boolean JML expressions. They extend Boolean Java expressions,
and thereby allow Java methods as sub-expressions (like in ‘m.get(k) ==
o’). Additional features of Boolean JML expressions include universal and
existential quantification, which are frequently used in Hoare triples, the ability
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to refer in a postcondition to a) the return value (with ‘\result’), and b) the
preexecution value of an expression (like in ‘x == \old(x + y)’).
Definition 4. Boolean JML expressions (BJMLE) are recursively defined as
follows:
 any side-effect free Boolean Java expression is a BJMLE,
 if a and b are BJMLEs, and x is a variable of type t, the following
expressions are BJMLEs:
– !a, a&&b, and a||b
– a ==> b (“a implies b”)
– a <==> b (“a is equivalent to b”)
– (\forall t x; a)
(“for all x of type t, a holds”)
– (\exists t x; a)
(“there exists x of type t such that a”)
– (\forall t x; a; b)
(“for all x of type t fulfilling a, b holds”)
– (\exists t x; a; b)
(“there exists an x of type t fulfilling a,
such that b”)
 replacing any sub-expression e in a BJMLE with \old(e) gives a BJMLE,
 replacing any sub-expression in a BJMLE with \result gives a BJMLE,
(well-typedness is context dependent, see Def.5)
We do not give a formal definition of the semantics of BJMLE here, just
the following comments. The meaning of negation, conjunction, disjunction,
implication, and equivalence are standard. The same is true for the first two
forms of quantification. Concerning the other two forms, “. . . a; b)”, they
relate to standard quantification in exactly the same way as was explained in
Sec. 2.5.1. (The only difference is that there we discussed meta-level notation,
whereas BJMLE is part of ppDATE.) The constructs \old and \result are
only allowed in postconditions of Hoare-triples (i.e., in pi′). \result refers
to the return value of a (non-void) method. \old allows to evaluate sub-
expressions not in the post-state (which is the default), but in the prestate of
a method’s execution. For instance, ‘x == \old(x + y)’ in a postcondition of
method m says that the difference between the values of x before and after the
execution of m is the value which y had before m’s execution.
In order to allow or disallow \old and \result, in the following, we provide
one syntactic category for postconditions, and one for all other conditions.
Definition 5. The syntactic category of postconditions over variables in Var,
postcondVar, is given by Boolean JML expressions over Var. (Well-typedness of
postconditions is context dependent, assuming that \result has the same type
as the specified method.) The syntactic category condVar is given by Boolean
JML expressions over Var containing neither \result nor \old.
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Now we can formally define ppDATE. As a ppDATE describes properties
about a particular system, we assume that every time we make reference to the
set of system variables, these variables belong to the system under scrutiny.
Definition 6. Given a set of system variables Sys and a set of ppDATE
variables V , a ppDATE m is a tuple (Q, t,B, q0,Π) such that:
 Q is the finite set of states.
 t is the transition relation among states in Q, where each transition is
tagged with (i) a trigger; (ii) a condition; (iii) an action which may change
the valuation of ppDATE variables: t ⊆ Q × trigger × condSys∪V ×
action×Q.
 B ⊆ Q is the set of bad states.
 q0 ∈ Q is the initial state.
 Π is a function which tags each state of m with Hoare triples for particular
method names in Σ: Π ∈ Q −→ P(condSys × Σ× postcondSys).
We will write q
tr|c 7→a−−−−→m q′ to mean that, given a ppDATE m whose transition
relation is t, (q, tr, c, a, q′) ∈ t. The subscript m is omitted if it is clear from
the context. In addition, we will use the usual Hoare triple notation {pi}σ {pi′}
∈ Π(q) to denote (pi, σ, pi′) ∈ Π(q).
Example 3. Consider once again, the ppDATE shown in Fig. 3.1. It can be
formalised as follows: m = (Q, t,B, q0,Π), where,
 Q = {q, q′, bad },
 V = {c},
 Σ = {fileTransfer, login, logout},
 B = {bad },
 q0 = q.
Furthermore, the transition relation t consists of four elements, including:
q′
fileTransfer↓|c≤107→c++−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ q′ and q′ fileTransfer
↓|c>107→skip−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ bad . In addition,
relation Π is defined as follows:
Π(q) = { {true} fileTransfer(f) {bytes == \old(bytes)} }
Π(q′) = { {true} fileTransfer(f) {bytes == \old(bytes) + size(f)},
{write ∈ rights(f)} rename(f,n) {name(f) == n} }
In addition to ppDATEs which exist up-front, and ‘run’ from the beginning
of a system’s execution, new ppDATEs can be created by existing ones. For
instance, one may want to create a separate ‘observer’ for each new user logged
into a system. For that, one needs to be able to define parameterised ppDATEs,
which we call templates, and allow ppDATEs to create new instantiations of
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templates. Given a ppDATE m, the creation of a new ppDATE, which will
run in parallel to m, can be achieved by using action create on a transition
of m. This action receives as arguments a ppDATE template describing the
ppDATE to be created and a list of arguments to instantiate the quantified
variables on the template. Below, we formally define ppDATE templates.
Definition 7. ppDATE templates of order n are recursively defined as follows:
 The set of ppDATE templates of order 0 is exactly the set of ppDATEs.
 Assume C is a syntactic sub-category of ppDATE (Def. 6), i.e., a syn-
tactic (sub-)category of Q, t,B, q0, or Π, respectively. If m is a ppDATE
template of order n, then λX:C.m′ is a ppDATE template of order n+ 1,
where m′ is the result of replacing, in m, some (sub-)term trm of category
C by X. We call X the template variable of λX:C.m′.
In the above definition, a template of order n+ 1 is defined by ‘abstracting’
over templates of order n, annotating the abstracted ‘hole’ X by the right
category, such that template instantiation (see below) can be guaranteed to
result in a well-typed ppDATE. When constructing a ppDATE template, the
choice of trm in Def. 7 does not matter. Its only role is to carry well-typedness
of ppDATEs over to ppDATE templates. Informally, the above definition says
that, within λX :C.m′, the X can appear anywhere in m′ where a term of
category C is expected.
We will refer to ppDATE templates without referring to an order to mean
templates that are not of order greater than 0. Formally:
Definition 8. The set of ppDATE templates Tppd, is defined as the union of
ppDATE templates of order n ≥ 1.
If X is a vector of template variables X1, . . . , Xn and C is a vector of
syntactic categories C1, . . . , Cn, then we can write λX :C.m to mean λX1 :
C1 . . . λXn:Cn.m.
Finally, we define what it means to instantiate a ppDATE template:
Definition 9. Given a term trm of syntactic category C, the instantiation of
a ppDATE template with term trm, denoted inst(m, trm), is defined by:
inst(λX:C.m, trm) = m[X/trm]
where m[X/trm] denotes the result of substituting all occurrences of X in m
by trm.
We can expand template instantiation to multiple arguments in the following
way. Given n ≥ 2, assume X = X1, . . . , Xn, and C = C1, . . . , Cn, and
trm = trm1, . . . , trmn (with trmi ∈ Ci). We extend the instantiation function
inst to an arbitrary number of arguments in the following way:
inst(λX:C.m, trm)
= (by syntactic convention)
inst(λX1:C1 . . . λXn:Cn.m, trm1, . . . , trmn)
df
=
inst(inst(λX1:C1 . . . λXn:Cn.m, trm1), trm2, . . . , trmn)
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one-at-a-time = λ C, S : cond, trigger.
qstart
q′
bad
S↓ | C 7→ skip
S↓ | true 7→ skip
S↑ | true 7→ skip
Figure 2.5: ppDATE template example.
inst(one-at-a-time, cups < limit, brew) =
qstart
q′
bad
brew↓ | cups < limit 7→ skip
brew↓ | true 7→ skip
brew↑ | true 7→ skip
Figure 2.6: ppDATE created using the template illustrated in Fig. 2.5.
Example 4. Fig.2.5 illustrates a ppDATE template, based on the ppDATE
depicted in Fig. 2.2. Let us call it one-at-a-time. This template has two param-
eters: C, which represents a condition, and S, which represents a method name.
Then, by executing the action create(one-at-a-time, cups < limit, brew↓), it
would instantiate the ppDATE depicted in Fig.2.6, i.e., C is instantiated with
cups < limit and S is instantiated with brew. This ppDATE specifies the
property: it is not possible to brew one more coffee cup until the brewing process
is done.
In the rest of this work we will only consider the use of deterministic
ppDATEs. Formally:
Definition 10. We say that a ppDATE m is deterministic if, for any two
transitions of m with same trigger tr which go from a state q to a different
state, their conditions are mutually exclusive:
∀ tr, c, c′, a, a′, q, q′, q′′·
q
tr|c7→a−−−−→m q′ and q tr|c
′ 7→a′−−−−−→m q′′ · not(c and c′)
In addition, although determinism on the Hoare triples’ preconditions is
not problematic in itself, we choose to extend the determinism condition to
ensure that any two Hoare triples in a single state over the same function have
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disjoint precondition so as to have a more effective monitoring algorithm of
these triples: for any {pi1}σ {pi′1} and {pi2}σ {pi′2} in Π(q), not(pi1 and pi2).
After having defined (individual) ppDATEs, we can now define a network
of ppDATEs.
Definition 11. Given a set of system variables Sys, a ppDATE network pn is
represented with a tuple (M,V, ν0, Tppd):
 M is a set of ppDATEs. If m ∈M , then we say that m = (Qm, tm, Bm,
q0m,Πm).
 V is a set of ppDATE variables.
 ν0 is the initial valuation5 of variables in V .
 Tppd is a set of ppDATE templates.
Note that on a network, whenever a trigger is activated, several ppDATEs
can have an enabled transition ready to be fired, i.e., a transition whose trigger
is active and whose condition holds. Whenever this happens all these enabled
transitions are fired in parallel. Also note that the set of ppDATE variables V
is global to the network of ppDATEs, rather than local to individual ppDATEs.
Thereby, V is effectively the ‘shared memory’ of the network.
Finally, we extend the notion of deterministic ppDATE to a ppDATE
network.
Definition 12. A ppDATE network pn = (M,V, ν0, Tppd) is deterministic
whenever every ppDATE in M is deterministic and every ppDATE which can
be created when executing action create is deterministic.
2.6 ppDATE semantics
In this section we present the semantics of a network of ppDATEs by introducing
Structural Operational Semantics (SOS) rules. These rules will show how a
global configuration is shifted to a new one by considering events and system
variables valuations in a system trace.
Informally, a global configuration (L, ν) (of a ppDATE network) consists of
a set L of local configurations (one for each ppDATE in the set of ppDATEs of
the network and one for each generated instance of a ppDATE template), and
a valuation ν of the set of ppDATE variables V (associated to the ppDATE
network). The local configurations store the current state, and record, for each
ongoing method execution whose precondition was fulfilled at call time, the
postcondition to be checked on exit.
Every time the system under scrutiny generates an event, e.g., by entering
or leaving a method, all local configurations in L with enabled transitions will
replace their current state value by the state indicated in the fired transition,
and execute the action of this transition, all simultaneously. For instance, given
a ppDATE m whose current state is q, and with a transition t1 of the form
5A valuation is a mapping from variables to values of adequate types.
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q
tr|c 7→a−−−−→m q′, when a system event triggers tr (and condition c holds), then t1
is fired, state q is replaced by q′ in the appropriate local configuration in L, and
a is executed. If the executed actions contain ppDATE variables assignments,
the valuation ν is updated. In addition, any action event generated by these
executions will be stored in a buffer.
Once all the previous enabled transitions are fired, every transition that
becomes enabled by the events in the buffer will be fired as well. For instance,
let us assume that action a in transition t1 (only) generates the action event
h, i.e., a = h!, and that a ppDATE m′ running in parallel to m is in state q′′,
and has a transition t2 of the form q
′′ h?|true7→a′−−−−−−−→m′ q′′′. Then, whenever t1 is
fired, execution of h! will add to the buffer an event which will enable t2, due
to the fact that trigger h? is activated by h and its condition (trivially) holds.
Therefore, after firing t1, t2 will be also fired.
Note that the buffer will be emptied before firing the transitions enabled
by the events consumed from the buffer. Therefore, the buffer only contains
events generated by the recent action executions, and no events from previous
ones. This procedure is repeated until no new action event is generated, i.e.,
the buffer is empty. In general, the process may not terminate, however if
we want to guarantee termination, we can adopt an approach which ensures
that there is no transitive mutual communication dependencies over the set of
automata as explained in the original semantics of Larva [45].
The rest of this section goes as follows: Sec. 2.6.1 and Sec. 2.6.2 introduce
necessary ground concepts for defining the semantics of ppDATE. Sec. 2.6.3
presents denotational semantics for the actions in the transitions of ppDATE.
Sec. 2.6.4 introduces structural operational semantics for ppDATE. Finally,
Sec. 2.6.5 introduces the notion of valid, and violating, trace.
2.6.1 Events, Valuations, and Traces
ppDATE networks describe which system behaviours are allowed, and which
are not. Here, we consider as behaviour basically a series of system events,
where each event also comes with a ‘snapshot’ of the values of (visible) system
variables, taken at the time where the event occurs. Formally, these snapshots
are valuations, i.e., mappings from variables to values (of adequate types).
Apart from the observed system, the ppDATE networks themselves may create
new events.
An event may therefore either be a system event (i.e., generated by the
system under scrutiny due to entering or leaving a method) or an action event
(i.e., generated by the execution of an action ! in a ppDATE transition).
Formally:
Definition 13. Given a set of method names Σ, the syntactic category of
events is defined as follows:
ξ ::= systemevent | actevent
systemevent ::= systemtriggerN
A systemevent consists of a systemtrigger which is indexed with a natural
number representing the nth execution of the method associated to the trigger.
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Such an index will be considered an identifier6 unique to each execution of the
method.
We distinguish the set of system variables valuations ΘSys, with typical
element θ, and the set of ppDATE variable valuations N , with typical element ν.
We represent valuations both as functions and (functional) relations7, i.e., sets
of pairs. This means that the notation β(v) = val is equivalent to the notation
(v, val) ∈ β. The union of valuations is therefore a set union such that, for any
two valuations β and β′, β ∪ β′ = {(v, val) | (v, val) ∈ β or (v, val) ∈ β′}. In
the presentation of examples, we limit the valuations to those variables which
matter for the example at hand, for simplicity.
In our semantic rules, we will use union over valuations only when the
domain of valuations do not overlap, as for instance in θ∪ν. Another operation
on valuations is the modification of a valuation β at variable x by value val,
written β[x← val]. It is defined as:
β[x← val](v) =
{
val iff v = x
β(v) otherwise
Given a set of variables S, a valuation β for S, and condition c ∈ condS ,
we will write β |= c to denote that c is satisfied by β. This is however
not sufficient for postconditions as they can refer to two valuations, after
and before (“\old”) a method’s execution. For that, |= will be overloaded.
Given a set of system variables Sys, valuations θ and θ′, and a postcondition
c ∈ postcondSys, we will write θ, θ′ |= c to denote that c is satisfied by θ and
θ′. When this is used, θ′ will be the current valuation of Sys when exiting
a certain method execution, whereas θ holds the valuation from before that
method execution. We only sketch the definition of |= here as it follows the
standard of first-order logic semantics. We use the two semantic truth values
T and F . For c ∈ condS , we define β |= c iff evalβ(c) = T , where evalβ is
recursively defined over the structure of c as standard in first-order logic8,
with the base case evalβ(x) = β(x) for variables x. For c ∈ postcondSys, we
define θ, θ′ |= c iff evalθ,θ′(c) = T . The definition of evalθ,θ′ is almost identical
to the definition evalβ , with the base case evalθ,θ′(x) = θ
′(x) for program
variables x. The only case in the definition where the pre-valuation θ matters is
the evaluation of \old-expressions: evalθ,θ′(\old(e)) = evalθ(e). This means
that, in postconditions, the post-valuation θ′ acts as the default, however not
inside \old-expressions, where instead the pre-valuation θ counts. The other
additional operator in postconditions is \result. To handle its evaluation
properly, we assume a special system variable named \result. Whenever a
non-void method returns, its return value, say val, is assigned to \result, such
that, in the post-valuation θ′, we have θ′(\result) = val .
A system trace is a sequence of tuples consisting of an event and a ‘system
snapshot’, i.e., a valuation of the system variables taken at the time when that
event occurs.
6These identifiers can be created automatically using techniques as those presented in [55]
or through stack frame references.
7A (binary) relation R is functional if {(x, y), (x, y′)} ⊆ R implies y = y′.
8To be precise, eval has one extra parameter, which is a logical variable assignment,
needed to define the evaluation of quantified formulas. We omit that parameter since it is
unimportant for our discussion here.
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Definition 14. A system trace w is a sequence of tuples in systemevent×ΘSys,
i.e. w ∈ (systemevent×ΘSys)∗.
2.6.2 Configurations
Given a system trace w, each tuple in w will shift a global configuration of a
ppDATE network to another. Global configurations are defined with the help
of local ones, so we start there.
Definition 15. Given a set of method names Σ, a local configuration is a
tuple (m, q, ρ) where m is a ppDATE, q ∈ Qm, and ρ ⊆ P(systemevent ×
postcondSys ×ΘSys).
The tuple (m, q, ρ) is a configuration of ppDATE m — where q represents
the current state, and ρ allows to monitor potential violations of Hoare triples.
For that, ρ stores which exit event (∈ systemevent) should cause a checking
of which postcondition (∈ postcond). The semantic rules described below
(Sec. 2.6.4) will guarantee that only method exit events (of the form σ↑i ) will
appear in ρ. During the processing of a trace, the appearance of (σ↓i , θ) at the
same time that the current state has a Hoare-triple with a fulfilled precondition,
e.g., θ |= pi, will lead to associate the corresponding postcondition, e.g., pi′,
with σ↑i in ρ, together with θ. Later, the appearance of (σ
↑
i , θ
′) will cause a
look-up of (σ↑i , pi
′, θ) in ρ, in order to check θ, θ′ |= pi′.
Example 5. Recall the ppDATE illustrated in Fig. 2.2, here called m. Its
initial local configuration is (m, q, ∅). Then, after firing transition t1 whenever
certain system event brew↓id (with id ∈ N) occurs, assuming that the field cups
is valuated to zero, the next local configuration is (m, q′, {(brew↑id, cups ==
\old(cups) + 1, {(cups, 0)})}).
Definition 16. Given ppDATE network pn = (M,V, ν0, Tppd), a global con-
figuration for pn is a tuple (L, ν) such that:
 L is a set of local configurations. For each m ∈M , there is exactly one
q and one ρ, such that (m, q, ρ) ∈ L. For each (m, q, ρ) ∈ L, we have
q ∈ Qm and either m ∈M or m = inst(t, args), for some t ∈ Tppd.
 ν is ppDATE variable valuation with domain V .
Before giving an example, we define the notion of initial global configuration
for a ppDATE network.
Definition 17. Given a ppDATE network pn = (M,V, ν0, Tppd) where m ∈M
is the tuple (Qm, tm, Bm, q0m,Πm), the initial global configuration Cinit(pn) is
defined as the tuple (L0, ν0), where L0 = {(m, q0m, ∅) | m ∈ M} is the set of
initial local configurations.
Example 6. Let us assume a ppDATE network pn = ({m,m′}, {v}, {(v, 0)}, ∅),
such that q0m′
tr|true7→v=v+1−−−−−−−−−−→m′ q1m′ . The initial global configuration for pn is
Cinit(pn) = (L0, {(v, 0)}), where L0 = {(m, q0m, ∅), (m′, q0m′ , ∅)}. Then, if the
given transition is fired, the new global configuration is (L′, {(v, 1)}), where
L′ = {(m, q0m, ∅), (m′, q1m′ , ∅)}.
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In the above example, the action v = v+ 1, does not generate any event. In
general, however, actions may generate events. For storing action events (and
process them in the next step), we introduce the concept of extended global
configuration.
Definition 18. Given a ppDATE network pn = (M,V, ν0, Tppd), and a set
of system variables Sys, an extended global configuration for pn is a tuple
(L, ν,E, θ) such that:
 (L, ν) is a global configuration for pn,
 E ⊆ P(ξ) is a set of events,
 θ ∈ ΘSys is a system variables valuation.
E contains the events to be processed in the next (small) step. In the
operational semantics to be described below, E will either be a singleton set
containing a system event, or a set of action events generated by the executions
of actions in the latest transition.
Example 7. Let us assume a ppDATE network pn = ({m,m′}, {v}, {(v, 0)}, ∅),
such that q1
foo↓|true 7→h!−−−−−−−−→m q2, q′1 h?|true 7→v=v+1−−−−−−−−−−−→m′ q′2, Πm(q1) = {{pi}foo{pi′}},
with q1 and q
′
1 the initial states of m and m
′, respectively. In addition, let us assume
that C1 = (L1, {(v, 0)}, {foo↓id}, ∅) is an extended global configuration for pn (for
some index id ∈ N), where L1 = {(m, q1, ∅), (m′, q′1, ∅)}. Then, when the given
transition of m is fired, given that pi holds and the current system variables valuation
is θ, the next extended global configuration for pn is C2 = (L2, {(v, 0)}, {h}, ∅), where
L2 = {(m, q2, {(foo↑id, pi′, θ)}), (m′, q′1, ∅)}. After that, event h in C1 triggers the given
transition of m′, leading to the extended global configuration C3 = (L3, {(v, 1)}, ∅, ∅),
where L3 = {(m, q2, {(foo↑id, pi′, θ)}), (m′, q′2, ∅)}.
The Structural Operational Semantics given in Sec. 2.6.4 formalises such
behaviour.
2.6.3 Semantics of Actions
When assigning meaning to actions, there are two levels to consider. One is
the level of the local actions, executed when an individual ppDATE takes a
transition. The semantics of those is sequential, as defined below. On top of
the assignments changing the ppDATE variable valuation, the local actions
may generate events, and create new instances of ppDATE templates.
The other level is parallel actions, where we compose simultaneous actions
of transitions taken in parallel by different ppDATEs. Here, we need to devote
special care to exclude conflicting writes to, as well as race conditions between
reads and writes from/to, the same variable. Also, we need to make sure that
if only one ppDATE writes to x, then the parallel composition propagates this
effect. All this makes it necessary to keep track of all reads and writes at the
local level, prior to execute the parallel composition. However, the treatment
of the local effects and newly created ppDATEs is simpler: we just take the
union of those when doing the parallel composition.
Definition 19. For each a ∈ action, its meaning [[a]]θ,ν (relative to sys-
tem/ppDATE variable valuations θ and ν) is given by a tuple (ν′,W,R,E,New),
where:
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 ν′ ∈ N is a ppDATE variable valuation computed (locally) in a,
 W ⊆ V is a set of ppDATE variables written to in a,
 R ⊆ V is a set of ppDATE variables read from in a,
 E ⊆ actevent is a set of action events generated in a,
 New ⊆ ppDATE is a set of ppDATEs newly created in a.
Given that pvars returns the ppDATE variables appearing in its argument(s),
[[a]]θ,ν = (ν
′,W,R,E,New) is defined as follows
[[skip]]θ,ν = (ν, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅)
[[v = e]]θ,ν = (ν[v ← evalθ∪ν(e)], {v}, pvars(e), ∅, ∅)
[[h!]]θ,ν = (ν, ∅, ∅, {h}, ∅)
[[create(t, args)]]θ,ν = (ν, ∅, pvars(args), ∅, inst(t, args))
[[a1 ; a2]]θ,ν =

(ν2,W1 ∪W2, R1 ∪R2, E1 ∪ E2,New1 ∪New2)
where
[[a1]]θ,ν = (ν1,W1, R1, E1,New1)
and
[[a2]]θ,ν1 = (ν2,W2, R2, E2,New2)
[[if c then a]]θ,ν =

(ν′,W,R ∪ pvars(c), E,New)
if θ ∪ ν |= c and [[a]]θ,ν = (ν′,W,R,E,New)
(ν, ∅, pvars(c), ∅, ∅)
otherwise
[[prog]]θ,ν = [[skip]]θ,ν
Following the definition of actions (Def. 2), the prog in the last line above
is a side-effect free program, i.e., it has no effect which could be noticed in the
current formalism, which is why we can simulate it with skip. prog will have
purposes orthogonal to our formalisation, like logging.
We are now in the position to define the parallel composition of actions.
Imagine we have a configuration with 5 parallel ppDATEs, 3 of which have
enabled transitions, with actions a1, a2, and a3, respectively. Assume moreover
that the current ppDATE variable valuation is ν. The parallel composition of the
meaning of a1, a2, and a3, is performed by mergeParalActsν({[[a1]], [[a2]], [[a3]]}) =
(ν′, E′,New′). The function mergeParalActs takes a set of semantic actions as input,
and computes a resulting valuation ν′, a resulting set of events E′, and a resulting set
of newly generated ppDATEs, New ′. The sets E′ and New ′ will simply be the union
of the corresponding sets from [[a1]], [[a2]], and [[a3]]. But the resulting valuation is
slightly more involved. Actions may conflict (e.g., we write to the same variable in
different actions), or have race conditions (i.e., we read from a variable and write to it
in different actions). In those cases, we leave the result of mergeParalActs deliberately
undefined. In all other cases, the different effects of the actions are merged. The
index of the merging function, ν, serves as a fall back for those variables which have
not been written to. In particular, ν′ = ν in case the set of actions to be merged is
empty.
These explanations are formalised in the following function, merging a set of
action meanings (Def. 19):
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Definition 20.
mergeParalActsν({(ν1,W1, R1, E1,New1), . . . , (νn,Wn, Rn, En,Newn)})
=

undefined
if ∃ i, j · (i, j ∈ [1, . . . , n] and i 6= j) · (Wi ∩Wj 6= ∅ or Wi ∩Rj 6= ∅)
(ν′, E′,New′) otherwise, where
E′ =
⋃n
i=1Ei, New
′ =
⋃n
i=1 Newi, ν
′(v) =
{
νi(v) if v ∈Wi
ν(v) if v 6∈ ⋃ni=1Wi
Note that if there are no actions to merge, we have mergeParalActsν(∅) = (ν, ∅, ∅).
2.6.4 Structural Operational Semantics
In this section we give structural operational semantics rules (SOS) for ppDATEs.
These rules will have the following generic form:
name
H1
· · ·
Hn
Goal
where name is a label used to identify the rule, Goal is the property enforced by the
rule and the premises H1, · · · , Hn are assumptions over the values of the Goal.
2.6.4.1 Auxiliary Predicates
In the semantic definitions given below, we use the following predicates.
activatedBy Given a (transition) trigger tr and an event e, predicate activatedBy(tr, e)
holds if tr and e match, in the following way:
activatedBy(tr, e)
df
={ ∃ i · i ∈ N · e = tri iff e ∈ systemevent
tr = e? iff e ∈ actevent
For instance, the trigger σ↓ is activated by the systemevent σ↓3, and the trigger h? is
activated by actevent h (generated before by the execution of action h!).
nextState Given a local configuration (m, q, ρ), a state q′, an event e, a system
variables valuation θ and a ppDATE variables valuation ν, predicate nextState holds
whenever there exists an enabled transition on m going from q to q′. We formally
write this as follows,
nextState((m, q, ρ), e, θ, ν, q′)
df
=
∃ tr, c, a · q tr|c7→a−−−−→m q′ and
activatedBy(tr, e) and θ ∪ ν |= c
checkOnExit Given a local configuration (m, q, ρ), a system event σ↓id, a system
variables valuation θ, and a postcondition pi′, predicate checkOnExit holds if there
exists a condition pi such that the Hoare-triple {pi}σ {pi′} is associated to state q, and
pi holds. We formally write this as follows,
checkOnExit((m, q, ρ), σ↓id, θ, pi
′)
df
=
∃ pi · {pi}σ {pi′} ∈ Πm(q) and θ |= pi
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enabled Given a local configuration l, an event e, a system variables valuation
θ, and a ppDATE variables valuation ν, predicate enabled holds if either l has an
enabled transition or it has a Hoare triple associated to q which has to be memorised.
Formally,
enabled(l, e, θ, ν)
df
=
∃ q′ · nextState(l, e, θ, ν, q′)
or
∃ pi′ · checkOnExit(l, e, θ, pi′)
toBeExecuted Given a local configuration (m, q, ρ), an event e, a system variables
valuation θ, a ppDATE variables valuation ν, and an action a, predicate toBeExecuted
holds if there exists an enabled transition such that a is its action. Formally,
toBeExecuted((m, q, ρ), e, θ, ν, a)
df
=
∃ tr, c, q′ · activatedBy(tr, e) and
q
tr|c7→a−−−−→m q′ and θ ∪ ν |= c
2.6.4.2 Small Steps for Local Configurations
The first step to define SOS rules describing the behaviour of a ppDATE network is
to introduce rules showing how a local configuration performs a small step.
Given an event e, a system variables valuation θ, and a ppDATE variables
valuation ν, a small local configuration step (or simply small step local), written
(e,θ,ν)
↪−−−−→, takes a local configuration (m, q, ρ) to some other local configuration (m, q′, ρ′).
This step relation is defined by the rules shown in Fig. 2.7. If e is an entry event of
the form σ↓id, there are three different possibilities: (i) there is an enabled transition in
m going from state q to state q′, and there is a Hoare triple {pi}σ {pi′} associated to
q such that pi holds (entry1); (ii) there is an enabled transition in m going from state
q to q′, but no Hoare triple {pi}σ {pi′} associated to q such that pi holds (entry2);
or (iii) there are no enabled transitions in m, but there is a Hoare triple {pi}σ {pi′}
associated to q such that pi holds (entry3).
In case of (entry1), the next state reached by the enabled transition is q
′, and
ρ gets extended by the tuple (σ↑id, pi
′, θ), in order to track the information about
the postcondition which has to be checked upon the exit of method σ. Entry event
identifiers are assumed to be unique in traces, and thereby, σ↑id is unique in ρ. In case
of (entry2) and (entry3), only one of these two effects takes place. Then, apart from
entry events, whenever e is either an exit event, i.e., it has the form σ↑id, or an action
event, by the rules exit and act, respectively,
(e,θ,ν)
↪−−−−→ results in the local configuration
(m, q′, ρ), where q′ is the next state reached by the enabled transition.
2.6.4.3 Small Steps for Extended Global Configurations
Given an extended global configuration EC = (L, ν,E, θ), the relation small step for
extended global configurations (or simply small step global), written as , takes EC
to some extended global configuration (L′, ν′, E′, θ) by following rule iter (depicted
in Fig. 2.8). Note that in the rule’s premises we define the set Len of all the local
configurations (m, q, ρ) ∈ L such that m has an enabled transition whose triggers
are activated by the events in E. Len is used to define both the set Lnch of local
configurations in L that will not change, and the set Lch of the local configurations
obtained after performing a small step on the local configurations in Len. These two
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entry1
checkOnExit((m, q, ρ), σ↓id, θ, pi
′)
nextState((m, q, ρ), σ↓id, θ, ν, q
′)
(m, q, ρ)
(σ
↓
id
,θ,ν)
↪−−−−−−→ (m, q′, ρ ∪ {(σ↑id, pi′, θ)})
entry2
@ pi′ · checkOnExit((m, q, ρ), σ↓id, θ, pi′)
nextState((m, q, ρ), σ↓id, θ, ν, q
′)
(m, q, ρ)
(σ
↓
id
,θ,ν)
↪−−−−−−→ (m, q′, ρ)
entry3
checkOnExit((m, q, ρ), σ↓id, θ, pi
′)
@ q′ · nextState((m, q, ρ), σ↓id, θ, ν, q′)
(m, q, ρ)
(σ
↓
id
,θ,ν)
↪−−−−−−→ (m, q, ρ ∪ {(σ↑id, pi′, θ)})
exit
nextState((m, q, ρ), σ↑id, θ, ν, q
′)
(m, q, ρ)
(σ
↑
id
,θ,ν)
↪−−−−−−→ (m, q′, ρ)
act
e ∈ actevent
nextState((m, q, ρ), e, θ, ν, q′)
(m, q, ρ)
(e,θ,ν)
↪−−−−→ (m, q′, ρ)
Figure 2.7: Small Step Rules for Local Configurations
iter
Len = {l | l ∈ L, enabled(l, e, θ, ν), e ∈ E}
Lnch = L\Len
Lch = {l′ | l ∈ Len, l
(e,θ,ν)
↪−−−−→ l′, e ∈ E}
Acts = {a | l ∈ Len, toBeExecuted(l, e, θ, ν, a), e ∈ E}
mergeParalActsν({[[a]]θ,ν |a ∈ Acts}) = (ν′, E′,New′)
Lnew = {(m, q0m, ∅) | m ∈ New′}
L′ = Lch ∪ Lnch ∪ Lnew
(L, ν, E, θ) (L′, ν′, E′, θ)
Figure 2.8: Small Step Rule for Extended Global Configurations
sets are used to define L′. Next, we define the set Acts of all the actions which label
the ‘firing’ transitions, and merge the meaning of those actions, which results in the
valuation ν′ and events E′ of the new extended global configuration. We also initialise
local configurations Lnew for the newly created ppDATEs from New
′. Finally, L′ is
the union of Lch, Lnch and Lnew.
Note that if mergeParalActs is undefined, due to conflicts in parallel variable
assignments (see Def. 20), then no global small step is defined, i.e., the execution
aborts.
2.6.4.4 Big Steps for Global Configurations
Given a ppDATE network pn = (M,V, ν0, Tppd), a global configuration (L, ν) such
that for all (m, q, ρ) ∈ L, m ∈ M and q ∈ Qm, and ν a valuation of the ppDATE
variables V , a system event e and the system variables valuation θ, the relation big
step rules for global configurations (or simply big step global), written
(e,θ)
===⇒, shifts
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shift
(L, ν, {e}, θ)∗ (L′, ν′, ∅, θ)
(L, ν)
(e,θ)
===⇒ (L′, ν′)
Figure 2.9: Big Step Rules for Global Configurations
(L, ν) to some global configuration (L′, ν′), written (L, ν)
(e,θ)
===⇒ (L′, ν′), by rule shift
given in Fig. 2.9. Note that here e and θ are external to the global configuration of
the ppDATE network: they come from the system acting as input to each step of the
global configuration.
This rule means that whenever e occurs while the current system variables
valuation is θ, (L, ν) shifts to (L′, ν′) if the transitive closure of the relation small
step global (, Fig. 2.8) takes the extended global configuration (L, ν, {e}, θ) to the
extended global configuration (L′, ν′, ∅, θ). We need the transitive closure because
the execution of actions may generate action events which also have to be consumed,
meaning that we iterate using small step global until the set obtained by applying rule
iter is the empty set. After having reached (L′, ν′, ∅, θ), the small steps are saturated,
because any configuration ( , , ∅, ) is a fixed-point of .
Lemma 1. For each set of local configurations L, ppDATE variable valuation ν,
and system variables valuation θ, the extended global configuration (L, ν, ∅, θ) is a
fixed-point of the relation small step global, i.e.,
(L, ν, ∅, θ) (L, ν, ∅, θ)
Proof. In rule iter (Fig. 2.8), if E = ∅, then Len = Lch = Acts = ∅, and Lnch = L.
From the note below Def. 20, we deduce that (ν′, E′,New′) = (ν, ∅, ∅), such that
Lnew = ∅, and L′ = Lnch = L. Therefore, (L′, ν′, E′, θ) = (L, ν, ∅, θ).
We can now define the semantics of ppDATEs by identifying how a system trace
changes the global configuration associated to a network of ppDATEs.
Definition 21. We define how a system trace w ∈ (systemevent × ΘSys)∗ shifts
a ppDATE from the global configuration (L, ν) to the global configuration (L′, ν′),
written (L, ν)
w
=⇒ (L′, ν′), by induction over w:
(L, ν)
ε
=⇒ (L′, ν′) df= L = L′ and ν = ν′;
(L, ν)
w:(e,θ)
====⇒ (L′, ν′) df= ∃ L′′, ν′′ · (L, ν) w=⇒ (L′′, ν′′) and (L′′, ν′′) (e,θ)===⇒ (L′, ν′);
For this definition we will overload the operator we previously introduced to
represent the relation big step global, i.e., ⇒ since it is straightforward to distinguish
between the two from the context.
2.6.5 Valid Traces and Violating Traces
Before defining violating system traces, we have to introduce the notion of counter-
example.
Definition 22. Given a network of ppDATEs pn = (M,V, ν0, Tppd), a system trace
w ∈ (systemevent×ΘSys)∗ is called a counter-example if Cinit(pn) w=⇒ (L, ν), and (i)
∃ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ L · q ∈ Bm; or (ii) w = w1 + 〈(σ↑id, θ′)〉, Cinit(pn)
w1=⇒ (L′, ν′)
and ∃ m, q, ρ, pi′, θ · ((m, q, ρ) ∈ L′and (σ↑id, pi′, θ) ∈ ρ) · θ, θ′ 6|= pi′.
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(The symbol + represents the concatenation of traces.) This means that a
counter-example either (i) ends in a bad state (in one of the local configurations), or
(ii) ends with the exiting of a method execution whose postcondition (stored in ρ) is
currently violated. Note that (i) and (ii) are not exclusive, so a counter-example may
have both properties at once. Also note that violations of preconditions when entering
methods is not mentioned here. In our semantics, the violation of preconditions does
not as such result in a counter example. It only means that the postcondition of
the corresponding Hoare triple does not need to be checked further on (see entry2,
Fig. 2.7).
Example 8. Recall the ppDATE m shown in Fig. 2.2, and let us assume that it is
in state q. Then, for any system variables valuation θ, w = 〈(brew↓1, θ), (brew↓2, θ)〉 is
a counter-example corresponding to the case (i) of Def. 22.
In addition, if the trigger cleanF↓1 is activated and the postcondition of the Hoare
triple {true} cleanF() {cups == 0} is violated when method cleanF terminates,
then w′ = 〈(brew↓1, θ), (brew↑1, θ), (cleanF↓1, θ), (cleanF↑1, θ)〉 is a counter-example cor-
responding to the case (ii) of Def. 22.
Definition 23. The set of violating system traces of a ppDATE network pn, written
VT (pn), is defined to be system traces which have a counter-example of pn as a
prefix.
Definition 24. The set of valid system traces of a ppDATE network pn, written
VAT (pn), is defined to be the system traces which are not violating.
Example 9. The following system traces, for the coffee machine system of Fig. 2.2,
are all valid:
w = 〈(brew↓1, θ), (brew↑1, θ), (brew↓2, θ), (brew↑2, θ)〉
w′ = 〈(brew↓5, θ), (brew↑5, θ), (cleanF↓2, θ), (cleanF↑2, θ)〉
w′′ = 〈(cleanF↓4, θ), (cleanF↑4, θ), (brew↓2, θ), (brew↑2, θ)〉
2.7 From ppDATE to DATE
In our framework, KeY first tries to prove all Hoare-triples of a ppDATE m, and then
the partial proofs are used to get an optimised ppDATE m′. To make the property
m′ runtime-checkable, we further translate away the (remaining/optimised) Hoare
triples, to arrive at a set of parallel (pure) DATEs that can be processed by Larva.
In this section, we formally define DATEs, we present the algorithm used by
StaRVOOrS to translate ppDATEs into DATEs, finally, after introducing the
semantics of DATEs, we prove soundness of the translation.
2.7.1 DATE
DATE [45] is a formalism similar to ppDATE, except that the automata do not
include Hoare triples in the states. DATEs also include support for timers, which are
not in ppDATEs. However, since the work we present here does not use timers, we
leave them out from the formalisation. Formally:9
Definition 25. A DATE is a ppDATE of the form (Q, t,B, q0,Π∅), where relation
Π∅ represents that there are no Hoare triples assigned to any of the states in Q, i.e.,
Π∅(q) = ∅, ∀q ∈ Q.
9Note that the definition of DATE given here is different from the one given in [45] as
Π∅ was not defined in the original formulation. It is easy to see that the formulations are
equivalent (modulo the differences mentioned above).
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exit cond checker = λ S,A : Σ, cond.
start ok
bad
S↑ | A 7→ skip
S↑ | ¬A 7→ skip
Figure 2.10: DATE template for verifying postconditions of Hoare triples.
Note that since a DATE is effectively a ppDATE, the semantics for DATEs are
already covered by the semantics of ppDATEs. We will also refer to a (deterministic)
network of ppDATEs where each ppDATE in the network is a DATE, as a network
of DATEs and similarly DATE templates.
2.7.2 Translation from ppDATEs to DATEs
Here we present how to translate a ppDATE (network) into a DATE (network).
However, first, let us intuitively analyse how the ppDATE depicted in Fig. 2.2, which
we will refer to as m, can be translated into a DATE m′.
For simplicity, we assign the following names to the different Hoare triples in the
states of m.
 h1: {cups < limit} brew() {cups == \old(cups)+1}
 h2: {true} cleanF() {cups == 0}
 h3: {cups < limit} brew() {cups == \old(cups)}
 h4: {true} cleanF() {cups == \old(cups)}
Then, we begin the translation by generating the DATE template illustrated in
Fig. 2.10, which will be used to create DATEs in charge of controlling the postcondi-
tions of the previous Hoare triples.
Next, we start dealing with the translation of the transitions of m. m′ will have
exactly the same set of states as m, and it will have similar transitions to the ones
of m. The only difference is that the transitions in m′ will also have to address the
verification of the Hoare triples. For instance, while being in state q, if the method
brew() is executed and the precondition of h1 holds, then its postcondition will have
to be verified whenever method brew() finishes its execution.
Therefore, for every transition of the form q
σ↓|c 7→a−−−−−→m q′, such that a Hoare triple
{pi}σ {pi′} is in q, m′ will include a modified version of this transition in such a way
that whenever this transition is fired, if pi holds, then the execution of its action will
have to create an instance of template exit cond checker. Thus, transitions t1, t3
and t4 (recall Fig. 2.2) are modified as follows:
 t′1 : q
brew↓|cups<limit7→skip ; a1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→m′ q′
 t′3 : q
′ brew↓|true7→skip ; a2−−−−−−−−−−−−→m′ bad
 t′4 : q
′ cleanF↓|true7→skip ; a3−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→m′ bad
where,
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qstart
q′
bad
t′1
t′4 t
′
3
t′2
t′5
Figure 2.11: Translation to DATE of the ppDATE illustrated in Fig. 2.2.
 a1 : if (cups < limit)
then create(exit cond checker,brew,part eval(cups==\old(cups)+1))
 a2 : if (cups < limit)
then create(exit cond checker,brew,part eval(cups==\old(cups)));
 a3 : if (true)
then create(exit cond checker,cleanF,part eval(cups == \old(cups))).
In the previous transitions we have used as the conditions of the if-expressions in
actions a1, a2 and a3, the preconditions of the different Hoare triples to be verified in
each case. Moreover, function part eval partially evaluates its argument, replacing
the expressions of the form \old(e) by the current value of e. If a postcondition does
not include such operator, then part eval is the identity. Note that even though the
if-expression in the transitions t′1 and t
′
4 may seem unnecessary, we include it anyway
in order to exactly reflect how the translation algorithm works.
In addition, if at a certain state, a Hoare triple has to be verified, but in that
state there are no outgoing transitions with an event related to the method in the
Hoare triple, then a new transition is added to m′ in order to be able to control such
Hoare triple. For instance, in state q the following self-transition has to be added in
order to verify h2 and h3.
 t′5 : q
cleanF↓|true7→a4−−−−−−−−−−→m′ q
where,
 a4 : create(exit cond checker,cleanF,part eval(cups == 0))
Again, we use the preconditions of the Hoare triples as conditions of the previous
action.
Given a transition q
tr|c 7→a−−−−→m q′ such that (i) tr fires upon exiting a method, or
(ii) tr fires upon entering a method but there is no Hoare triple associated to this
method in q, these transitions remain untouched, i.e., it is translated as q
tr|c7→a−−−−→m′ q′.
For instance, transition t2 is translated as follows.
 t′2 : q
′ brew↑|true7→skip−−−−−−−−−−→m′ q
Fig 2.11 illustrates the DATE obtained when translating m following the previous
steps. Note that whole translation would consist on the previous DATE and the
generated template exit cond checker.
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2.7.2.1 Translation Algorithm
For clarity of presentation we give two algorithms, one for the case when no Hoare
triples clashes arise, and one for the full case. Intuitively, we call it a clash if the
behaviour of a method σ, in a certain ppDATE state q, is defined by both, a Hoare
triple in q, and an outgoing transition from q. Formally, we define a clashing Hoare
triple as follows.
Definition 26. Given a ppDATE network pn = (M,V, ν0, Tppd) such that every
ppDATE m ∈ M is defined as the tuple (Qm, tm, Bm, q0m,Πm), a Hoare triple
{pi}σ {pi′} ∈ Πm(q), for some q ∈ Qm, is called clashing if an outgoing transition
from q is guarded by trigger σ↓ (i.e., ∃ c, a, q′ · q σ
↓|c 7→a−−−−−→m q′). A clash-free ppDATE
is a ppDATE with no clashing Hoare triples.
We now present the algorithm to translate a clash-free ppDATE network into a
DATE network. The translation works by replacing each Hoare triple {pi}σ {pi′} in a
state q of a ppDATE by a new reflexive transition (from q to q) triggered by an entry
into function σ such that the precondition pi holds, and a parallel DATE is created,
checking the postcondition.
We assume a function part eval ∈ postcond 7→ cond, which removes \old con-
structs in postconditions. The function performs partial evaluation — replacing each
\old(e) with the current value of e. Our algorithm syntactically places the part eval
function in an action that will be executed when the according method is entered, i.e.,
partial evaluation does not happen during the translation algorithm, but at runtime,
when the method is entered.
Algorithm 1. Given a clash-free ppDATE network pn = (M,V, ν0, Tppd), such
that every ppDATE m ∈ M is defined as the tuple (Qm, tm, Bm, q0m,Πm), we can
construct a DATE network equivalent to pn in the following manner:
1. With each Hoare triple {pi}σ {pi′} in a ppDATE state, replace in pi′ each
instance of the \result by the variable ret. This variable will represent the
value returned by the method associated to the Hoare triple.
2. Generate the following DATE template:
exit cond checker = λ S,A : Σ, cond.
start ok
bad
S↑ | A 7→ skip
S↑ | ¬A 7→ skip
This template will be used to create DATEs handling the verification of the
postcondition of the method.
3. Transform M , the set of ppDATEs of pn, into the set of DATEs M ′ = {m′ |
m′ = (Qm, t′m, Bm, q0m,Π∅),m ∈M} such that t′m follows the rules below:
3a. each Hoare triple {pi}σ {pi′} in Πm(q) is replaced by q σ
↓|pi 7→a−−−−−→m′ q, where
a = create(exit cond checker, σ,part eval(pi′));
3b. each transition q
tr|c7→a−−−−→m q′ remains unchanged, i.e. q tr|c7→a−−−−→m′ q′
4. Translate Tppd (the set of ppDATE templates in pn) into a set of DATE
templates Td by repeatedly applying steps 3a and 3b to the body of the
templates.
5. Extend the set Td by including the template generated in step 2. Let us call
this extension T ′d.
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6. Finally, the resulting DATE network is defined to be (M ′, V, ν0, T ′d).
This translation works well except that it would introduce non-determinism when
the ppDATE includes clashes. To extend the translation to work in the presence
of clashes, we transform Hoare triples clashing with a transition into a family of
disjoint transitions, each of which performs the transition but also checks whether
the postcondition checker should be created.
Algorithm 2. Given a (possibly clashing) ppDATE network pn, we construct a
network of DATEs equivalent to pn by using Algorithm 1 except that we replace
steps 3a and 3b, by the following:
3a1. Each non-clashing Hoare triple: {pi}σ {pi′} in Πm(q) is turned into a transition
q
σ↓|pi 7→create(exit cond checker,σ,part eval(pi′))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→m′ q
3a2. For each clashing Hoare triple: {pi}σ {pi′} ∈ Π(q), clashing with n outgoing
transitions, q
σ↓|ck 7→ak−−−−−−−→ qk (0 ≤ k < n):
 Replace q
σ↓|ck 7→ak−−−−−−−→m qk with: q σ
↓|ck 7→(ak; ifpi then a)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→m′ qk;
 Add the following transition: q
σ↓|(!c0&&...&&!cn&&pi)7→a−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→m′ q,
where, in both cases, a = create(exit cond checker, σ,part eval(pi′))
3b. each transition q
tr|c7→a−−−−→m q′ such that either Πm(q) = ∅, Πm(q) 6= ∅ but there
is no Hoare triple associated to trigger tr, or trigger tr is activated by an exit
event, remains unchanged, i.e. q
tr|c7→a−−−−→m′ q′.
2.7.3 Proof of Soundness of the translation algorithm
In this section we will show that the translation algorithms introduced in the previous
section are sound.
2.7.4 Coupling Invariant Lemmas
Here, we formally introduce two lemmas which together form the coupling invariant
that is used to prove soundness. The proofs of these lemmas can be found in Appendix
A.
Lemma 2 states that given a trace, both a ppDATE network pn and its translation
to DATE will change their initial global configuration to global configurations (L, ν)
and (L˜, ν′), respectively, such that ν = ν′, and that for every (m, q, ρ) ∈ L where m
is in pn, there is a local configuration (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜ such that m′ is the translation
of m and both m and m′ are in the same state, and vice versa.
In this lemma we represent the translation of a single ppDATE to DATE with
the function κ ∈ ppDATE 7→ DATE.
Lemma 2. Given a network of ppDATEs pn = (M,V, ν0, Tppd), its translation
ppd2DATE (pn) = (M ′, V, ν0, T ′d), a trace w ∈ (systemevent×ΘSys)∗, and the global
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configurations (L, ν) and (L˜, ν′),
Cinit(pn)
w
=⇒M (L, ν) and Cinit(ppd2DATE(pn)) w=⇒M′ (L˜, ν′)
implies
ν = ν′
and
∀ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ L,m ∈M ·
∃ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜ · κ(m) = m′ and q = q′
and
∀ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜,m′ ∈M ′·
∃ m, q, ρ ·m ∈M,κ(m) = m′, (m, q, ρ) ∈ L · q = q′
and
∀ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ L,m /∈M ·
∃ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜,m′ /∈M ′ · q = q′
and
∀ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜,m′ /∈M ′·
∃ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ),m /∈M ∈ L · q = q′
Lemma 3 states that given a trace, if this trace shifts a ppDATE network pn
and its DATE translation from their respective initial global configuration to some
global configurations (L, ν) and (L˜, ν′), respectively, then for each entry (σ↑id, pi
′, θ)
in a ρ component of a local configuration in L there is one local configuration in L˜
whose DATE component is an instance of the template exit cond checker in charge
of controlling pi′, and vice versa.
Lemma 3. Given a network of ppDATEs pn = (M,V, ν0, Tppd), its translation
ppd2DATE (pn) = (M ′, V, ν0, T ′d), a trace w ∈ (systemevent×ΘSys)∗, and the global
configurations (L, ν) and (L˜, ν′),
Cinit(pn)
w
=⇒M (L, ν) and Cinit(ppd2DATE(pn)) w=⇒M′ (L˜, ν′) implies ψ(L, L˜)
where,
ψ(L, L˜) = ∀ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ L ·
∀ σ↑id, pi′, θ · (σ↑id, pi′, θ) ∈ ρ ·
∃ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜ ·m′ = inst (exit cond checker, σ, pi′)
and
∀ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜,m′ /∈M ′·
∃ σ↑id, pi′ ·m′ = inst (exit cond checker, σ, pi′)
implies ∃ m, q, ρ, θ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ L · (σ↑id, pi′, θ) ∈ ρ
2.7.4.1 Proof of Soundness
We can now prove the soundness of the translation algorithm. Below we provide the
formalisation of this property and an intuitive explanation for it. However, a rigorous
proof of this theorem can be found in Appendix B.
Theorem 1. Given a ppDATE network pn = (M,V, ν0, Tppd), and its translation
ppd2DATE(pn) = (M ′, V, ν0, T ′d),
VT (pn) = VT (ppd2DATE(pn))
2.8. THE STARVOORS TOOL IMPLEMENTATION 55
Proof. To prove the soundness of the translation algorithm we will show that both a
ppDATE network pn and its translation to a DATE network have the same set of
violating traces. Intuitively, we will prove that given a trace w which is violating for pn,
i.e., w ∈ VT (pn), is also violating for pn’s translation, i.e., w ∈ VT (ppd2DATE(pn)),
and vice versa.
In the case when w ∈ VT (pn), by definition of counter-examples of ppDATEs, w
has a prefix w′ such that either (i) w′ takes the initial global configuration Cinit(pn)
to a global configuration (L′, ν′) such that the state component of L′ is a bad state;
(ii) given a method σ and a system variables valuation θ′, w′ can be written as
w1 + (σ
↑
id, θ
′) such that w1 takes Cinit(pn) to a global configuration (L′, ν′) where
there exists a local configuration in L′ whose ρ component contains a tuple (σ↑id, pi
′, θ),
such that pi′ fails to be satisfied in the ‘moment’ event σ↑id appears.
In the case of (i), we use the fact that (by Lemma 2), if w′ takes the translation
from the initial global configuration Cinit(ppd2DATE(pn)) to a global configuration
(L˜, ν), for every local configuration in L′, there is a local configuration in L˜ such
that its state component is the same. Thus, there is a local configuration in L˜ whose
state component is a bad state, which means that w′ is a counter-example of the
translation as well.
In the case of (ii), due to the fact that a Hoare triple {pi}σ {pi′} has to be
verified, we know that some local configuration will have a ρ component such that
(σ↑id, pi
′, θ) ∈ ρ. We can now use the fact that by Lemma 3, tuple is handled by a
DATE in the translation (which verifies the postcondition). Thus, there exists a
DATE controlling pi′ which fails moving to a bad state, i.e., w′ is a counter-example
of the translation as well.
In order to prove the opposite direction, we assume w ∈ VT (ppd2DATE(pn)).
Again, since this is a counter-example and this is a DATE (and thus cannot fail
due to a violated postcondition), it can be only the case that w has a prefix w′
such that this prefix takes the initial global configuration Cinit(ppd2DATE(pn)) to a
global configuration (L˜, ν) such that there is a local configuration in L˜ whose state
component is a bad state. Then, assuming that w′ takes pn from the initial global
configuration Cinit(pn) to a global configuration (L
′, ν′), we proceed to do a case
analyses depending whether the bad state belongs to a DATE which was controlling
the postcondition of a Hoare triple or not. In the affirmative case, we will use this
fact to show that, given certain method σ and a system variables valuation θ′, w′ can
be selected to be a prefix which can be written as w1 + (σ
↑
id, θ
′) such that w1 takes
Cinit(pn) to a global configuration (L
′, ν′) where the verification of the postcondition
fails whenever event σ↑id occurs. Therefore, w
′ is a counter-example of pn. Finally,
(by Lemma 2), there is a local configuration in L′ such that its state component is
the same as the bad state in L˜. Therefore, w′ is a counter-example of pn.
2.8 The StaRVOOrS Tool Implementation
In this section we present how the (fully automatic) verification tool StaRVOOrS [37]
implements the framework presented in Sec. 2.4. To illustrate this, we use a running
example of a bank system in which users log in to perform transactions10. The set of
logged-in users is implemented as a Hashtable object, whose class represents an open
addressing hashtable with linear probing as collision resolution. Method add, which
is used to add objects into the hashtable, first attempts to put the corresponding
object at the position of its computed hash code. However, if that index is occupied,
then add searches for the nearest following index which is free. Fig. 2.12 depicts a
10Both the source code and the ppDATE specification for this example are available
from [4].
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1 public void add (Object o, int key) {
2 if (size < capacity) {
3 int i = hash_function(key);
4 if (h[i] == null ) {
5 h[i] = o;
6 size ++;
7 return ;
8 }
9 else {
10 while (h[i] != null ) {
11 if (i == capacity -1) i = 0;
12 else {i++;}
13 }
14 h[i] = o;
15 size ++;
16 return ;
17 }
18 }
19 }
Figure 2.12: Code snippet for method add.
code snippet for this method. Within the hashtable object, users are stored into an
array arr. This means that the set of logged-in users has its capacity limited by the
length of arr. In order to check in a straightforward manner whether the capacity
of arr is reached or not, a field size keeps track of the amount of stored objects
and a field capacity represents the (total) number of objects that can be added into
the hash table. In addition, this system has to fulfil the properties described with
the ppDATE template depicted in Fig. 2.13. This template specifies the following
properties:
(i) A user has to be logged-in in order to perform a deposit, i.e. a deposit should
happen between a login and a logout.
(ii) Provided there is space in the hashtable, executing method add with object o and
key k should add the object to the table.
Property (i) is verified with the transitions of the ppDATE template, whereas property
(ii) is represented by the Hoare triple in state q1. If size < capacity, then there is
room in the hashtable for one more element, and if method add places the object o in
the hashtable, there exists an index in the array arr such that o is placed in that index,
i.e., ∃ int i; i>= 0 && i < capacity; arr[i] == o. Note that the given Hoare
triple is only included in state q1 since only a successful login leads to the execution
of the method add, i.e., this Hoare triple is context dependent; and that login(f)↓
means that method login associated to the trigger is the one defined within object f .
In addition, we assume that the specification of the system has a ppDATE with a single
state q and single transition of the form q
new(o)↓|true7→create(prop−deposit−temp,o)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ q,
such that the trigger new(o)↓ is activated by the declaration of an object o of the
class UserInterface. Thus, this ppDATE creates an instance of the template in
Fig. 2.13 every time an object of the class UserInterface is declared.
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prop-deposit-temp = λ f : UserInterface.
q1 : {size < capacity} add(o,k) {∃ i. arr[i] == o}start q2
bad
login(f)↑ | true 7→ skip
deposit(f) ↓| val
>
0 7→
skip
logout(f)↓ | true 7→ skip
deposit(f)↓ | val > 0 7→ skip
Figure 2.13: ppDATE specification of properties for a bank system.
2.8.1 ppDATE Specification as an Input Script for StaRVOOrS
Before describing how StaRVOOrS works, we need to introduce how a ppDATE
specification is written as an input script for this tool. Below, we show the input script
for the ppDATE template illustrated in Fig. 2.13, and the ppDATE which creates
its instances. In addition, we give a brief description of each one of the sections this
script. For a full description on how to write ppDATEs as an input script for our
tool, one may refer to the StaRVOOrS User Manual11.
IMPORTS { main.UserInterface ; main.Hashtable ; }
GLOBAL {
PROPERTY prop-deposit {
PINIT { (prop-deposit-temp, UserInterface) }
}
}
TEMPLATES {
TEMPLATE prop-deposit-temp (UserInterface uf) {
TRIGGERS {
login_exit(String un, int pwd)
= {UserInterface f.login(un, pwd)exit()} where {uf = f}
logout_entry()
= {UserInterface f.logout()entry} where {uf = f}
deposit_entry(int val)
= {UserInterface f.deposit(val)entry} where {uf = f}
}
PROPERTY prop_deposit {
STATES {
ACCEPTING { q2 ; }
BAD { bad ; }
STARTING { q1 (add_ok) ; }
}
11This document is available from [4], in the Downloads section.
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TRANSITIONS {
q1 -> q2 [login_exit \ f.getUser() != null]
q1 -> bad [deposit_entry]
q2 -> q1 [logout_entry \ f.getUser() != null ]
q2 -> q2 [deposit_entry \ f.getUser() != null]
}
}
}
}
CINVARIANTS {
HashTable {\typeof(h) == \type(Object[])}
HashTable {arr.length == capacity}
HashTable {arr != null}
HashTable {size >= 0 && size <= capacity}
HashTable {capacity >= 1}
}
HTRIPLES {
HT add_ok {
PRE {size < capacity}
METHOD {Hashtable.add}
POST {(\exists int i; i>= 0 && i < capacity; arr[i] == o)}
ASSIGNABLE {size, arr[*]}
}
}
The section IMPORTS lists the Java packages which may be used in any of the other
sections of the script, in this case UserInterface and Hashtable. The section
TEMPLATES contains the description of the ppDATE templates (tagged by TEMPLATE).
Here, the section TRIGGERS is used to declare the different triggers which may be used
in the transitions of the ppDATE, i.e, login exit, logout entry, deposit entry,
and the section PROPERTY describes the different states, i.e., q1, q2 and bad, and
transitions of the ppDATE. Note that the syntax q1 (add ok) associates the Hoare
triple tagged as add ok to state q1. This means that the Hoare triple add ok has
to be verified if the method associated to it, in this case method add, is executed
whenever the ppDATE is in state q1. The section GLOBAL contains the description of
the ppDATE. Here, ppDATEs are described in the same manner as in a TEMPLATE
section. However, note that it is also possible, as it is the case in our example, to
use the special section PINIT when describing the section PROPERTY. Section PINIT
represents a ppDATE with single state, and a looping transition which is fired every
time an object of the class listed within this section (UserInterface in our example)
is declared, leading to the creation of an instance of the listed template for that object
(prop-deposit-temp in our example). We have included this special case because it is
quite common to have ppDATEs only focus on creating instances of a template upon
declaration of a particular object. Regarding the section CINVARIANTS, class invariants
are described by the syntax class name {invariant}, meaning that invariant has
to be fulfilled by all the methods in the class class name. These invariants are only
meant as a help for the deductive verification of the Hoare triples (see Sec. 2.8.2).
If no invariants are needed, then this section can be omitted. Finally, the section
HTRIPLES gives a list of named Hoare triples (tagged by HT). Here, PRE describes
the precondition of the Hoare triple, POST describes the postcondition of the Hoare
triple, METHOD indicates which one is the method associated to the Hoare triple,
and ASSIGNABLE lists the (class) variables that might be modified when the method
associated to the Hoare triple is executed. Note that the predicates in invariants,
pre- and postconditions follows JML-like syntax and pragmatics. For instance, in
the Hoare triple add_ok the second semicolon separates the range predicate (i>=0 &&
i<capacity) from the desired property over integers in that range, (arr[i]==o).
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2.8.2 Running StaRVOOrS
StaRVOOrS is a fully automatic verification tool which takes the Java source code
of the system under scrutiny and a file with the ppDATE specification for this system
and produces (i) a runtime monitor, (ii) an instrumented version of the system given
as input with the required event generation and additional code infrastructure, (iii) a
report summarising the results of the deductive verification of the Hoare triples, and
(iv) a refined version (if any) of the provided ppDATE specification.
This tool implements the framework described in Sec. 2.4 with each stage of the
framework, i.e., Deductive Verification, Specification Refinement, Translation and
Instrumentation, and Monitor Generation, being performed automatically by the tool.
Below, we describe the implementation of these stages through the use of the working
example.
2.8.2.1 Deductive Verification
The first step performed by StaRVOOrS is the deductive verification of the Hoare
triples associated to the states of the ppDATE (template) using KeY. To accomplish
this, StaRVOOrS extracts the Hoare triples specified in the ppDATE script, converts
them into JML contracts, and then annotates these contracts in the Java sources,
before the corresponding method declaration. For instance, the following JML contract
associated to method add is extracted from the Hoare triple add_ok:
requires size < capacity;
ensures (\exists int i; i>= 0 && i < capacity ; arr[i] == o);
assignable size, arr[*];
Note that the requires clause describes the precondition of add, the ensures clause
describes the postcondition of add, and the assignable clause lists the (class) variables
that might be modified when add is executed.
Once all the JML contracts are in place, i.e., they are annotated in the code,
StaRVOOrS uses KeY to verify them. First, KeY generates proof obligations in
Java Dynamic Logic for each JML contract. Next, it attempts to prove the contracts
automatically. Finally, it stores the results of all the verification attempts in a XML
file. Here, note that even though it could be possible to allow for user interaction
(using KeY’s elaborate support for interactive theorem proving), we chose to use KeY
in automatic mode, since StaRVOOrS targets users untrained in theorem proving.
StaRVOOrS generates a report summarising the results produced by KeY in an easy
to understand format.
Using our running example, when KeY tries to verify the previous JML contract,
it will result in a partial proof. This analysis is shown in the following fragment of
the generated XML file:
<executionPath
pathCondition="arr[hash_function(key)] = null"
verified="true"/>
<executionPath
pathCondition="!arr[hash_function(key)] = null"
verified="false"/>
This indicates that while KeY was symbolically executing method add, there was a
branching in the condition arr[hash function(key)] = null, leading to two possible
execution paths (depending on its truth value). Recalling the code snippet in Fig. 2.12,
this condition corresponds to the condition on the if-expression in line 4. Thus, the
execution path for the condition arr[hash function(key)] = null corresponds to
the case where the array arr has a free slot at the hash code of key, whereas the
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execution path for the condition !arr[hash function(key)] = null corresponds
to the case where the program enters the while-loop in line 10, searching for the
next free slot in arr. In addition, in the XML, the component verified represents
whether KeY was able to prove the branch of the proof (verified=true), or not
(verified=false). Therefore, from the previous fragment of the XML file we know
that KeY was able to close the branch where the array arr has a free slot (= null) at
the hash code of key, but it was not able to verify the other case (where the program
enters a loop searching for the next free slot). The main reason why KeY was not
able to prove the latter case is the lack of loop invariants to deal with the while-loop.
2.8.2.2 Specification Refinement
The output of KeY is then used to refine the Hoare triples in the specification based
on what was (partially) proved. The Hoare triples associated to JML contracts
which were fully verified by KeY are entirely removed from the specification, while
the precondition of the Hoare triples associated to partially proved JML contracts
are refined based on what KeY managed to prove. The new precondition is the
conjunction of the original precondition with the disjunction of new preconditions
corresponding to open proof goals, i.e., the path condition on each different execution
paths. Note that StaRVOOrS generates a new ppDATE specification script based
on such refinements, instead of modifying the provided ppDATE script.
In the example, the precondition of the Hoare triple add ok will be refined with
the condition for the one goal not closed by KeY, i.e.,
!(arr[hash function(key)] == null). The Hoare triple will thus be strengthened
as follows:
HT add_ok {
PRE {size < capacity && !(h[hash_function(key)] == null)}
METHOD {Hashtable.add}
POST {(\exists int i; i>=0 && i<capacity; arr[i]==o)}
ASSIGNABLE {size, arr[*]}
}
2.8.2.3 Translation and Instrumentation
Once the refined ppDATE specification is ready, StaRVOOrS translates it into
(pure) DATE formalism using the algorithm from Sec.2.7.2. This enables the monitor
generation by Larva (explained in the next stage). In addition, in order to properly
address the refined ppDATE, our tool operationalises the conditions and instruments
the code, as described below.
Pre/Postcondition Operationalisation
In this step, the tool syntactically analyses the specification for expressions in pre-
and postconditions of the Hoare triples which may have to be operationalised, i.e.,
transformed into algorithmic procedures. For instance, transforming either existential
or universal quantifications into loops.
During the operationalisation process, the tool creates Java code containing the
implementation of all necessary methods for runtime verification, including those
generated to algorithmically check the pre/postconditions.
In our example, as the postcondition of the Hoare triple add ok has an existential
quantifier, it has to be operationalised, producing the following method:
1 public static boolean add_ok_post_opE_1(Hashtable hasht,
2 Object o, int key) {
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3 boolean r = false;
4 for (int i = 0 ; i < hasht.capacity ; i++) {
5 if (hasht.arr[i] == o) { r = true ; break; }
6 }
7 return r;
8 }
The for-loop declaration in line 3 is created from the conditions in the range of
the existential quantification, i.e., i>=0 && i<capacity, and the condition of the
if-expression in line 4 is created from the condition in the body of the existential
quantification, i.e., arr[i]==o. Thus, if any value on the range of the existential
quantification fulfils its body, then this method returns true, i.e., exists a value that
fulfils the existential quantification. Otherwise, it returns false, i.e., it does not exist
a value fulfilling the existential quantification.
Code Instrumentation
Next, StaRVOOrS instruments the Java source code of the system adding identifiers
to each method associated to a Hoare triple in the refined ppDATE specification script,
and additional code to get fresh identifiers. As mentioned in Sec. 2.4, these identifiers
will be used to distinguish different executions of the same method. However, in order
to avoid modifying all the calls to these methods in the entire system, we have opted
to introduce this instrumentation in the form of auxiliary methods. For instance, in
our working example the method add has to be instrumented, resulting in:
public void add (Object o, int key) {
addAux(o,key,fid.getNewId());
}
public void addAux (Object o, int key, Integer id) {...}
The method addAux implementation corresponds to the body of method add in
Fig. 2.12. This method represents the instrumentation of method add with the
extra argument Integer id, which is used as identifier. In addition, method add
now simply calls addAux, but generating a fresh identifier for the call using function
fid.getNewId.
Moreover, the previously generated DATE specification is modified accordingly,
to refer to the instrumented version of the methods. In our example, the DATE
specification would be modified to refer to method addAux instead of method add.
2.8.2.4 Monitor Generation
Finally, StaRVOOrS uses Larva to automatically generate a monitor from the DATE
specification obtained in the previous stage. Larva takes this DATE and generates
the monitoring system and aspects instrumenting the communication between the
system and the monitor [46].
2.9 Case Study: SoftSlate Commerce
SoftSlate Commerce (or simply SoftSlate) [3] is an open-source Java shopping cart
web application designed following a Model-View-Controller architecture. A user
of SoftSlate sends a request to a server hosting the application via a web browser.
Then, the server processes the received request and executes an action associated to
it (Controller layer). Such action may require to interact with and/or modify the
information in the database (Model layer), e.g., information about users, products,
orders, etc. Finally, once the request is fully processed, the server sends back a
response to the user. The information in this response will be reflected on a web page
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loaded on the browser (View layer). The administrator of the application interacts
with it in a similar fashion.
SoftSlate offers a basic implementation of a shopping cart web application featuring
outer space related pictures, whose server is set up by using Apache Tomcat [1]. This
implementation is meant to be used by developers to start building their own web
applications.
In this case study we analyse an extension of the SoftSlate basic implementation.
This extension increases modularity of parts of the implementation, to better link it
to the required properties. Basically, we have created a few helper methods in order
to better observe the various steps performed by a user to checkout a purchase. In
addition, we have modified a few methods to receive an entire object instead of some
of its components, and to properly access the components.
As our main focus is to verify the source code offered by SoftSlate, in our
extension we are not adding any new feature to the ones already provided in the basic
implementation, i.e., the functionality of the basic implementation and our extension
is the same.
Note that when we started developing this case study there was an open source
version of SoftSlate available online. However, later, this version was not available
any more. Thus we cannot distribute the sources we have used. However, in [4] one
may find the files for the ppDATE specifications described below.
2.9.1 ppDATE specification
Here we introduce two ppDATEs specifications, one describing a property related to
the log in and log out of users in the web application, and one describing a property
related to the checkout of the purchases performed by the users of the application.
These properties address basic functionalities which we consider that a web cart
application should offer.
Note that even though we could have either described more properties or specified
more control- and data-oriented behaviour in the properties we are depicting in this
section, the ppDATEs introduced here are sufficient to highlight the benefits of using
StaRVOOrS in a real application. In addition, for readability reasons, Hoare triples
are not going to be included on the figures depicting the ppDATEs. Moreover, as the
application is placed in a server, the monitor generated by our tool is placed in the
server as well.
Login — Logout
Users can freely browse through the web site of the application. However, if they
want to buy products (i.e., pictures), they have to be logged in the application, to be
able to proceed to the checkout section.
Fig. 2.14 and Fig. 2.15 illustrate the specification. The ppDATE in Fig. 2.14
creates instances of the ppDATE template login-logout whenever an object of class
User is created, and the ppDATE template login-logout (Fig. 2.15) describes the
following properties:
(i) A user has to be logged in the application in order to perform a purchase, i.e.,
the checkout of a purchase can only happen between a login and a logout.
(ii) If a user is logged in, then that user cannot successfully log in again in the
application until she logs out from it.
(iii) If a user is not logged-in, then that user cannot successfully log out from the
application.
(iv) A user can only proceed to the checkout section if her status is a valid one.
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start
User.new↑ | true 7→ create(login-logout, \result)
Figure 2.14: ppDATE in charge of creating instances of the template login-
logout.
login-logout = λ u : User.
logoutstart login
bad
login(u)↑ | Ok 7→ skip
logout(u) ↑| O
k 7→
skip
orderComplete(u) ↓| true 7→
skip
login(u)↑ | Fails 7→ skip
login(u)↑ | Ok 7→ skip
logout(u)↑ | Ok 7→ skip
logout(u)↑ | Fails 7→ skip
orderComplete(u)↓ | true 7→ skip
Figure 2.15: ppDATE template describing properties about the log in and log
out of users.
(v) A user who is not a costumer cannot proceed to the checkout section.
The transitions of the ppDATE described by the template control properties
(i)–(iii). Initially, this ppDATE is in state logout. Then, whenever there is a successful
login, the ppDATE moves to state login. Later, once the user logs out, the ppDATE
returns to state logout. Therefore, if a purchase is performed (i.e., an order is checkout)
while the ppDATE is in state login, then the ppDATE remains in that state. However,
if a purchase is performed while the ppDATE is in state logout, then it shifts to
state bad.12 In addition, while being at state logout, if an attempt to log in is not
successful, then the ppDATE stays in that state; and if there is a successful logout,
then the ppDATE shifts to state bad due to the fact the user is considered to be
logged out while the ppDATE is in that particular state. Something similar happens
when the ppDATE is in state login. (In Fig. 2.15, Fails and Ok are abbreviations, for
presentation purpose, of real Java expression checking the failure or success of the
respective operations.)
12Shifting to state bad means that a property was violated.
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start
User.new↑ | true 7→ create(prop-checkout, \result)
Figure 2.16: ppDATE in charge of creating instances of the template prop-
checkout.
Regarding properties (iv) and (v), they are addressed using Hoare triples. For
instance, property (iv) is represented as follows:
{ !baseForm.getUserStatus().equals("Registered")
&& !baseForm.getUserStatus().equals("Unapproved"); }
prepareCheckout(baseForm)
{ \result.equals("success"); }
As the only non valid statuses are “Registered” and “Unapproved”, if the status
of the user is not one of these values, then starting a purchase, i.e., using method
prepareCheckout, should return “success”. Regarding property (v), a user is only
considered to be a costumer if she has logged-in into the application. Even though
this property seems to be similar to property (i), this similarity is only apparent.
Property (i) only addresses the proper order in which the methods should be executed,
whereas property (v) focuses on controlling how the data related to a user is modified
during such executions. Finally, both properties (iv) and (v) are only placed in state
login because that is the only state in which a successful purchase can occur, i.e., (iv)
and (v) are context dependent data-oriented properties.
Purchases Checkout
We consider that a purchase starts whenever an item (i.e., a product) is added to the
cart. A user can continue either by adding other items to the cart or by removing
some of the items from the cart. We refer to all the items in a cart as the order.
Once the user finishes the creation of her order, she may proceed to the checkout
page. In SoftSlate, a checkout is realised in four steps. First, the user enters the
contact information and delivery address. Then, the shipping method is selected
(either ground transport or air transport), after which the user enters her credit card
details. Finally, a confirmation for the order is requested. If accepted, the order
is settled. Later, when the user receives the items, the order is considered to be
completed.
Note that a user can modify her order as long as she has not yet confirmed it. If
so, whenever she proceeds to the checkout section again, all its required steps have
to be performed one more time. In addition, if the user removes all the items in an
order, clears the cart or logs out13, then the order is considered to be removed.
Fig. 2.16 and Fig. 2.17 illustrate a ppDATE specification where the ppDATE
in Fig. 2.16 creates instances of the ppDATE template prop-checkout whenever an
object of class User is created, and the ppDATE template prop-checkout (Fig. 2.17)
describes the following properties:
(1) The checkout of a purchase should be performed following the four required steps.
13Logging out clears the cart.
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Figure 2.17: ppDATE template describing properties related to checkout of
purchases.
(2) It should not be possible to buy zero or less items.
(3) The expiration date of the credit card should not earlier than the current date.
(4) The price of a product should be positive.
(5) Before a purchase is completed, taxes should be processed.
(6) The total cost of a purchase should be equal to the sum of the prices of all the
products to be purchased.
(7) If the price of an item changes, then its price in the order of the user should be
updated.
Again, consider the transitions of the ppDATE described by the template. When
the first item is added to the cart, the ppDATE shifts to state one. In this state,
once the first step of the checkout is completed, the ppDATE shifts to state two, and
so on until reaching state four. In state four, once the order is settled, the ppDATE
shifts back to state start in order to wait for a possible new purchase. Moreover,
while being at either state one, two, three or four, if there is any change in the order,
then the ppDATE shifts to state one, meaning that all the steps of the checkout have
to be performed again. This is enough to control property (1).
Note that for readability reasons, in states one, two, three and four we have not
included transitions going to state start whenever the user logs out, the cart is cleared
or all the items in the cart are removed. In addition, we have not included transitions
going to state bad from either state one, two, three or four if a step of the checkout
was performed in a wrong way. For instance, if while being at state one either a
second step, a third step or a fourth step of a purchase occurs instead of the first
step, then the ppDATE shifts to state bad.
Regarding property (7), since the method in charge of updating the orders
whenever the price of an item changes in the database is fully implemented using
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different Java libraries, writing an appropriate Hoare triple for it would require
introducing several work-arounds, e.g., defining stub versions of the methods associated
to the different libraries and introducing invariants (or properties) regarding what
would be expected as their behaviour. Instead, we implemented a method which
compares the prices of the items in the order with their prices in the database, and
include it as part of the information validation process corresponding to the fourth
step of the purchase. Thereby, in state four there are two transitions controlling the
result of this method. (Most real world applications of this kind would guarantee
prices for some defined duration, and adjust it when that time has passed. For
simplicity, we only model the latter in (7).)
Properties (2)–(6) are addressed with Hoare triples. Properties (2)–(4) are related
to the integrity of the information introduced by either the users, in the case of
(2) and (3), or the administrator, in the case of (4), on their requests to the server.
Property (5) is related to the proper processing of taxes associated to the items in
the current order. Property (6) enforces that the total amount that the user has to
pay for her order should be equal to the sum of the totals of all the items included in
the order.
As items could be added to the cart at any time during a purchase, property (2)
is included in all the states of the ppDATE, with exception of the state bad.
On the other hand, property (3) is context dependent. This property should only
be enforced on state three, which represents the step of a purchase where a user enters
her credit card details. Note that, as it is in this case, a single property might be
associated to several Hoare triples. For instance, below we introduce two of the four
Hoare triples which describe property (3),
{ cardYear > actualYear; }
checkDate(cardMonth,cardYear, actualMonth,actualYear)
{ \result; }
{ cardYear < actualYear; }
checkDate(cardMonth,cardYear, actualMonth,actualYear)
{ !\result; }
Regarding property (4), we assume that initially all the data in the database is
properly set. Therefore, this property should only be enforced every time that the
administrator modifies the price of an item. As this may happen at any time during
a purchase, this property is included in all the states of the ppDATE, with exception
of the state bad.
In relation to property (5), in SoftSlate whenever the taxes of items are processed,
the status of the order changes to “Tax processed”. This change is done by using the
following method,
public void setStatus(String s) { status = s;}
This method might be simply specified as follows:
{ true; } setStatus(s) { status.equals(s); }
However, due to the fact that taxes are processed while the ppDATE is in state four,
that we know which particular value should be written when updating the status
of the order, i.e., “Tax processed”, and that ppDATE allows us to write context
dependent properties, we include in four the following Hoare triple:
{ true; } setStatus(s) { status.equals("Tax processed"); }
Regarding property (6), it is represented by the following Hoare triple:
{ true; }
updateOrderAndDeliveryTotals(user,order,item)
{ user.getOrder().getSubtotal().doubleValue() ==
(\old(user).getOrder().getSubtotal().doubleValue()
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+ item.getTotal().doubleValue());}
In short, the new total amount is equal to the old total amount plus the amount of
the newly added item.
2.9.2 Using StaRVOOrS
The previous specifications were analysed on a PC Pentium Core i7 using a single
core. A similar setup was used to perform the experiments in the following section
(2.9.3).
Since SoftSlate uses many Java libraries, to perform static analysis on its source
code it was necessary to generate stub files for some of these libraries in order to
allow KeY to find information about their method declarations.
Login — Logout
When feeding StaRVOOrS with this property and the source code of SoftSlate, it
automatically generates a runtime monitored version of the application and a report
which summarises the results obtained from the static analysis.
Regarding the result of the translation, it consisted of a DATE specification
which looks exactly like the original ppDATE specification. The static analysis
and instrumentation process takes 11 seconds, where most time is used by KeY to
statically analyse the Hoare triples (approximately 7 seconds). By inspecting the
report we notice that KeY successfully verified all the Hoare triples in the ppDATE
specification. Thus, the refined ppDATE specification to be translated was already
a DATE, .i.e, the translation process did not have add any new transitions to the
specification.
Purchases Checkout
When feeding StaRVOOrS with this property and the source code of SoftSlate, it
automatically generates a runtime monitored version of the application and a report
which summarises the results obtained from the static analysis. The static analysis
and instrumentation process takes 23 seconds, where most time is used by KeY to
statically analyse the Hoare triples (approximately 20 seconds). By inspecting the
report we can see that properties (2) and (3) are fully proved, properties (4) and (5)
are not proved, and that property (6) and (7) are partially proved.
Regarding property (7), as KeY does not have any information about the state of
purchases, and this property is context dependent, obviously, it is not able to prove
it. However, thanks to the use of StaRVOOrS we can include this property in an
appropriate state of the ppDATE, fact which guaranties that whenever a purchase
reaches such state, this property is going to be verified at runtime by the generated
monitor.
Regarding property (6), the report shows that this property postcondition is
going to be checked upon entering method updateOrderAndDeliveryTotals only if
the condition user.getOrder() != null holds. Thereby, this property is refined by
StaRVOOrS as follows:
{ user.getOrder() != null; }
updateOrderAndDeliveryTotals(user,order,item)
{ user.getOrder().getSubtotal().doubleValue() ==
(\old(user).getOrder().getSubtotal().doubleValue()
+ item.getTotal().doubleValue());}
This refined version of property (6) is the one verified by the generated monitor at
runtime.
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Finally, the result of the translation consisted on one DATE to create instances
of the obtained DATE template prop-checkout (the translation of its homonymous
ppDATE template), and three generated DATE templates whose instances verify
properties (4)–(6). Note that the instances of the generated DATE templates are
created by actions on the transitions of the DATE template prop-checkout.
2.9.3 Experimentation
2.9.3.1 Properties Analysis
Login — Logout
Although this property may appear to be simple, by verifying it we discovered
unexpected behaviour in SoftSlate when a user logs in, performs a purchase, and logs
out. In spite of the fact that the user was logged in the application, the monitor
flagged a violation of property (iii). It turned out that after performing the purchase,
SoftSlate replaced the object representing the logged-in user by a new one.
More concretely, the log file generated by the monitor showed that a new monitor,
corresponding to a new instance of the template login-logout, was generated for the
‘new’ user. So, we got two different user objects, the one who originally logged in
into the system (let’s call it ulogged) and the new generated one (let’s call it unew ).
The new monitor (corresponding to the user unew ) would then be in its initial state,
that is in the state logout. Thus, when the (real) user tried to log out, the monitor
corresponding to user unew shifted to a bad state, while the monitor corresponding to
user ulogged remained in state login. As a consequence, property (iii) was violated.
In order to understand whether this is an error in the implementation we inspected
the source code to better understand how the login and purchase were implemented.
We found that each instance of class User was associated to a session, whose informa-
tion was unique for each different execution of the application. Though the relation
between (real) users and the session is bijective (for each real user there is a unique
session, and vice versa), there were (at least) two instances of the class User, ulogged
and unew , associated with each session.
We were not sure what were the real reasons behind this design decision, but the
implementation seemed correct, and our specification did not capture this situation.
So, we decided to change our ppDATE template to capture this by including a
Boolean variable reflecting whether the (real) user was connected or not, which we
refer to as active. The updated ppDATE template is shown in Fig. 2.18. Further
executions of the system (reproducing the previous executions and providing new
ones) did not violate this property.
Purchases Checkout
We also run the system many times in order to analyse whether the execution of
SoftSlate fulfils the properties described by the provided ppDATE specification.
First, we performed several purchases to analyse if property (1) was fulfilled. We
added some items to the cart, bought them, and added and removed items at any
stage of the checkout of a purchase, and then completed the purchase. None of these
operations violated this property. We re-run the system executing the same steps as
above to check property (5), which was not violated.
Next, we continued performing purchases, but this time the administrator of the
application introduced modifications in the price of some items during the purchases.
By doing so we were able to analyse whether properties (4), (6) and (7) were violated.14
14Remember that properties (2) and (3) were fully proved statically.
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Figure 2.18: Extension on the ppDATE describing properties related to the
log in and log out of users illustrated in Fig. 2.15.
In order to check whether property (4) held, we executed the system logged in
as administrator and as a normal user (in parallel). The user performed a purchase
(and thus the item was added to the cart), and as administrator we modified the
price of the item introducing a negative value as its new price. At this moment
the monitor reported that property (4) was violated. By inspecting the price of the
modified item in the database, we could confirm that the negative value provided by
the administrator was actually assigned to the item. This clearly was an error. We
corrected this by not allowing to input negative numbers, and thus property (4) was
finally satisfied.
On the other hand, when the administrator modified the price of an item intro-
ducing a positive value as its new price, then property (4) was fulfilled as expected.
However, we noticed that property (7) was violated: some of the prices of the items
in the order did not match with the prices in the database.15 In particular, the
mismatched values were those that were modified by the administrator: the new
prices were propagated to the database but they were not updated in the visualisation
of the cart (to the user). This was an error, and when inspecting the code we realised
that there was a method implementing the propagation of the update, but it was not
called when the change (done by the administrator) was performed. We have not yet
corrected this error in the original code.
Property (6) was not violated by any of the previous executions.
15This also happened when entering negative numbers, but we only found out this when
focusing on checking property (7) after correcting the issue with negative inputs.
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Purchases (a) no monitoring (b) monitoring S (c) monitoring S′
1 800 ms 1,300 ms 1,100 ms
10 10,500 ms 15,500 ms 13,000 ms
100 120,000 ms 190,000 ms 150,000 ms
Table 2.1: Performance of different purchases.
2.9.3.2 Runtime Verification Overhead Analysis
In this section we analyse the overhead added to SoftSlate by the monitor generated
using StaRVOOrS. To perform this analysis, we considered three scenarios: several
users performed one purchase, 10 purchases in a row, and 100 purchases in a row.
Table 2.1 shows the average execution time of: (a) an unmonitored execution
of SoftSlate; (b) a monitored execution of SoftSlate using the original ppDATE
specification S, and (c) a monitored execution of SoftSlate using specification S’,
obtained from S via static (partial) proof analysis using StaRVOOrS. In all three
scenarios, the users and the server hosting SoftSlate were run in different computers
with identical specifications (a PC Intel Core i7 using a single core). Note that as
SoftSlate is an interactive application, in order to perform these experiments we have
implemented a program which uses url connections to access the application and
perform a purchase16. Therefore, our experiments consist on executing this program
repeatedly and measuring its execution time.
As expected, adding a monitor to SoftSlate introduced overhead on its execution
time. However, when we compared the overhead added by the monitor which uses the
original ppDATE specification (without optimisations) (b), with the one added by the
monitor which was generated using StaRVOOrS (c), one could notice a reduction in
overheads gained by using our tool.
Through optimisations introduced by StaRVOOrS, we obtained a version of
the monitor which, in relation to the times in (a), introduced in average a 25% of
overhead to the execution time of the system. On the contrary, the monitor without
the optimisations of StaRVOOrS introduced a 50% of overhead to the execution
time.
Even though these results are not as impressive as the one we obtained on the
case study analysed in [10] (Mondex, also reported here in Sec. 2.10), the monitor
generated by our tool for SoftSlate still has a better performance than the one which
uses the original ppDATE specification. The main difference lies in the amount of
Hoare triples which have to be runtime verified in each case study. Every time an
experiment is performed to analyse SoftSlate, the optimised monitor generated by
StaRVOOrS verifies 3 Hoare triples, whereas the monitor using the original ppDATE
specification (without optimisations) verifies 5. However, each experiment performed
on Mondex requires the verification of 7 Hoare triples when using the unoptimised
version of the monitor, whereas the optimised one does not have to verify any Hoare
triples at all (cf. Sec. 2.10).
2.10 Case study: Mondex
Mondex is an electronic purse application which is used by smart cards products [2],
and has been considered as a verification benchmark problem since 2006, originally
appearing as case study as part of the Verified Software Grand Challenge [95].
16The package java.net is used here to handle the communication between our program
and SoftSlate.
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Mondex’s original sanitised specification can be found in [85]. It consists of a Z
specification [84], together with hand-written proofs of several properties.
Mondex essentially provides a financial transaction system supporting transferring
of funds between accounts, or purses. Whenever a person has to make a transaction,
electronic money is taken from their electronic purse and transferred to the target
electronic purse. Such transactions are performed following a multi-step message
exchange protocol: (1) the source and destination purses should (independently)
register with the central fund transferring manager; (2) await a request to deduct
funds from the source purse; (3) await a request to add the funds to the destination
purse; and finally (4) an acknowledgement is sent to indicate that the transfer took
place before the transaction ends.
In our version of this case study we consider a Java implementation running on a
desktop computer instead of a Java Card implementation running on smart cards.
The principal difference in the implementation is that in our version some methods
return values to indicate whether their output is normal or erroneous, instead of
raising Java Card exceptions. Our specification is strongly inspired by the JML
formalisation presented in [88]. The full specification and source code of our case
study can be found in [4]. The specification (see Fig. 2.19) consists of a ppDATE with
10 states, 25 transitions and a total of 26 different Hoare triples. The implementation
of Mondex consists on 514 lines of code (without comments) which are distributed
over 8 files.
Note that ppDATE allows us to represent the overall status of the observer using
ppDATE states. In other pre/post-style specification approaches, one would instead
introduce additional data, and corresponding additional constraints, as is indeed done
in [88] when specifying Mondex with JML. Such additional data implies a certain
complexity of the specification, which somehow lacks the structure of the problem. We
believe that specifications of this kind are sometimes developed with an automaton in
mind. In ppDATE, we can make that automaton explicit. This being said, we want
to stress again that we took great advantage of the JML specification of Mondex
in [88].
2.10.1 ppDATE Property
Fig. 2.19 illustrates a ppDATE describing the top-level specification of Mondex. To
keep the ppDATE readable, the description of the different Hoare triples are not
included in the figure. (We will show some of them below.)
At the automaton level, the ppDATE specifies the control-oriented property
which indicates how the multi-step message exchange protocol is suppose to work.
For instance, after the parties are initialised (encoded in state Parties Initialised), a
message requesting to transfer more money than the one available in the source purse
should fail. Otherwise, such a message should take the ppDATE to a state in which
the protocol now allows for the money to be transferred to the destination purse
(named Money deducted). Note that the ppDATE will not take any explicit action
whenever the state BAD STATE is reached. It will stay in this state until the whole
monitor is restarted.
In contrast, the pre/postconditions properties placed on the states of the ppDATE
ensure the well-behaviour of the methods involved in the individual steps of the
protocol, behaviour which obviously changes together with the status of the protocol.
For instance, once two purses agree on participating in a money transfer and the
destination purse has requested for certain amount of money, (encoded in state Money
Deducted), method val operation which transfers money from the source purse to
the destination one should succeed and increase the money of the destination purse
by the sent amount (provided the limit of its account has not been reached), as shown
in the Hoare triple below:
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In addition:
 All states have outgoing transitions for ret == SUCCESS && SENDER != party (where
party is the party from whom a message is not expected), going to a bad state.
 All states but Awating end have outgoing transitions for end transfer, going to a bad
state.
Figure 2.19: ppDATE template describing the transaction protocol of Mondex
to perform a transference.
{ checkSameTransaction() == SUCCESS
&& transaction.value <= (ShortMaxValue - balance); }
val_operation
{ \result == SUCCESS
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&& (balance == \old(balance) + transaction.value); }
On the other hand, if the same method is accessed after the funds have already
been transferred (encoded in state Money deposit), then the destination purse content
should remain unchanged, and the request should be ignored:
{ checkSameTransaction() == SUCCESS
&& transaction.value <= (ShortMaxValue - balance); }
val_operation
{ \result == IGNORED; }
Note that both Hoare triples above have the same precondition, but depending
on the state of the ppDATE (i.e., the state of the protocol) different behaviours (i.e.,
postconditions) are expected for method val_operation.
2.10.2 Using StaRVOOrS
For this case study, we have used a setup identical to the one described in Sec. 2.10.2.
Running StaRVOOrS on the source code of Mondex and the ppDATE depicted
in Fig. 2.19 automatically produces a runtime monitored version of the application
and a report summarising the results obtained from the static analysis. The static
analysis and instrumentation process takes 1 minute 20 seconds, where most time
is used by KeY to statically analyse the Hoare triples (approximately 1 minute 15
seconds).
The monitor generated by our tool consists one DATE to control the main
property, and 24 DATEs templates to control the postconditions which were only
partially verified by KeY, with 106 states and 196 transitions in total. By inspecting
the report we can see that the two Hoare triples associated to the initialisation and
termination of a transaction were fully proved, and that all the other 24 triples about
the methods involved in the transaction protocol were the partially verified ones. For
instance, let us consider the property already discussed in the previous section about
method val_operation, which we will refer here to as val operation ok :
{ checkSameTransaction() == SUCCESS
&& transaction.value <= (ShortMaxValue - balance); }
val_operation
{ \result == SUCCESS
&& (balance == \old(balance) + transaction.value); }
The report shows that the postcondition will have to be checked at runtime only when
the condition status != 2 holds upon entering val_operation (i.e., the destination
purse is not waiting for the arrival of the requested money). Thus, the previous Hoare
triple was refined by StaRVOOrS as follows:
{ checkSameTransaction() == SUCCESS
&& transaction.value <= (ShortMaxValue - balance)
&& !(status == ProtocolStatus.Epv); }
val_operation
{ \result == SUCCESS
&& (balance == \old(balance) + transaction.value); }
This refined version of the property is the one which will be runtime verified by the
generated monitor.
The size of the source code of the original implementation of Mondex was 23.5kB.
After running the tool, the total size of all the generated files (i.e. instrumented
version of the source code and the implementation of the monitor) grows to 277.4kB.
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Transactions (a) no monitoring (b) monitoring S (c) monitoring S′
10 8 ms 120 ms 15 ms
100 50 ms 3500 ms 90 ms
1000 250 ms 330000 ms 375 ms
Figure 2.20: Performance of different transactions which do not violate any of
the specified properties
2.10.3 Experimentation
We now summarise the experimental results of applying our approach to the Mondex
case study.
2.10.3.1 Normal Behaviour
The table 2.20 shows the execution time of: (a) an unmonitored implementation of
Mondex; (b) a monitored implementation using the original ppDATE specification S,
and (c) a monitored implementation using specification S’, obtained from S via static
(partial) proof analysis using StaRVOOrS. In all three scenarios, the system is run
over a numbers of transactions which do not violate the specification. Note that in
case (c), statically analysing all the Hoare triples took KeY around 1 minute, which
however is done once and for all prior to deployment.
As one would expect, the addition of a monitor to the system introduces execution
time overhead (b). However, if we compare this overhead to the one added by the
monitor which was generated by StaRVOOrS (c), one can see a substantial overhead
reduction, gained through the use of our tool. Through our optimisations we obtain
a version which is at least 10 times faster for a low number of transactions, and this
factor rises up to 900 when the number of transactions is increased. This significant
reduction in execution time overheads is mainly due to the fact that monitoring
data-centric properties may be prohibitively expensive. In fact, using S, each method
invocation involved in the transfer protocol creates an additional DATE that will
check the postcondition on exit. However, the postcondition checker is only created
if the precondition holds on method invocation. In this case study, this causes large
overheads when monitoring the unoptimised specification. Using the results from
static verification, however, strengthens the preconditions by additional constraints,
which in the Mondex case state were always falsified at invocation time, meaning that
no postcondition checker is ever created. Apparently, in Mondex, the algorithmic
complexity of the individual method implementations is limited enough such that KeY
could fully prove the methods correct (automatically) if only the internal constraints
corresponding to the ppDATE states were provided to KeY. But as they are not,
KeY generates those constraints (closed branch conditions, see Sec. 2.4), and adds
their negation to the preconditions. With that, the preconditions are never true at
runtime. This phenomenon cannot be fully generalised to cases where KeY really
lacks (automated) proving power for the code at hand, or where the code is faulty of
course.
2.10.3.2 Faulty Behaviour
Usually, it is hard to get full proofs when using a static verifier like KeY without
considering either user interaction with the prover or the use of special annotations,
e.g., loop invariants, to help the prover on its task. However, it might be the case that
the static verifier does not succeed in closing a branch in the proof due to the fact that
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the remaining open goal was generated by an erroneous execution path. KeY cannot
per se determine which one of these situations is dealing with. Fortunately, Larva
can detect the occurrence of the erroneous case whenever it appears at runtime.
We have intentionally injected errors into Mondex source to verify that the
optimised monitor still detects them. Consider the case of a bug in the implementation
of method val operation — the value of variable balance is incremented with a
different amount from the one given in the specification of the method. When
analysing property val operation ok, KeY obviously does not manage to prove it.
Therefore, the whole property will have to be runtime verified. The monitor spots
this error reaching a bad state.
In addition, we have also considered incomplete and wrong specifications. In
the case where the specification is too weak, the implementation may fulfil it for
wrong reasons. As in all verification approaches, we may not catch this kind of
problem. When using our verification approach there lies the possibility that the
problem propagates to a state in which the specification is strong enough to identify
it. For example, consider if the specification does not specify how the variables
of a purse should be initialised by the ConPurse class constructor, and there is an
implementation error where the variable balance is initialised to −1 instead of being
initialised to 0. In spite of the error in the specification, KeY would proceed normally
with the proofs and the previous particular situation would not be directly controlled
on runtime. However, this erroneous initialisation leads to an erroneous initial charge
of money in the purses (performed using the method chargeMoney in class ConPurse).
As balance is negative, the previous method fails to update it with the new amount of
money. Hence, after applying chargeMoney the value of balance is still −1. Thereby,
whenever a purse tries to begin a transfer, either the method initialising the sender
purse during a transaction or the method initialising the receiver purse during a
transaction will fail its execution (the former due to insufficient funds and the latter
due to a value overflow). This failure leads to an unsuccessful termination of the
transfer, which is detected by the monitor controlling the transaction protocol and
takes it to a bad state. This analysis can be easily concluded by inspecting the
execution trace generated by the monitor. This trace allows one to backtrack through
the execution of the different methods until reaching the one that was the cause the
failure. In this scenario, it is important to note that in spite of the fact that we have
not enforced any Hoare triple on the constructor of class ConPurse, it was specified
and proved correct using KeY.
On the other hand, if a Hoare triple has an overly weak precondition or overly
strong postcondition, then KeY will fail to prove the Hoare triple. StaRVOOrS thus
ensures that the Hoare triple is checked at runtime, which allows us to realise the issue
when expected results arise. Finally, another scenario is when the user uses erroneous
data, not detected by the application. For instance, a user might request a transfer
exceeding the amount of money in a purse. In this situation, the method initialising
the sender purse during a transaction will fail its execution due to insufficient funds
and this will lead to an unsuccessful termination of the transfer. This unsuccessful
termination is detected by the runtime monitor controlling the transaction protocol.
2.11 Related Work
The combination of different verification techniques is gaining more and more popu-
larity. One active area of research is the combination of testing and static analysis,
e.g. [19,32,39,47,57,59,87]. Those works we have different objectives. We are not
aiming at generating test cases, but at monitoring the actual post-deployment runs
of the system. What we have in common is that static analysis/verification is used
to limit the dynamic efforts, there by filtering test cases, here by filtering checks at
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runtime.
Another line of research is the combination of testing and runtime verification.
Decker et al. in [51] introduce an extension of the testing framework JUnit, which
adds runtime verification artefacts to it. In this extension, during the execution of a
test, a monitor is in charge of checking whether the actual executed test conforms
with the property being monitored. In [18] Artho et al. present a framework where
automated test case generation benefits from the use of runtime verification in a
similar way to [51]. Falzon and Pace [55] study the combination of QuickCheck
and Larva by presenting a technique which extracts monitors from a QuickCheck
testing specification. Even though this line of work has a different objective when
compare to ours, it is worth mentioning that the QuickCheck automata used in [55]
are quite similar to ppDATEs. QuickCheck automata employ pre/postconditions as
part of their transitions, as opposed to ppDATEs which include them in the states of
the automata. This similarity may suggest that it might be possible to extend our
approach by also including the possibility of perform testing.
Another area worth mentioning is the combination of runtime assertion checks
with runtime verification. In [48] de Boer et al. present SAGA, a framework which
combines runtime assertion checking with monitoring. In contrast to our approach
which targets data- and control-oriented properties in general, SAGA focuses only on
the verification of data-flow and control-flow properties of Java classes and interfaces,
e.g., interaction protocol among objects.
However, we are mainly interested in the combination of static verification and
runtime verification such that static verification is used to reduce the overhead
introduced to the system execution by monitoring properties. Wonisch et al. in [94]
make use of program transformations in order to avoid unsafe program executions.
In [30] the efficiency of runtime monitoring based on tracematches is improved by
using a static analysis technique which reduces the runtime instrumentation needed.
The technique consists on three stages: exclusion of some tracematches, elimination
of inconsistent instrumentation points, and additionally refinement of this analysis
considering the order of execution.
Other works use this kind of combination but with different goals. In [31] Bodden
and Lam present CLARA, a framework which uses static techniques aiming to
improve the monitors themselves, instead of verifying software. The work by Zee
et al. in [96] investigates the combination of static and runtime verification, but
aiming at a specification language whose specifications may be both statically and
runtime checked. With this goal in mind, they extend the static verifier Jahob by
adding techniques to verify specifications at runtime. In this approach, most of
the properties which can be verified are data-oriented, as opposed to ours where
control-oriented properties are covered as well. In [83] So¨zer integrates static code
analysis and runtime verification. On this approach, runtime verification statements
are created from static code analysis alerts, in order to generate monitors which will
allow to both check for possible faults in the system and eliminate false positives
obtained in the static phase.
Many specification approaches, such as SPARK [21], JML [72] and SPEC# [22]
are supported by both static and runtime verification tools. Nevertheless, to the best
of our knowledge, static verification is not used to optimise the runtime verification
of properties.
2.12 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented StaRVOOrS, a framework for verifying integrated
data- and control-oriented properties for Java programs, using a combination of
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static and runtime verification. The StaRVOOrS tool-chain uses KeY [9] for static
verification, and Larva [46] for the verification performed at runtime.
We have presented the language ppDATE which is based on automata and
pre/post conditions to describe properties of both, the control flow and the data
computations. The basic structuring principle of the language is the composition of
parallel automata, whose transitions fire simultaneously in reaction to events of the
observed system, but also in reaction to events generated by some automata in the
previous step. A distinguishing feature of the language is the inclusion of functional
properties of computation units into the above, thereby capturing the dependency
of functional properties on the history of previous events, by assigning Hoare triples
to (automata-theoretic) states. Finally, the template concept allows to parameterise
components in a great variety of ways, and create concrete instantiations dynamically.
We also presented here a semantics of ppDATEs, precisely describing the interplay
of transitions, event consumption and generation, Hoare triple monitoring, creation
of template instances. We then use the semantics to prove soundness of the algorithm
our tool uses to translate ppDATE into DATE, allowing us to employ the DATE tool
Larva as a back-end for runtime verifying ppDATE specifications.
This article also reports on the application of StaRVOOrS to SoftSlate, an
open-source shopping cart web application. In this case study, we analyse ppDATEs
describing properties about the proper behaviour of the system while users perform
purchases. We selected this case study because verifying a real application is always
quite challenging, and dealing with it would gave us a better perspective regarding
the benefits which can be obtained when using our tool. We also report on the
application of StaRVOOrS to the verification benchmark Mondex, an electronic
purse application. We demonstrate how properties can be verified using combined
static and runtime verification. This case study was selected because it is a usual
benchmark in the static verification community, and we thought that it would be
interesting to analyse what the use of runtime verification could bring into play.
As with all case studies, the empirical observations are difficult to generalise.
However, our experimental results give an indication of what gains are possible with
our technique. For SoftSlate, the overhead of pure runtime verification (without
employing static verification) is roughly 50%, a penalty which we get down to roughly
25% when using StaRVOOrS, by facilitating static verification (cf. Sec. 2.9.3.2).
These differences are much smaller compared to when we applied StaRVOOrS to the
Mondex case study, where pure runtime verification created a much higher overhead.
Compared to that, the monitor created by StaRVOOrS was 10 times faster for a
low number of transactions, and up to 900 times faster as the number of transactions
increase. ‘When using the monitor generated from the original specification provided
for Mondex, the execution of each method involved in a transaction (7 in total)
creates an additional DATE to be traversed in parallel, which is in charge of checking
the postcondition. This would lead to the large overheads obtained in that case
study. However, when using the monitor generated by StaRVOOrS, thanks to
the optimisations introduced in the specification by this tool, no additional DATEs
are created when a transaction is performed, because the additional checks in the
preconditions are false at runtime.
As a final remark, note that the efficiency gain for monitoring will benefit from
any improvements in the used static and runtime verifiers. For instance, if KeY
is improved in such a way that more branches are closed during the static proof,
then this will have an immediate effect in StaRVOOrS thus reducing the runtime
overhead. Similarly, any optimisation performed in Larva will only bring benefits to
our tool.
We are currently looking at ways of pushing our techniques further. On one hand,
we are looking at techniques to add control-flow static analysis to StaRVOOrS, thus
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benefiting from further optimisation prior to deployment. We are also looking at
extending the framework to deal with distributed systems [15], which brings in new
challenges, and might require assume-guarantee reasoning to enable us to perform
static analysis based optimisations.
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A Proofs of Coupling Invariant Lemmas
In order to prove both Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we introduce the following two
propositions. Prop. 1 says that the translation algorithm only modifies the actions
of the transitions in the translated ppDATE network. Prop. 2 says that for every
transition in the translation either there is a similar transition in the original ppDATE
network, or there is not such a transition, due to the fact that the transition is a new
loop transition (added by the translation to control Hoare triples).
Remember that we represent the translation of a single ppDATE to DATE with
the function κ ∈ ppDATE 7→ DATE.
Proposition 1. Given a ppDATE network pn = (M,V, ν0, Tppd) and its translation
ppd2DATE(pn) = (M ′, V, ν0, T ′d),
∀ m, q, q′, tr, c, a ·
q
tr|c7→a−−−−→m q′ and m ∈M and κ(m) ∈M ′·
(∃ a′ · q tr|c7→a
′
−−−−−→κ(m) q′)
Proof. Given a ppDATE m ∈M and a state q ∈ Qm, whenever Πm(q) = ∅, Πm(q) 6= ∅
but there is no Hoare triple associated to the method related to trigger tr, or the
trigger is associated to exiting a method, by Step 3b., transitions remain unchanged
in the translation. Therefore, a′ = a in these cases.
On the other hand, for each clashing Hoare triple {pi}σ {pi′} ∈ Πm(q), by step
3a2., the transition q
tr|c7→a−−−−→m q′ is replaced by one of the following transitions:
q
tr|c 7→{a; ifpi then create(post checker,(σ↑
id
,pi′)}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→κ(m) q′, or
q
tr|c 7→{a; ifpi then create(post checker h,(σ↑
id
,vali)}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→κ(m) q′.
Thereby, either a′ = a; ifpi then create(post checker, (e↑id, pi
′)}, or
a′ = a; ifpi then create(post checker h, (e↑id, vali)} .
Finally, as in step 3a1 non-clashing Hoare triples add new transitions but do not
modified existing ones, this case trivially holds.
Proposition 2. Given a ppDATE network pn = (M,V, ν0, Tppd) and its translation
ppd2DATE(pn) = (M ′, V, ν0, T ′d),
∀ m′, q, q′, tr, c, a ·
q
tr|c7→a−−−−→m′ q′ and m′ ∈M ′·
(∃ m,a′ ·m ∈M,κ(m) = m′ · q tr|c7→a
′
−−−−−→m q′)
or
((@ m,a′ ·m ∈M,κ(m) = m′ · q tr|c 7→a
′
−−−−−→m q′) and (q = q′))
Proof. Each transition t′ ∈ t′m for any m′ ∈M ′ is obtained by applying either step
3a1, 3a2 or 4b.
If t′ was obtained by applying step 3a1, then it is a new loop transition added
by the translation, i.e., its origin and destination states are the same, and given a
ppDATE m ∈M such that κ(m) = m′, there not exists a transition associated to t′
in m. Therefore, the right side of the disjunction holds.
If t′ was obtained by applying step 3a2, then, given a ppDATE m ∈ M such
that κ(m) = m′, either there exists one transition on m with the same trigger, same
condition, and similar action (but without including the if-expression checking the
precondition), or t′ is a new loop transition added by the translation. In the first
case the left side of the disjunction holds, whereas in the the second case the right
side of the disjunction holds.
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Finally, if t′ was obtained by applying step 3b, then, given a ppDATE m ∈ M
such that κ(m) = m′, m has exactly the same transition. Therefore, the left-hand
side of the disjunction holds in these cases.
Now, we proceed to prove the lemmas.
Lemma 2. Given a network of ppDATEs pn = (M,V, ν0, Tppd), its translation
ppd2DATE (pn) = (M ′, V, ν0, T ′d), a trace w ∈ (systemevent×ΘSys)∗, and the global
configurations (L, ν) and (L˜, ν′),
Cinit(pn)
w
=⇒M (L, ν) and Cinit(ppd2DATE(pn)) w=⇒M′ (L˜, ν′)
implies
∀ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ L,m ∈M ·
∃ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜ · κ(m) = m′ and q = q′
and
∀ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜,m′ ∈M ′·
∃ m, q, ρ ·m ∈M,κ(m) = m′, (m, q, ρ) ∈ L · q = q′
and
∀ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ L,m /∈M ·
∃ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜,m′ /∈M ′ · q = q′
and
∀ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜,m′ /∈M ′·
∃ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ),m /∈M ∈ L · q = q′
and
ν = ν′
Proof. We proceed to prove this lemma by induction on the length of the trace w.
 Base case: w = ε (empty trace)
Cinit(pn)
ε
=⇒M (L, ν) and Cinit(ppd2DATE(pn)) ε=⇒M′ (L˜, ν′)
implies
∀ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ L,m ∈M ·
∃ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜ · κ(m) = m′and q = q′
and
∀ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜,m′ ∈M ′·
∃ m, q, ρ ·m ∈M,κ(m) = m′, (m, q, ρ) ∈ L · q = q′
and
∀ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ L,m /∈M ·
∃ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜,m′ /∈M ′ · q = q′
and
∀ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜,m′ /∈M ′·
∃ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ),m /∈M ∈ L · q = q′
and
ν = ν′
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By Def. 17 and Def. 21, we know that
L0 = L and ν0 = ν and L
′
0 = L˜ and ν0 = ν
′
implies
∀ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ L,m ∈M ·
∃ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜ · κ(m) = m′and q = q′
and
∀ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜,m′ ∈M ′·
∃ m, q, ρ ·m ∈M,κ(m) = m′, (m, q, ρ) ∈ L · q = q′
∀ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ L,m /∈M ·
∃ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜,m′ /∈M ′ · q = q′
and
∀ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜,m′ /∈M ′·
∃ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ),m /∈M ∈ L · q = q′
and
ν = ν′
where L0 = {(m, q0m, ∅) | m ∈M}, and L′0 = {(m′, q0m′ , ∅) | m′ ∈M ′}.
Next, by substitution with the antecedents we have to prove
(1) ∀ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ L0,m ∈M ·
∃ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L′0 · κ(m) = m′ and q = q′
and
(2) ∀ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L′0,m′ ∈M ′·
∃ m, q, ρ ·m ∈M,κ(m) = m′, (m, q, ρ) ∈ L0 · q = q′
and
(3) ∀ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ L0,m /∈M ·
∃ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L′0,m′ /∈M ′ · q = q′
and
(4) ∀ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L′0,m′ /∈M ′·
∃ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ),m /∈M ∈ L0 · q = q′
and
(5) ν0 = ν0
As in L′0 all the DATE components of the local configurations correspond to the
translation of ppDATE in pn, both (1) and (2) are trivially fulfilled, and the ranges
of both (3) and (4) are never fulfilled, meaning that, as these ranges are empty (i.e.,
false), both expressions are trivially evaluated to true. In addition, (5) is trivially
fulfilled. Thereby, the base case holds.
 Inductive case: w = w′ : (e, θ)
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IH : ∀ L, L˜, ν, ν′·
Cinit(pn)
w′
=⇒M (L, ν) and Cinit(ppd2DATE(pn)) w
′
=⇒M′ (L˜, ν′)
implies
∀ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ L,m ∈M ·
∃ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜ · κ(m) = m′ and q = q′
and
∀ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜,m′ ∈M ′·
∃ m, q, ρ ·m ∈M,κ(m) = m′, (m, q, ρ) ∈ L · q = q′
and
∀ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ L,m /∈M ·
∃ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜,m′ /∈M ′ · q = q′
and
∀ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L′,m′ /∈M ′·
∃ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ),m /∈M ∈ L˜ · q = q′
and
ν = ν′
Given the previous inductive hypothesis IH, we have to prove,
Cinit(pn)
w′:(e,θ)
=====⇒M (L, ν) and Cinit(ppd2DATE(pn)) w
′:(e,θ)
=====⇒M′ (L˜, ν′)
implies
∀ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ L,m ∈M ·
∃ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜ · κ(m) = m′ and q = q′
and
∀ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜,m′ ∈M ′·
∃ m, q, ρ ·m ∈M,κ(m) = m′, (m, q, ρ) ∈ L · q = q′
and
∀ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ L,m /∈M ·
∃ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜,m′ /∈M ′ · q = q′
and
∀ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L′,m′ /∈M ′·
∃ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ),m /∈M ∈ L˜ · q = q′
and
ν = ν′
By Def. 21 we have,
(i) ∃ L′′, ν′′ · Cinit(pn) w
′
=⇒ (L′′, ν′′) and (L′′, ν′′) (e,θ)===⇒ (L, ν)
and
(ii) ∃ L′′, ν′′ · Cinit(ppd2DATE(pn)) w
′
=⇒ (L′′, ν′′) and (L′′, ν′′) (e,θ)===⇒ (L˜, ν′)
Then, we proceed with the proof by assuming the antecedent of the implication.
This assumption allows us to remove the existential quantifiers in the antecedents by
introducing the fresh values L′′ and ν′′ in (i), and the fresh values L˜′′ and ν′′′ in (ii).
Therefore, we have
(i′) Cinit(pn)
w′
=⇒ (L′′, ν′′) and (L′′, ν′′) (e,θ)===⇒ (L, ν)
and
(ii′) Cinit(ppd2DATE(pn))
w′
=⇒ (L˜′′, ν′′′) and (L˜′′, ν′′′) (e,θ)===⇒ (L˜, ν′)
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Next, by IH we know
(iii) ∀ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ L′′,m ∈M ·
∃ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜′′ · κ(m) = m′ and q = q′
and
(iv) ∀ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜′′,m′ ∈M ′·
∃ m, q, ρ ·m ∈M,κ(m) = m′, (m, q, ρ) ∈ L′′ · q = q′
and
(v) ∀ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ L,m /∈M ·
∃ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜,m′ /∈M ′ · q = q′
and
(vi) ∀ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L′,m′ /∈M ′·
∃ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ),m /∈M ∈ L˜ · q = q′
and
(vii) ν′′ = ν′′′
In relation to L, by (i) we know it is obtained from L′′ after performing a big
step with (e, θ). Thereby, the local configurations on L are either the same as in L′′,
a modified version of the ones in L′′, or new local configurations added to control a
DATE which is a new instance of a template.
Let us introduce the sets Lnc, Lc and Lnew, to represent the local configurations
in each one of the previous categories, respectively. Then, we know that
(viii) L = Lnc ∪ Lc ∪ Lnew
In addition, by using a similar approach with L˜ and (ii), we introduce the following
sets.
(ix) L˜ = L˜nc ∪ L˜c ∪ L˜new
Let us come back now to the expression we want to prove.
(x) ∀ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ L,m ∈M ·
∃ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜ · κ(m) = m′ and q = q′
and
(xi) ∀ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜,m′ ∈M ′·
∃ m, q, ρ ·m ∈M,κ(m) = m′, (m, q, ρ) ∈ L · q = q′
and
(xii) ∀ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ L,m /∈M ·
∃ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜,m′ /∈M ′ · q = q′
and
(xiii) ∀ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L′,m′ /∈M ′·
∃ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ),m /∈M ∈ L˜ · q = q′
and
(xiv) ν = ν′
By (iii) and (iv), as the values in both Lnc and L˜nc are the same as in L
′′ and L˜′′,
respectively, we know that these values fulfil all the previous expressions. Thereby,
we can reduce (viii) and (ix) to
(viii′) L = Lc ∪ Lnew (ix′) L˜ = L˜c ∪ L˜new
Regarding the newly created local configurations in both Lnew and L˜new, they
do not fulfil the ranges of the universal quantifications in neither (x) nor (xi). In
addition, by Prop. 1 and Prop. 2, we know that the only difference in the executed
actions in the ppDATEs in pn and their translation is that the actions in the DATEs
may include the creation of an instance of template exit cond checker. Besides, by
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step 4 in the translation algorithm, we now that both the ppDATEs templates and
their translations have similar transitions and are initialised in the same state. Thus,
(xii) and (xii) are fulfilled for these values, and we can reduce (viii) and (ix) to
(viii′′) L = Lc (ix′′) L˜ = L˜c
Therefore, we have to prove,
(x′) ∀ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ Lc,m ∈M ·
∃ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜c · κ(m) = m′ and q = q′
and
(xi′) ∀ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜c,m′ ∈M ′·
∃ m, q, ρ ·m ∈M,κ(m) = m′, (m, q, ρ) ∈ Lc · q = q′
and
(xii′) ∀ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ L,m /∈M ·
∃ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜c,m′ /∈M ′ · q = q′
and
(xiii′) ∀ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ Lc,m′ /∈M ′·
∃ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ),m /∈M ∈ L˜c · q = q′
and
(xiv) ν = ν′
By (iii) and Prop. 1 we know that for every enabled transition of a ppDATE
m ∈M , there is one enabled transition in κ(m) ∈M ′ performing the same change
of state and, if any, generating the same action events. Thereby, both pn and its
translation will shift the local configurations in Lc and L˜c, respectively, in the same
manner, i.e., (x′) holds.
In addition, by (iv) and Prop. 2 we know that for every enabled transition in a
DATE m′ ∈M ′, there is either an enabled transition in a ppDATE m ∈M , where
κ(m) = m′, such that this transition performs the same change of state and, if any,
generates the same action events, or the transition enabled in m′ is a loop transition.
In the first case, both pn and its translation will shift the local configurations in
Lc and L˜c, respectively, in the same manner. Thus, (xi
′) holds.
In the second case, the local configuration obtained after the shift is in the same
state as before the shift. Thus, by (iv), this (xi′) holds.
Moreover, by IH, Prop. 1, Prop. 2 we know that whenever a ppDATE in pn creates
an instance of a template, its translation will create an instance of the translation of
such template, and vice versa. Besides, by the step 4 in the translation algorithm, as
such instances have similar transitions, they will shift the local configuration associated
to them in the same manner. Therefore, both (xii′) and (xiii′) are fulfilled.
Finally, in relation to (xiv), by Prop. 1 and Prop. 2 we know that only difference
in the executed actions in pn and its translation is that the actions of the latter may
include the creation of an instance of template exit cond checker (whose actions do
not modify ppDATE variables valuations). In addition, by step 4 in the translation
algorithm we know that both an instance of a ppDATE template and a similar
instance of the translation of the template will fire similar transitions (with the same
actions). Therefore, they perform the same modifications in the valuations ν′′ and
ν′′′. Thus, by (vii), (xiv) holds.
Lemma 3. Given a network of ppDATEs pn = (M,V, ν0, Tppd), its translation
ppd2DATE (pn) = (M ′, V, ν0, T ′d), a trace w ∈ (systemevent×ΘSys)∗, and the global
configurations (L, ν) and (L˜, ν′),
Cinit(pn)
w
=⇒M (L, ν) and Cinit(ppd2DATE(pn)) w=⇒M′ (L˜, ν′) implies ψ(L, L˜)
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where,
ψ(L, L˜) = ∀ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ L ·
∀ σ↑id, pi′, θ · (σ↑id, pi′, θ) ∈ ρ ·
∃ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜ · inst (exit cond checker, σ, pi′) = m′
and
∀ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜,m′ /∈M ′·
∃ σ↑id, pi′ · inst (exit cond checker, σ, pi′) = m′
implies ∃ m, q, ρ, θ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ L · (σ↑id, pi′, θ) ∈ ρ
Proof. We proceed to prove this lemma by induction on the length of the trace w.
 Base case: w = ε (empty trace)
Cinit(pn)
ε
=⇒M (L, ν) and Cinit(ppd2DATE(pn)) ε=⇒M′ (L˜, ν′) implies ψ(L, L˜)
By Def. 17 and Def. 21 we know that
L0 = L and ν0 = ν and L
′
0 = L˜ and ν0 = ν
′ implies ψ(L, L˜)
where L0 = {(m, q0m, ∅) | m ∈M}, and L′0 = {(m′, q0m′ , ∅) | m′ ∈M ′}.
Next, by substitution with the antecedents,
L0 = L and ν0 = ν and L
′
0 = L˜ and ν0 = ν
′ implies ψ(L0, L′0)
Thus, by the definition of ψ we have to prove that,
∀ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ {(m, q0m, ∅) | m ∈M} ·
∀ σ↑id, pi′, θ · (σ↑id, pi′, θ) ∈ ρ ·
∃ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ {(m′, q0m′ , ∅) | m′ ∈M ′}·
inst (exit cond checker, σ, pi′) = m′
and
∀ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ {(m′, q0m′ , ∅) | m′ ∈M ′},m′ /∈M ′·
∃ σ↑id, pi′ · inst (exit cond checker, σ, pi′) = m′
implies ∃ m, q, ρ, θ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ {(m, q0m, ∅) | m ∈M}·
(σ↑id, pi
′, θ) ∈ ρ
First, let us analyse the expression,
∀ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ {(m, q0m, ∅) | m ∈M} ·
∀ σ↑id, pi′, θ · (σ↑id, pi′, θ) ∈ ρ ·
∃ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ {(m′, q0m′ , ∅) | m′ ∈M ′}·
inst (exit cond checker, σ, pi′) = m′
As ρ is always the empty set, the condition (σ↑id, pi
′, θ) ∈ ρ will always evaluate to
false. Therefore,
∀ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ {(m, q0m, ∅) | m ∈M} ·
∀ σ↑id, pi′, θ · false·
∃ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ {(m′, q0m′ , ∅) | m′ ∈M ′}·
inst (exit cond checker, σ, pi′) = m′
Then, as the range of the inner universal quantification is empty (i.e., false), it is
trivially evaluated to true.
∀ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ {(m, q0m, ∅) | m ∈M} · true
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Finally, as the body of the previous universal quantification is simply the value
true and its range is not empty, the whole expression is trivially evaluated to true.
Now, let us analyse the expression,
∀ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ {(m′, q0m′ , ∅) | m′ ∈M ′},m′ /∈M ′·
∃ σ↑id, pi′ · inst (exit cond checker, σ, pi′) = m′
implies ∃ m, q, ρ, θ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ {(m, q0m, ∅) | m ∈M}·
(σ↑id, pi
′, θ) ∈ ρ
As in the initial configuration of the translation of pn there are no instances of
DATE templates, the range of the universal quantification is always evaluated to
false. Therefore,
∀ m′, q′ · false·
∃ σ↑id, pi′ · inst (exit cond checker, σ, pi′) = m′
implies ∃ m, q, ρ, θ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ {(m, q0m, ∅) | m ∈M}·
(σ↑id, pi
′, θ) ∈ ρ
Thus, as the range of the universal quantification is empty (i.e., false), the whole
expression is trivially evaluated to true. Thereby, the base case holds.
 Inductive case: w = w′ : (e, θ)
IH : ∀ L, L˜, ν, ν′ ·
Cinit(pn)
w′
=⇒M (L, ν) and Cinit(ppd2DATE(pn)) w
′
=⇒M′ (L˜, ν′)
implies ψ(L, L˜)
Given the previous inductive hypothesis IH, we have to prove,
Cinit(pn)
w′:(e,θ)
=====⇒M (L, ν) and Cinit(ppd2DATE(pn)) w
′:(e,θ)
=====⇒M′ (L˜, ν′)
implies ψ(L, L˜)
By Def. 21 we have,
(i) ∃ L′′, ν′′ · Cinit(pn) w
′
=⇒ (L′′, ν′′) and (L′′, ν′′) (e,θ)===⇒ (L, ν)
and
(ii) ∃ L′′, ν′′ · Cinit(ppd2DATE(pn)) w
′
=⇒ (L′′, ν′′) and (L′′, ν′′) (e,θ)===⇒ (L˜, ν′)
implies ψ(L, L˜)
Then, we proceed with the proof by assuming the antecedent of the implication.
This assumption allows us to remove the existential quantifiers in the antecedents by
introducing the fresh values L′′ and ν′′ in (i), and the fresh values L˜′′ and ν′′′ in (ii).
Therefore, we have
(i′) Cinit(pn)
w′
=⇒ (L′′, ν′′) and (L′′, ν′′) (e,θ)===⇒ (L, ν)
and
(ii′) Cinit(ppd2DATE(pn))
w′
=⇒ (L˜′′, ν′′′) and (L˜′′, ν′′′) (e,θ)===⇒ (L˜, ν′)
Next, by IH we know that ψ(L′′, L˜′′). Thus, we have
(iii) ψ(L′′, L˜′′)
In relation to L, by (i′) we know it is obtained from L′′ after performing a big
step with (e, θ). Thereby, the local configurations on L are either the same as in L′′,
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a modified version of the ones in L′′, or new local configurations added to control a
DATE which is a new instance of a template.
Let us introduce the sets Lnc, Lc and Lnew, to represent the local configurations
in each one of the previous categories, respectively. Then, we know that
(iv) L = Lnc ∪ Lc ∪ Lnew
In addition, by using a similar approach with L˜ and (ii′), we introduce the
following sets.
(v) L˜ = L˜nc ∪ L˜c ∪ L˜new
As in the translation the set L˜new contains both the instances of ordinary templates
and the instances of the templates about Hoare triples, we split L˜new into the sets
L˜′new and L˜h, to represent each one of the previous categories, respectively. Thus,
(v′) L˜ = L˜nc ∪ L˜c ∪ L˜′new ∪ L˜h
Now, let us come back to the expression ψ(L, L˜). By (iv) and (v′), we replace it
by
ψ(Lnc ∪ Lc ∪ Lnew, L˜nc ∪ L˜c ∪ L˜′new ∪ L˜h)
By (iii), as the values in both Lnc and L˜nc are the same as in L
′′ and L˜′′,
respectively, we know that the former fulfil ψ. Thereby, we can reduce the previous
expression to
ψ(Lc ∪ Lnew, L˜c ∪ L˜′new ∪ L˜h)
In addition, newly created local configurations in both Lnew and L˜
′
new do not
fulfil the ranges of the quantified expressions in ψ. Then, we can discard them.
ψ(Lc, L˜c ∪ L˜h)
Next, by the definition of ψ, we have
(vi) ∀ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ Lc ·
∀ σ↑id, pi′, θ · (σ↑id, pi′, θ) ∈ ρ ·
∃ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜c ∪ L˜h · inst (exit cond checker, σ, pi′) = m′
and
(vii) ∀ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜c ∪ L˜h,m′ /∈M ′·
∃ σ↑id, pi′ · inst (exit cond checker, σ, pi′) = m′
implies ∃ m, q, ρ, θ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ Lc · (σ↑id, pi′, θ) ∈ ρ
In relation to the configurations in L˜c, as they were obtained from configurations
in L˜′′, by (iii) we know they fulfil (vii) (same DATE component). Thereby, we only
need to prove that
(vi) ∀ m, q, ρ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ Lc ·
∀ σ↑id, pi′, θ · (σ↑id, pi′, θ) ∈ ρ ·
∃ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜c ∪ L˜h · inst (exit cond checker, σ, pi′) = m′
and
(vii′) ∀ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜h,m′ /∈M ′·
∃ σ↑id, pi′ · inst (exit cond checker, σ, pi′) = m′
implies ∃ m, q, ρ, θ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ Lc · (σ↑id, pi′, θ) ∈ ρ
Now, let us focus on (vi). If event e is either an exit event, or an entry event
which does not require to verify any Hoare triple, then it does not introduce any
new values in ρ components of the local configurations in Lc. Thus, by (iii), (vi) is
fulfilled in both cases.
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If event e is an entry event which requires the check of Hoare triples, then by
Lemma 2 and Prop. 1, we know that for every enabled transition which requires the
verification of a Hoare triple in pn, a similar transition will be fired in its translation
whose action will create a DATE in charge of controlling such Hoare triple. Thus, for
every new entry in a ρ component in Lc, a new local configuration is added in L˜h.
Thereby, (vi) holds.
Regarding (vii′), if event e is either an exit event, or an entry event which does
not require to verify any Hoare triple, then L˜h = ∅. Thus, as the range of universal
quantification is empty, (vii′) is trivially fulfilled in both cases.
If event e is an entry event which requires the check of Hoare triples, then by the
rules entry1 and entry3 in the relation small step local, we know that a new tuple
is going to be added to the ρ component of the local configuration in Lc which are
associated to the ppDATEs whose current state possess a Hoare triple that has to be
verified. In addition, a local configuration is going to be included in L˜h for the DATE
instantiated to control the corresponding Hoare triple. Thereby, (vii′) holds.
2.13 Proof of Soundness
Theorem 1. Given a ppDATE network pn = (M,V, ν0, Tppd), and its translation
ppd2DATE(pn) = (M ′, V, ν0, T ′d),
VT (pn) = VT (ppd2DATE(pn))
Proof. To prove this theorem we will show that,
∀ w · w ∈ (systemevent×ΘSys)∗ · w ∈ VT (pn) iff w ∈ VT (ppd2DATE(pn))
In the following, we abbreviate ppd2DATE(pn) by dn.
 w ∈ VT (pn) implies w ∈ VT (dn)
As w ∈ VT (pn), by Def. 22 we know that it has a prefix w′ such that either,
(i) Cinit(pn)
w′
=⇒M (L′, ν′) and ∃ (m, q, ρ) · (m, q, ρ) ∈ L′ · q ∈ Bm, or
(ii) w′ = w1 + 〈(σ↑id, θ′)〉, Cinit(pn)
w1=⇒ (L′, ν′) and ∃ m, q, ρ, pi′, θ · ((m, q, ρ) ∈
L′and (σ↑id, pi
′, θ) ∈ ρ) · θ, θ′ 6|= pi′.
In relation to (i), let us assume that exists (L˜, ν) such that Cinit(dn)
w′
=⇒M′ (L˜, ν).
Then, by Lemma 2 we know that for every local configuration in L′, there is a local
configuration in L˜ such that its state component is the same. Therefore, as in L′
there is a local configuration in a bad state, there is a local configuration in L˜ in a
bad state, i.e. w′ is a counter-example of dn. Thereby, w ∈ VT (dn).
Regarding (ii), it corresponds to the case where (at least) one Hoare triple is not
fulfilled when event σ↑id occurs. Here, by Lemma 3 we have
ψ(L′, L˜)
Therefore, by (ii) and ψ(L′, L˜) we know that
∃ m′, q′ · (m′, q′, ∅) ∈ L˜ · inst(exit cond checker, σ, part eval(pi′)) = m′
Let us assume that the local configuration (m′, q′, ∅) is the one satisfying the
previous existential quantification. In addition, let us assume (L˜, ν) to be given by
Cinit(dn)
w1=⇒M′ (L˜, ν). Then, once σ↑id occurs, as by (ii) we know that the pi′ is not
fulfilled, m′ will shift to a bad state. Thereby, w′ is a counter-example of dn, i.e.
w ∈ VT (dn).
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 w ∈ VT (dn) implies w ∈ VT (pn).
As w ∈ VT (dn), by Def. 22 and the fact that every DATE in dn has no Hoare
triples associated to its states, we know that it has a prefix w′ such that,
Cinit(dn)
w′
=⇒M′ (L˜, ν) and ∃ (m, q, ρ) · (m, q, ρ) ∈ L˜ · q ∈ Bm
Now let us assume that exists (L′, ν′) such that Cinit(pn)
w′
=⇒M (L′, ν′). In
addition, let us assume that the bad state in L˜ belongs to a local configuration
associated to a DATE m′, which is an instance of the template exit cond checker,
i.e., m′ was created to control a Hoare triple. Let us represent this Hoare triple as
{pi}σ {pi′}. Then, by Lemma 3 we know that,
(1) ∃ m, q, ρ, θ · (m, q, ρ) ∈ L′ · (σ↑id, pi′, θ) ∈ ρ
We will assume that the ppDATE m and the valuation θ are the ones fulfilling (1).
Note that the index id is introduced by Lemma 3. Next, as m′ is in a bad state
we know that whenever σ↑id occurs, pi
′ is not fulfilled. Thus, let us assume that the
selected prefix is of the form w′ = w1 + 〈(σ↑id, θ′)〉. Thereby, by Def. 22, w′ is a
counter-example of pn, i.e. w ∈ VT (pn).
On the other hand, if the bad state in L˜ does not belongs to a local configuration
associated to a DATE m′ which is an instance of the template exit cond checker,
then by Lemma 2 we know that there is a local configuration in L′ such that its state
component is the same as the bad state in L˜. Therefore, w′ is a counter-example of
pn, i.e. w ∈ VT (pn).
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3.1 Introduction
Day by day the use of formal verification techniques to verify the correctness of
programs is increasing. In general, verification tools use either static verification
techniques (i.e., the verification is performed prior to program execution), or dynamic
verification techniques (i.e., the verification is performed during program execution),
in order to verify whether a program fulfils certain properties.
Nowadays, a new trend focused on the combination of static and dynamic verifica-
tion techniques is starting to emerge. StaRVOOrS (Static and Runtime Verification
of Object-Oriented Software) is a tool which aims at both the specification and
verification of properties by combining the use of Static Verification and Runtime
Verification. On the whole, StaRVOOrS is fed with a Java program and a ppDATE
specification [10] describing properties which the program under scrutiny must fulfil,
and it automatically generates a runtime monitor which will verify the specified
properties (at runtime) whenever the provided program is executed.
This document is the user manual of StaRVOOrS. Its structure is as follows.
Section 3.2 provides an intuitive description of the ppDATE specification language
used by this tool. Section 3.3 gives a high level explanation about how this tool works.
Section 3.4 shows how to write a ppDATE specification in the input language of the
tool. Finally, section 3.5 provides a complete example on how to run this tool.
3.2 ppDATE Specification Language
Here, we briefly introduce the ppDATE specification language. However, both its
complete (formal) description and its semantics can be found in [11].
ppDATE is an automaton-based formalism which, basically, consists of a labelled
transition system whose states may include Hoare triples describing properties about
the methods of the system under scrutiny.
Transitions in a ppDATE are labelled by a trigger (tr), a condition (c) and an
action (a). Together, the label is written tr | c 7→ a. A transition is enabled to be
taken whenever its trigger is active and the condition guarding it holds. In addition,
if a transition is taken, we say that it is fired. Whenever a transition is fired, its
action is executed.
Regarding the triggers, they are activated by the occurrence of either a visible
system event such as entering or exiting a method, or an action event generated by
certain actions labelling other transitions. We use the notation foo↓, foo↑, e?, to
represent the trigger which is activated whenever the method foo is entered, the
trigger which is activated whenever the method foo is exited, and the trigger which
is activated whenever the action event e occurs, respectively.
Regarding the conditions, they are expressions written using JML boolean expres-
sion syntax [72]. Conditions may depend on the values of system variables (i.e., of
the system under scrutiny) and the values of ppDATE variables (i.e., variables which
belong to the ppDATE). The latter can be modified via actions in the transitions.
Regarding the actions, they consist on any number of the following: (i) assignments
of the form v = exp, where v is a ppDATE variable and exp is an expression that
may depend on system variables and ppDATE variables; (ii) an action ! such that
e! represents the generation of the action event e; (iii) an action \create, used to
generate instances of a ppDATE template (see Sec. 3.4.3); (iv) IF-THEN conditional
expressions whose branching condition depends on the valuations of system variables
and ppDATE variables; (v) an action \log such that \log(string) adds string into the
log file generated by the monitor; (vi) and (Java) programs. All the actions should
end in a semicolon.
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q :
(i) {cups < limit} brew() {cups == \old(cups)+1}
(ii) {true} cleanF() {cups == 0}start
q′ :
(iii) {cups < limit} brew() {cups == \old(cups)}
(iv) {true} cleanF() {cups == \old(cups)}
bad
t1 : brew↓ | cups < limit 7→ skip
t4 : cleanF↓ | true 7→ skip t3 : brew↓ | true 7→ skip
t2 : brew↑ | true 7→ skip
Figure 3.1: A ppDATE controlling the brew of coffee
In relation to the Hoare triples on the states of a ppDATE, intuitively, if a
Hoare triple {pi} foo() {pi′} is included in some state q, this property ensures that:
if method foo is entered while the monitor is in state q, and pre-condition pi holds,
then upon reaching the corresponding exit from foo, post-condition pi′ should hold.
Both pre-/post-conditions in the Hoare triples are expressed using JML Boolean
Expressions syntax (see Sec. 3.4.5 for details about this syntax).
Now, let us introduce an example in order to give a better intuition on how a
ppDATE is described.
ppDATE Specification Example
Let us consider a coffee machine system where, after a certain amount of coffee cups
are brewed, its filters have to be cleaned. If the limit of coffee cups is reached, the
machine should not be able to brew any more coffee. In addition, while the coffee
machine is active (a coffee cup is being brewed), it is not possible to start brewing
another coffee, or to clean the filters.
Fig. 3.1 illustrates a ppDATE describing this part of the system. In other words,
whenever the coffee machine is not active, i.e., the machine is not brewing a cup
of coffee, and the method brew starts the coffee brewing process, then it is not
possible either to execute this method again, or to execute the method cleanF (which
initialises the task of cleaning the filter), until the initialised brewing process finishes.
The previous property can be interpreted as follows: initially being in state q,
the state which represents that the coffee machine is not active, whenever method
brew is invoked and it is possible to brew a cup of coffee (i.e., the limit of coffee cups
was not reached yet), then transition t1 shifts the ppDATE from state q to state q’.
While in q’, the state which represents that the coffee machine is active, if either
method brew or method cleanF are invoked, then transitions t3 or transition t4 shift
the ppDATE to state bad, respectively. This indicates that the property was violated.
On the contrary, if method brew terminates its execution, then transition t2 shifts the
ppDATE from state q’ to state q. Note that the names used on the transitions, e.g.
t1, t2, etc., are not part of the specification language. They are included to simplify
the description of how the ppDATE works.
In addition to this, the Hoare triples in state q ensure the properties: (i) if the
amount of brewed coffee cups has not reached its limit yet, then a coffee cup is brewed;
(ii) cleaning the filters sets the amount of brewed coffee cups to 0. Property (i) has to
be verified if, while the ppDATE is on state q, the method brew is executed and its
precondition holds; and property (ii) has to be verified if, while the ppDATE is on
state q, the method cleanF is executed and its precondition holds. Regarding state
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q’, the Hoare triples in this state ensure the properties: (iii) no coffee cups are brewed;
(iv) filters are not cleaned. Property (iii) and (iv) are verified if either method brew
and method cleanF are executed, and their preconditions hold, respectively. Here,
remember that this state represents that the coffee machine is active. Thus, if it
occurs that either the method brew or the method cleanF are executed while the
ppDATE is on this state, then, as this would move the ppDATE to state bad, one
would expect the value of the variable cup to remain unchanged. This is precisely
what is verified when either property (iii) or (iv) are analysed.
Note that none of the Hoare triples makes reference to the state of the coffee
machine, i.e., there is no information about whether the machine is active or not.
This is due to fact that the state of the machine is implicitly defined by the states of
the ppDATE. If the ppDATE is in state q, the coffee machine is not active. However,
if it is in state q’, then the machine is active. Therefore, the Hoare triples are
context dependent. This is the reason why we can describe properties with the same
precondition, but with different postconditions depending on the state of the ppDATE
in which they are placed.
3.3 High-level Description of StaRVOOrS
StaRVOOrS takes three arguments: (i) the path to the main folder of the Java files
to be verified; (ii) a description (as input language) of the ppDATE specification for
the provided program; and (iii) the path of the output folder (the generated files are
stored in this folder). Then, it automatically generates (1) a runtime monitor; (2)
an instrumented version of the Java files in (i); (3) a report summarising the results
obtained by statically verifying the Hoare triples described in (ii); (4) and a refined
version of (ii), when possible.
To generate such output, StaRVOOrS combines the use of the deductive source
code verifier KeY [9] with the runtime monitoring tool Larva [46]. KeY is a deductive
verification system for data-centric functional correctness properties of Java programs,
which generates, from JML [72] and Java, proof obligations in Dynamic Logic (a
modal logic for reasoning about programs) [62], and attempts to prove them by
using a sequent calculus which follows the symbolic execution paradigm. Larva is an
automata-based Runtime Verification tool for Java programs which automatically
generates a runtime monitor from a property using the automaton-based specification
language DATE [45]. Larva transforms such specification into monitoring code
together with AspectJ code to link the system under scrutiny with the generated
monitor.
In a nutshell, StaRVOOrS output is generated by following the steps enumerated
below.
(a) The Hoare triples described in (ii) are translated into JML contracts, which
are textually added to to the Java files in (i) as annotations of the respective
methods;
(b) KeY attempts to (statically) verify all the JML contracts automatically. The
result obtained for each contract is either a complete proof, or a partial proof
where some parts of the contract are proved and others are not, or that KeY
cannot prove any of the parts the contract. These results are stored in a XML file.
In addition, a report summarising the content of this file, i.e., (3), is generated.
Here, note that our tool does not support user interaction with KeY. It uses this
prover in fully automatic mode;
(c) The ppDATE specification is refined based on the XML file, i.e., (4). Fully verified
Hoare triples are removed from the specification, but those Hoare triples which are
not fully verified, are left in the specification to be verified at runtime. However,
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the original pre-conditions of the remaining Hoare triples may be strengthen with
the (path) conditions resulting from partial proofs, thus covering at runtime only
executions that are not closed in the static verification step;
(d) The refined ppDATE specification is encoded into a DATE specification. In
particular, the DATE specification language does not support pre/post-conditions
which thus have to be translated to use notions native to this specification
language. This also requires a number of changes to the system (through code
instrumentation), in order to be able to distinguish different executions of the
same code unit, and to evaluate the Hoare triples in the states of the refined
ppDATE at runtime. i.e, (2). Regarding the former, method declarations get
a new argument which is used as a counter for invocations of this method.
Regarding the latter, not every condition in a pre/postcondition of a Hoare triple
can be directly written as a Java Boolean Expression, e.g., quantified expressions.
Thus, methods which operationalise the evaluation of those conditions are added
to the Java files in (i);
(e) The Larva compiler generates a runtime monitor using aspect-oriented program-
ming techniques, i.e., (1).
Once deployed, the runtime monitor and the instrumented version of the Java
files are executed together, thus effectively running the monitor in parallel with the
program. The runtime monitor identifies violations at runtime, reporting error traces
to be analysed.
3.4 Composing a ppDATE Specification in the
Input Language of StaRVOOrS
In this section we explain in detail how to write a ppDATE specification using the input
language of StaRVOOrS. The files written in such language have extension .ppd, and
their content may consist on 6 sections which are ordered as follows: IMPORTS, GLOBAL,
TEMPLATES, CINVARIANTS, HTRIPLES and METHODS. Below, we describe the content of
each one of these sections, show their syntax, and provide examples illustrating how
to write them.
3.4.1 IMPORTS
Section IMPORTS lists the packages included in the system under scrutiny which are
related to the properties to be verified (both the Hoare triples and the automata).
Its syntax is described as follows:
IMPORTS { import package ; }
Each package listed in this section follows the usual Java syntax for imports. For
instance,
IMPORTS {
import main.Foo ;
import other.sub.Goo ;
import other.Hoo ;
}
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3.4.2 GLOBAL
Section GLOBAL contains the description of the ppDATE specification. Its syntax,
which is described below, is written as follows:
GLOBAL {
VARIABLES { -- definition of the variables -- }
ACTEVENTS { -- definition of the action events -- }
TRIGGERS { -- definition of the triggers -- }
PROPERTY property_name1 {
STATES { -- definition of the states of the ppDATE -- }
TRANSITIONS { -- definition of the transitions of the ppDATE -- }
}
PROPERTY property_name2 {
-- definition of states and transitions --
}
...
}
Note that one may describe more than one PROPERTY. This would be the case when
one is describing several ppDATEs in one single specification file, i.e., each property
represents a ppDATE.
3.4.2.1 VARIABLES
Subsection VARIABLES allows to include as part of the specification the declaration
of variables. These variables, which are referred to as ppDATE variables, may be
freely used in the transitions of a ppDATE, both in their conditions and actions. For
instance, one may use an integer variable as a counter to keep track of how many
times a method is executed. Below, we illustrate how variables may be defined within
this subsection.
VARIABLES {
type var ;
type var = initial_value ;
}
Such syntax follows the usual Java syntax for the declaration of variables. For
instance,
VARIABLES {
String s;
int i = 0;
}
Note that whenever a variable is not initialised when it is defined, its initialisation
has to be performed by the execution of an action. Otherwise, there is going to be an
exception at runtime whenever the monitor attempts to manipulate such variable.
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public class Foo {
public void foo();
}
public class Goo {
public void goo(int x,boolean b);
public int hoo(int x, int y, int z);
}
Figure 3.2: Example of Java classes.
3.4.2.2 ACTEVENTS
Subsection ACTEVENTS includes the declaration of the different action events which
may be generated by using the action !. Here, it is only necessary to list the names of
these events, as illustrated in the example below for the action events e1, e2, and e3.
ACTEVENTS {
e1 ; e2 ; e3 ;
}
3.4.2.3 TRIGGERS
Subsection TRIGGERS includes the declaration of the different triggers which may be
used in the transitions of a ppDATE.
Triggers Associated to System Events
The triggers which are activated by the occurrence of a visible system event, i.e.,
entering or exiting a method, have the following signature:
name(args) = {varDecl.method(args’)sysevent }
Here, name is a label which works as an identifier for the trigger; method is the name
of the method generating the system event which activates the trigger; and sysevent
represents whether the trigger is activated by a system event produced by entering or
exiting a method, represented with the notation entry or exit, respectively.
In addition, each trigger may have a number of arguments args which act as
binds for args’ (i.e., args’ are the arguments in args, but without their types).
This allows the access at runtime to the arguments which are being provided to the
method, and to the value returned by a method (see examples below).
Regarding varDecl, it is a variable declaration which has the following signature:
varDecl = * | identifier | type identifier
The symbol * means that the triggers can be activated by an event associated to
method, no matter what class it belongs to; identifier is the target object (instance
of the class type) on which method is being called. Note that identifier should be
always associated to a class. Thus, if one uses only identifier as variable declaration,
then args should include an argument of the form type identifier. In addition,
one may use identifier to access at runtime the target object.
Below, by considering the Java classes depicted in Fig. 3.2, we give several
examples illustrating the different manners in which triggers might be defined.
TRIGGERS {
foo1() = {Foo f.foo()entry}
foo2() = {*.foo()entry}
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goo1(int x, boolean b) = {Goo g.goo(x,b)entry}
goo2(int x) = {Goo g.goo(x,*)entry}
foo3() = {*.foo()exit()}
goo4(int x,boolean b) = {Goo g.goo(x,b)exit()}
hoo(int x, int ret) = {Goo g.hoo(x,*)exit(int ret)}
}
On these definitions, whenever either the target object of the method or any of the
arguments of the method are not necessary for the definition of a trigger, e.g., the
definition of a trigger which is activated by the execution of a method foo where
several classes have an implementation for this method, they can simply be omitted
by replacing them with the symbol ‘∗’, which is used as a place holder. Triggers foo2,
goo2, foo3, and hoo are examples illustrating these situations. In addition, in the
definition of a trigger which is activated by a system event produced by exiting a
method, it is possible to refer to (and later to access) the value (or object) returned
by the method, by including in the arguments of the trigger an argument with an
appropriate type to represent such value, and then including this argument in the
notation exit, as it is illustrated in the definition of trigger hoo.
Triggers Associated to Constructors
It is possible to define a special exit trigger which is activated when an object of a
certain class is created. These triggers have the following signature:
name(type obj) = {type.new()exit(obj)}
where obj represents the created object for the class type. If the constructor has
arguments, then they have to be included as part of the arguments of the trigger
and the call to new. For instance, let us assume that the following signature for the
constructor of a class Foo: Foo(int n, boolean b). Then, one should define this
kind of triggers as follows:
foo new(int n, boolean b, Foo obj) = {type.new(n,b)exit(obj)}
3.4.2.4 PROPERTY
The core of this section is the subsection PROPERTY. It consists of the actual description
of a ppDATE. This subsection is divided in two parts: STATES and TRANSITIONS.
Note that there should be defined at least one property here.
STATES
Section STATES lists all of the states in a ppDATE. There are four kind of states:
starting states, accepting states, bad states, and normal states. STARTING list the
initial state of the ppDATE. There should be only one starting state listed. The
accepting states, which are listed in ACCEPTING, represent the states in which it is
desirable for the monitor to be in whenever the program under scrutiny terminates its
execution. The bad states, which are listed in BAD, represent states which a monitor
reaches whenever a property which is described with the transitions of the ppDATE
is violated at runtime. Finally, normal states, which are listed in NORMAL, are neither
accepting nor bad states, but simply possible states where a monitor may be in during
the execution of a program.
In relation to the list of states, each entry consists on the name of a state, and a
list of the names of the Hoare triples which have to be verified in that state (this is
properly explained in Sec. 3.4.5). Entries in a list of states terminate in a semicolon.
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Below you can see an example of a STATES subsection.
STATES {
STARTING { q0 (h1) ; }
ACCEPTING { q4 ; q5; }
BAD { bad ; }
NORMAL { q1 ; q2 (h2,h3) ; q3; }
}
Note that the order previously illustrated in the syntax (starting, accepting, bad,
normal) should be preserved. In addition, it is mandatory to always include a starting
state on a ppDATE. Otherwise, the monitor will not know from which state it should
start. Finally, it is important to remark that the accepting states are considered sink
states, i.e. they should not have outgoing transitions. Therefore, once a ppDATE
reaches one of such states, it is deactivated (i.e. it stops running).
TRANSITIONS
Section TRANSITIONS contains the description of all the transitions in the ppDATE.
For each ppDATE transition going from state q to state q’ with trigger tr, (optional)
condition c, and (optional) action a, this section includes a line of the form
q -> q’ [tr \ c \ a]
Here, where tr should be either the name of a trigger defined in a TRIGGERS subsection
(see Sec. 3.4.2.3), or an expression of the form e?, where e is an action event defined
in the ACTEVENTS section (see Sec. 3.4.2.2); c is a boolean expression following JML
syntax [72], which may depend on both system and ppDATE variables; and a is an
action consisting on sequence of the following:
 assignments of the form v = exp, where v is a ppDATE variable and exp is an
expression that may depend on system variables and ppDATE variables;
 an action \gen(e) which generates the action event e that activates the trigger
e?;
 an action \create, used to generate instances of ppDATE templates (see
Sec. 3.4.3);
 IF-THEN conditional expressions whose branching condition depends on the
valuations of system variables and ppDATE variables;
 an action \log such that, \log(string) adds string into the log file generated
by the monitor;
 a block of actions delimited by curly brackets;
 actions ++ v, −− v, ++ v, v−−, v+= e, and v−= e, with their standard (Java)
meaning;
 (Java) programs.
All the actions should terminate in a semicolon. Regarding action \gen(e), both
in the theory ( [10]) and in Sec. 3.2, this action is represented with the symbol !,
i.e., e! generates the action event e. The main reason why we decided not to use
the same notation in our input language as the one used in the theory is that both
JML and Java use the symbol ! as the boolean negation. Thus, we consider that by
introducing action \gen instead, we are avoiding the possible confusion which may
arise in relation to whether v! refers to the negation of the boolean variable v, or the
generation of the action event v. In addition, the trigger e? in the fourth transition
represents the trigger which is activated whenever the action event e occurs.
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login-logout = λ u : User, tr : Trigger.
logoutstart login
bad
login(u)↑
tr
logout(u)↑
tr
Figure 3.3: ppDATE template describing properties about the log in and log
out of users.
Regarding the use of (Java) programs in the actions, the tool only supports the
use of method calls, e.g., inc(v) in the first transition. However, it is possible to use
the section METHODS (see Sec. 3.4.6) to define programs as (Java) methods. Then,
one simply has to make a method call to them.
Below we list all the syntactically valid expressions which may be used within
this section.
(1) q -> q’ [tr\c\a]
(2) q -> q’ [tr\\]
(3) q -> q’ [tr\]
(4) q -> q’ [tr]
(5) q -> q’ [tr\c\]
(6) q -> q’ [tr\c ]
(7) q -> q’ [tr\\a]
Note that the expressions (2), (3), and (4) are equivalent. Similarly, expressions (5)
and (6) are equivalent as well. In addition, when using a trigger in a transition it is
not necessary to write their arguments in the trigger component of the transition.
This does not affect the possibility of using such arguments in both the conditions,
and the actions. For instance, given the trigger t(int x) = {Goo g.goo(x)entry},
one may define the transition q0 -> q1 [t\x == 8], where x is the argument of the
trigger t.
Now, let us illustrate some of the previous expressions with the following example:
TRANSITIONS {
q0 -> q1 [tn \ c == 8 \ v = 0; \gen(e);]
q0 -> q2 [f \ c == 2 \ ]
q1 -> q3 [g \ \ IF (b) THEN inc(v); foo();]
q2 -> q2 [ae?]
q3 -> q2 [g \ true \ \log("info");]
}
3.4.3 TEMPLATES
In addition to ppDATEs which exist up-front, and ‘run’ from the beginning of a
program’s execution, new ppDATEs can be created by existing ones. For instance, one
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may want to create a separate ‘observer’ for each new user logging into a system. For
that, one needs to be able to define parameterised ppDATEs, which we call templates,
and allow ppDATEs to create new instantiations of them. Fig. 3.3 illustrates an
example of a ppDATE template called login-logout which, given a user u, describes
the property “the user has to log in to perform a deposit”.
Section TEMPLATES lists tagged ppDATE templates. Below, we show the syntax
of this section.
TEMPLATES {
TEMPLATE id_template (params) {
VARIABLES { -- definition of the variables -- }
TRIGGERS { -- definition of the triggers -- }
PROPERTY name { -- definition of the property -- }
}
}
Each template is described within a subsection TEMPLATE, whose header is followed
by a (unique) name id template assigned to the template, and a list of parameters
params used to generalise the definition of the templates. Each element in params has
the form Type var, where Type is either a reference type (i.e. Java class), or one of
the following special types: Trigger, Condition, Action, HTriple, and MethodName.
These special types can be used to abstract triggers, conditions, actions, Hoare triples,
and method names, respectively, in a template. Regarding var, it represents the
abstraction of a value (of the corresponding type).
Note that as a template describes a ppDATE, the subsections VARIABLES, TRIGGERS,
and PROPERTY are defined just like it is described in Sec. 3.4.2. In addition, the trig-
gers defined in a template may have the same name as the triggers defined in a
(non-template) ppDATE. Whenever this happens, the template will always refer to
its own definition of the trigger. Below, we illustrate how the ppDATE template in
Fig. 3.3 could be written using this syntax.
TEMPLATES {
TEMPLATE login-logout (User u,Trigger tr) {
TRIGGERS {
login_ex(String username, int pwd) = {u.login(username, pwd)exit()}
logout_ex() = {u.logout()exit()}
}
PROPERTY deposit {
STATES {
STARTING { logout ; }
ACCEPTING { login ; }
BAD { bad ; }
}
TRANSITIONS {
logout -> login [login_ex]
logout -> bad [tr]
login -> logout [logout_ex]
login -> login [tr]
}
}
}
}
Regarding the instantiation of a template, it is accomplished by using the action
create on the transition of a ppDATE. This action receives as arguments the name
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start
User.new(res)↑ | true 7→ \create(login-logout,res,deposit en)
Figure 3.4: ppDATE in charge of creating instances of the template login-logout.
of the ppDATE template to be instantiated and a list of values to instantiate
the parameterised arguments of the template, and it generates the instance of the
template. For example, Fig.3.4 illustrates a ppDATE which creates an instance of
the template login-logout (Fig. 3.3) upon declaration of an object of class User. Here,
res represents the (concrete) object of class User which was created. In addition, the
trigger User.new↑ is activated when such a creation occurs.
3.4.4 CINVARIANTS
Section CINVARIANTS lists the definitions of class invariants which may need to be
considered during the verification of the properties. Its syntax is described as follows:
CINVARIANTS {
class { invariant }
}
Here, class represents a Java class in the program under scrutiny whose imple-
mentation has to preserve the invariant definition described by invariant. Such
invariants follow JML-like syntax and pragmatics. Below we illustrate an example of
this section.
CINVARIANTS {
Foo { v <= 10 }
Foo { count >= 0 }
}
Note that if no class invariants are needed on a specification, then this section may
be omitted. In addition, the actual version of the tool only uses the class invariants
during the static verification of the Hoare triples. However, we are currently working
to include the verification of class invariants at runtime as well.
3.4.5 HTRIPLES
Section HTRIPLES lists tagged Hoare triples. Its syntax is described as follows:
HTRIPLES {
HT hoare_triple_name {
PRE { -- precondition -- }
METHOD { -- method to verify -- }
POST { -- postcondition -- }
ASSIGNABLE { -- variables modified -- }
}
}
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Each Hoare triple is described within a subsection HT, whose header is followed by
the name assigned to the Hoare triple. This name is unique for each Hoare triple,
and it is used to associate the Hoare triples with the states of a ppDATE. Subsection
HT is composed by four parts: PRE, which describes the pre-condition of the Hoare
triple; POST, which describes the post-condition of the Hoare triple; METHOD, which
describes which is the method that has to fulfil the Hoare triple; and ASSIGNABLE,
which lists the variables that might be modified when the method under scrutiny
on the Hoare triple is executed. Here, PRE, POST, and ASSIGNABLE follow JML-like
syntax and pragmatics.
Regarding METHOD, it is an expression of the form file.method(types), where
method is the name of the method related to the Hoare triple, file is the Java class
where the previous method is implemented, and types is a list of arguments that can
be used to differentiate methods with the same name. Note that the use of types is
optional. Regarding PRE, POST, and ASSIGNABLE, these parts may be omitted. If so,
they will have as default values true, true, and \everything, respectively.
Below, we provide an example illustrating the use of this section.
HTRIPLES {
HT inc_ok {
PRE { v }
METHOD { Foo.inc }
POST { count == \old(count)+1 }
ASSIGNABLE { count }
}
HT inc_err {
PRE { !v }
METHOD { Foo.inc }
POST { count == \old(count) }
ASSIGNABLE { \nothing }
}
HT add1_ok {
PRE { true }
METHOD { Goo.add(int) }
POST { x == \old(x) + n }
ASSIGNABLE { \everything }
}
HT add2_ok {
METHOD { Goo.add(int,int) }
POST { x == n + m }
}
}
Note that this section may contain several subsections HT, one per each Hoare triple.
In addition, if no Hoare triples are included as part of a ppDATE, then this section
may be omitted.
3.4.6 METHODS
Section METHODS is an optional section which allows to include method declarations
as part of a specification. These methods will be included as part of the implementation
of the monitor generated by the tool. Its syntax is described as follows:
METHODS {
type method(arguments) { -- method implementation -- }
}
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Methods are declared following standard Java notation. However, access modifiers
(i.e., public, protected, private) are not necessary when declaring these methods. If a
method is declared as static method, then monitor variables will not be accessible
within that particular method. Below, we illustrate an example of this section.
METHODS {
boolean compare (int x, int y) { return (x == y); }
int four() { return 4 ; }
}
3.4.7 Remarks
3.4.7.1 Comment Lines
One may include comments in a ppDATE specification by writing %% followed by
the comment.
3.4.7.2 Key Words
The key words are words appearing in the grammar of ppDATE. We strongly recom-
mend not to use these words as part of your implementation. Otherwise, you may
run into parsing issues. The key words used in ppDATE are the following:
| ACCEPTING | ACTEVENTS | ASSIGNABLE | BAD
| CINVARIANTS | FOREACH | GLOBAL | HT
| HTRIPLES | IMPORTS | METHOD | METHODS
| NORMAL | PINIT | POST | PRE
| PROPERTY | STARTING | STATES | TEMPLATE
| TEMPLATES | TRANSITIONS | TRIGGERS | VARIABLES
| call | entry | execution | exit | final | import
| uponHandling | uponThrowing | where
3.4.7.3 Private Variables in the Hoare triples
When writing a Hoare triple it is possible to include private variables both in its
precondition, and its postcondition. StaRVOOrS will automatically annotate the
source code with appropriate JML clauses (i.e. spec public) preceding the (private)
variables definition, at the time of statically verifying the Hoare triples. However,
note that if later one of these Hoare triples has to be verified at runtime, then the
monitor will require access to the private variables values. In such situations, the user
will have to decide how to deal with these variables and modify the generated files
accordingly. For instance, one can introduce getter methods in order to give access
to the monitor to the values of the private variables, and then update the generated
file HoareTriplesPPD.java (under ppArtifacts) to use those methods. See Sec. 3.5.4
for more details about the files generated by the tool.
3.4.8 Extra Features
This section describes some extra features added to the tool and its input language,
which are not covered by the semantics described in [11]. Note that in Sec. 3.4.8.6
we provide arguments regarding how the soundness of the ppDATE semantics is
preserved when considering these features.
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U.new(res)↑ | true 7→ \create(prop-temp,res)
Figure 3.5: ppDATE in charge of creating instances of the template prop-temp.
3.4.8.1 PINIT Definition in Section PROPERTY
When describing a ppDATE specification, it is quite common to have some ppDATEs
only focus on creating instances of a template upon declaration of an object. Such
ppDATEs would look like the ppDATE illustrated in Fig. 3.5, which creates an
instance of the template prop-temp every time an object of the class U is created.
Here, \result represents the (concrete) object of class U which was created. In
addition, the trigger U.new↑ is activated when such a creation occurs.
Therefore, we decided to include a special subsection PINIT as part of the section
PROPERTY, which can be used to specify these kinds of ppDATEs in a simple manner.
The syntax of this subsection is as follows:
PROPERTY property_name {
PINIT { (template_name,Class) }
}
where property name is the name of the property (as described in Sec.3.4.2.4),
template name is the name of a ppDATE template defined in section TEMPLATE,
and Class is the name of the class associated to the declared object. Below, we
illustrate how the ppDATE from Fig.3.5 is described using this special subsection.
PROPERTY example {
PINIT { (prop-temp,U) }
}
Alike Fig. 3.5, property example describes a ppDATE which has a single state with
only a loop transition which is fired every time an object of the class U is created,
leading to an instantiation of the template prop-temp using the created object as
argument.
3.4.8.2 Where clause
When declaring a trigger, any of its arguments can be bound to a variable which
is not directly related to the method arguments. For instance, let us assume that
we have to perform some processing on a particular value, and that we want that,
depending on its result, a ppDATE fires a transition (or not). Then, by using a where
clause right after a trigger definition one can use one argument of the trigger as a
bound for that particular value. Consider the next example:
TRIGGERS {
goo(int x,boolean y) = {Goo g.foo(x)entry} where {y = g.IsValid();}
}
Here, we do not have any interest in the whole object g, but we simply need to know
if its a valid object or not, fact which can be computed using the method IsValid(),
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in order to send the ppDATE to either the state q2, or bad, respectively. Then, one
can use the boolean argument y of the trigger for binding the result of that method.
This would allow us to write transitions like the following ones:
TRANSITIONS {
q1 -> q2 [goo\ y]
q1 -> bad [goo\ !y]
}
Here, remember that it is not necessary to write the arguments of a trigger in the
trigger component of a transition, but one can refer to them in both the conditions
and the actions.
Furthermore, any variable which is not directly bound to the method arguments
is initialized in the where clause. This is done by checking that there is at least one
assignment statement with the unbound variable on the left-hand side.
Note that the statements in the where clause can be any valid JAVA statements
and these can call any relevant method from imported packages, and that the use of
curly brackets in this clause is compulsory.
3.4.8.3 Foreach construct
The FOREACH construct can be used as a simplistic alternative to the use of ppDATE
templates. Consider the following ppDATE:
GLOBAL {
TRIGGERS {
log(User user) = {Interface f.login(User user)entry}
out(User user) = {Interface f.logout(User user)entry}
}
PROPERTY example {
STATES {
ACCEPTING { logout ; }
BAD { bad ; }
STARTING { login ; }
}
TRANSITIONS {
logout -> login [log\\ \create(deposit-temp,user)]
logout -> bad [out]
login -> logout [out]
login -> bad [log]
}
}
}
TEMPLATES {
TEMPLATE deposit-temp (User u) {
TRIGGERS {
dep(int amount) = {u.deposit(amount)entry}
}
PROPERTY deposit { --- }
}
}
On this ppDATE, every time a user logs in the interface, an instance of the template
deposit-temp is created in order to runtime verify the property deposit for that
user.
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Now, let us introduce a similar ppDATE to the one described above, but written
using the foreach construct:
GLOBAL {
TRIGGERS {
log(User user) = {Interface f.login(User user)entry}
out(User user) = {Interface f.logout(User user)entry}
}
PROPERTY example {
STATES {
ACCEPTING { logout ; }
BAD { bad ; }
STARTING { login ; }
}
TRANSITIONS {
logout -> login [log]
logout -> bad [out]
login -> logout [out]
login -> bad [log]
}
}
FOREACH (User u) {
TRIGGERS {
dep(int amount) = {User u1.deposit(amount)entry } where {u = u1;}
}
PROPERTY deposit { --- }
}
}
In this version of the ppDATE, as soon as an object of the class User is created, a
ppDATE verifying the property deposit is generated. Here, remember that this is
not what happen the template version of the ppDATE, where the ppDATE verifying
property deposit is only created when a user logs in.
Using a foreach construct may seem simpler than using a ppDATE template.
However, one have to consider the following points when using it:
(i) This construct introduces a context to the ppDATE, i.e., the triggers, variables
and transitions will now be in a particular context. Hence, each trigger should
specify its context so that the ppDATE which will be affected will only be
the one belonging to that particular context. This is done by using the where
clause associated to each trigger. In addition, variables may be affected for the
introduction of a context. This happens when different contexts have variables
with the same name. By default, variables are match to the innermost context.
However, it is possible to indicate which one is the context of the variable
by using the following special notation: ::amount, ::u::amount. The former
notation refers to the variable amount in GLOBAL (i.e. top level), whereas the
latter refers to the variable amount in the context of the foreach (i.e. Foreach
(User u)).
(ii) ppDATEs for verifying the properties within a foreach are always going to be
generated upon creation of an object, even if the execution of the program does
not require to verify them.
(iii) This construct can only refer to reference types.
(iv) ppDATE templates are much more expressive than this construct.
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Anyhow, note that we mainly decided to include this construct in our language
because:
(I) in the case where one just wants to generalise a specification regarding objects
of a particular reference type, this construct may be simpler to use compared
to the use of a template;
(II) DATE users can start writing ppDATE specifications right away, without being
limited to learn to use templates first;
(III) it allows to migrate DATE specifications to ppDATE specifications in a simple
manner.
3.4.8.4 Channel Communication
ppDATE offers a simplistic manner for automata communication by using action
!. However, in certain situations it would be desirable to send information (i.e. an
object) from one automaton to the other. Thus, we introduce the use of channels for
accomplishing such communications.
A channel will broadcast its messages to all the ppDATEs listening to it at the
moment of broadcasting. In order to use them, one have to include in the VARIABLES
section of GLOBAL (at top level in the case a foreach construct is used) a declaration
of the following form:
GLOBAL {
VARIABLES {
Channel channelName ;
}
....
}
One should use in a transition the action channelName.send(o) to send a message
(i.e. object o) through the channel. In order to receive the massage, the receiver
ppDATEs should include a trigger similar to the following one:
TRIGGERS {
rec(type obj) = {channelName.receive(obj)entry}
}
These triggers are activated by the events generated when an object is send through
the channel, i.e. by the action channelName.send. Then, in the transition enabled
by the occurrence of rec one can access to the sent object by referring to obj (target
object instance of the class type).
3.4.8.5 Clocks
Clocks can be used in StaRVOOrS as timers which produce (internal) events once a
certain time interval has elapsed. In particular, clocks introduce the possibility of
defining real-time properties using ppDATE.
In order to use them, one has to, first, declare them in the VARIABLES section (see
Sec. 3.4.2.1) of the ppDATE specification. For instance, one would declare a clock c
in the following manner: Clock c = new Clock();. In addition, one has to define
a special trigger to capture the timeout (event) produced by the clock. Below, we
illustrate the syntax for these kind of triggers.
name() = { clock@time }
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Here, name is a label which works as an identifier for the trigger; clock is the name of
the declared clock, e.g. in our previous declaration c is the name of the clock; time is
the amount of seconds after which the clock will produce the timeout captured by this
trigger, each time the clock is reseted. For simplicity, one can also define the clock
as clock@%time, meaning that the clock will automatically reset after producing the
timeout.
Note that clocks are contextual, i.e. if one declares a clock within either a FOREACH
(see Sec. 3.4.8.3), or a TEMPLATE (see Sec. 3.4.3), a spare clock will be created for
each monitored object (or template instance). Moreover, if a clock is declared in the
GLOBAL section (see Sec. 3.4.2), then only one clock is created, and it will be available
in all the inner contexts of the specification.
In addition, clocks are automatically started as soon as their contexts start
existing. For instance, whenever the monitor starts working, all of the clocks declared
in the VARIABLES section, within the context of the GLOBAL section, are started.
Clocks implementation
Clocks are implemented as Java objects to simplify their usage. Below, we provide
the signature of the different methods which are part of the Clock class, and we
briefly describe what they do. All these methods can be used in the transitions of
the ppDATEs, e.g. c.reset() can be used to reset clock c.
 void reset(): as its name indicates, resets the clock, i.e. the clock is restarted;
 double current(): returns the number of seconds which have elapsed since
the clock was started (or reseted);
 int compareTo(double seconds): compares seconds to the current value of
the clock, i.e. the value returned by method current. If they are the same
value, then this method returns zero. If the latter is bigger than the former,
then this returns a positive integer. Otherwise, this method returns a negative
integer;
 void off(): Switches off the clock;
 void on(): Turns (back) on the clock;
 void pause(): Pauses the clock;
 void resume(): Resumes the clock.
Comparison to Timed Automata
Properties described using timed automata can also be described by using a ppDATE
with clocks. For instance, let us assume we have two clocks, c1 and c2, such that c1
triggers after 42 seconds, and c2 triggers after 10 seconds. In addition, the trigger
of one clock causes the reset of the other one. Fig. 3.6 illustrates this example as a
timed automaton. This automaton can also be written as the following ppDATE (in
the StaRVOOrS input language):
GLOBAL {
VARIABLES {
Clock c1 = new Clock();
Clock c2 = new Clock();
}
TRIGGERS {
c1Trigger() = { c1@42 }
c2Trigger() = { c2@10 }
}
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c1 < 42start c2 < 10
c1 >= 42,c2 := 0
c1 := 0,c2 >= 10
Figure 3.6: A timed automaton example.
PROPERTY example {
STATES {
STARTING { start }
NORMAL { normal }
}
TRANSITIONS {
start -> normal [ c1Trigger \ c1.compareTo(42) >= 0 \ c2.reset();]
normal -> start [ c2Trigger \ c2.compareTo(10) >= 0 \ c1.reset();]
}
}
}
Note that this example is an adaptation from an example provided in [43].
3.4.8.6 Towards the Semantics of the Extra Features
As mentioned above, all of the extra features depicted in this section are not covered
by the ppDATE semantics described in [11]. Here, we do not provide any formal
treatment for the semantics of these features. Still, we foresee that their use is
safe, i.e., the soundness of the specifications is preserved. Below, we provide some
arguments regarding why the soundness of ppDATE semantics would not be alter
when these extra features are used.
Regarding the PINIT definition, as it is simply syntactic sugar to simplify the
writing of some particular ppDATEs, its semantics would be the same as the one for
the ppDATEs written in the ordinary manner, i.e., it preserves soundness.
Regarding the where clause, it could only break the soundness of a specification
if a variable is bound to a particular value returned by a method, and this method
throws an exception. However, in [11] programs are assumed to be side-effect free,
i.e., they are restricted to not have any effect on the system which could in turn be
observed by the monitor. Thus, the use of this clause preserves soundness.
Regarding the FOREACH construct, as it is intended to be a simplistic alternative
to the use of ppDATE templates, their semantics could be described in a similar
manner to the one described in [11] for the templates. Thus, we can argue that the
use of this construct preserves soundness.
Regarding the use of channels and clocks, in order to guarantee that their use
preserves the soundness of ppDATE semantics, the semantics described in [11] should
be extended to handle these features properly. In order to do so, we can use as a
base the semantics described in [45] for DATE. DATE provides the use of channels
and clocks as well. In fact, we have implemented these features in the StaRVOOrS
input language by following their implementation in DATE. Thus, as these features
are considered to be sound in DATE, by considering similar semantics for them as
depicted in [45] for ppDATE, we can argue that the use of these features preserve
soundness.
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3.5 Using StaRVOOrS
In this section we depict how StaRVOOrS works by running the tool on the coffee
machine example introduced in Sec. 3.2. Both the ppDATE specification written in
the input language of the tool, and a simplistic implementation of the coffee machine
system, together with two big case studies based on Mondex [2] and SoftSlate (a real
Java cart application) [3], can be found in [4], under the section Downloads.
3.5.1 Coffee Machine Specification and Implementation
This section illustrates both the ppDATE specification written in the input language
of StaRVOOrS, and a (simplistic) implementation for the coffee machine system,
which were informally introduced in Sec. 3.2.
3.5.1.1 ppDATE Specification for the Coffee Machine
IMPORTS { import main.CMachine; }
GLOBAL {
EVENTS {
brew_entry() = {CMachine cm.brew()}
brew_exit() = {CMachine cm.brew()uponReturning()}
cleanF_entry() = {CMachine cm.cleanF()}
}
PROPERTY prop {
STATES {
BAD { bad ; }
NORMAL { q2 (brew_error,clean_filter_error) ;}
STARTING { q (brew_ok,clean_filter_ok) ; }
}
TRANSITIONS {
q -> q2 [brew_entry \ cm.cups < cm.limit ]
q2 -> q [brew_exit ]
q2 -> bad [ brew_entry ]
q2 -> bad [ cleanF_entry ] }
}
}
HTRIPLES {
HT brew_ok {
PRE {cups < limit}
METHOD {CMachine.brew}
POST {cups == \old(cups)+1}
ASSIGNABLE {cups} }
HT brew_error {
PRE {cups < limit}
METHOD {CMachine.brew}
POST {cups == \old(cups)}
ASSIGNABLE {cups} }
HT clean_filter_ok {
PRE {true}
METHOD {CMachine.cleanF}
POST {cups == 0}
ASSIGNABLE {cups} }
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HT clean_filter_error {
PRE {true}
METHOD {CMachine.cleanF}
POST {cups == \old(cups)}
ASSIGNABLE {cups} }
}
3.5.1.2 Coffee Machine Implementation
public class CMachine {
public int cups;
public int limit;
public boolean active;
CMachine(int limit) {
this.limit = limit;
cups = 0;
active = false;
}
public void cleanF() {
if (!active)
cups = 0;
}
public void brew() {
if (!active && cups < limit)
cups++;
}
}
3.5.2 Running StaRVOOrS
In order to run StaRVOOrS, as it is illustrated in Fig. 3.7, the following input should
be provided:
(i) the path to the main directory of the Java files to be verified, for instance,
Example/CoffeeBrew.
(ii) a description of the ppDATE specification for the provided program written in
the input language of the tool, for instance, Example/prop brew.ppd.
(iii) the path of the output directory where the files generated by the tool are going
to be placed, for instance, Example.
3.5.2.1 Flags
When running StaRVOOrS, one may include flags to indicate different options.
Most of these flags are use as follows:
StaRVOOrS [-OPTIONS] <java source files> <ppDATE file> <output add>
Below, we list them.
 -n (or - -none verbose)
None verbose monitor generation.
 -x (or - -xml)
The .xml file generated by KeY is not removed.
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Figure 3.7: Running StaRVOOrS
 -r (or - -only rv)
Monitor generation without performing deductive verification with KeY.
 -k (or - -killbad)
All the ppDATEs which have reached a bad state are killed, i.e. terminated.
 -d (or - -distributed)
Improves the output provided by the monitor in the context of active objects.1
 -v (or - -version)
Shows StaRVOOrS version number. Usage: StaRVOOrS -v
 -p (or - -only parse)
Only parse the ppDATE file. Usage: StaRVOOrS -p <ppDATE file>
 -h (or - -help)
Describes the different flags available. Usage: StaRVOOrS -h
Note that the flags -p, -h, and -v, have to be used in isolation. All of the other flags
can be combined.
3.5.3 StaRVOOrS ouput
Fig.3.8 illustrates all the files generated by StaRVOOrS when it is used to analise
the running example. This output consists of: the monitor files generated by Larva
(folder aspects and folder larva), the files generated by StaRVOOrS to runtime
verify partially proven Hoare triples (folder ppArtifacts), an instrumented version
of the source code (folder CoffeMachine), a report summarising the results obtained
during the static verification of the Hoare triples (report.txt), the optimised version
(if any) of the provided ppDATE specification (prop brew optimised.ppd), and the
DATE specification obtained as a result of translating the (optimised) ppDATE
(prop brew.lrv). Note that StaRVOOrS does not modify the provided source code,
it creates an instrumented version of it. Thus, at the time of monitoring the code,
the instrumented version of the source code is the one which should be used.
3.5.4 StaRVOOrS execution insights
StaRVOOrS is a fully automated tool. However, in order to have a better under-
standing of its execution, below we will explain it in three stages. Note that during
1This feature was only tested in ProActive.
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Figure 3.8: StaRVOOrS output
Figure 3.9: Initiating Static Verification
each one of this stages, StaRVOOrS will produced some output on the terminal.
We will illustrate such an output through figures.
The first stage corresponds to the static verification of the Hoare triples using
KeY. Fig. 3.9 shows the output produced by the tool on the terminal during this
stage. At first, KeY (taclet) options are set. These options are parameters which, for
instance, indicate to KeY which rules of its sequent calculus it is able to use during
the verification of a property. For the time being, we are just using the standard
options. Then, KeY is ran.
While KeY analyses all the Hoare triples, every time a proof attempt is saturated,
some information related to this analysis is given as output in the terminal. Fig. 3.10
illustrates this. Once KeY is done verifying all the Hoare triples, it generates a
temporary file out.xml, which is removed once StaRVOOrS is done2, describing its
results. This file is used by StaRVOOrS to optimise the ppDATE specification for
runtime checking. However, in order to give to the user some understandable feedback
about what happened during the static verification of the contracts, StaRVOOrS
generates a file report.txt which briefly explains the content of the .xml file.
2Note that one may use the flag -x to include this file as part of the output.
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Figure 3.10: Output shown on the terminal during static verification
Figure 3.11: Optimization and files generation after static verification
The second stage corresponds to the refinement of the specification. In this stage,
all the Hoare triples which were fully proven are removed from the ppDATE, and those
which were only partially proven are modified by strengthening their pre-conditions
including the conditions which lead to an unclosed path on a proof. For instance, in
our running example the report would include the information that the pre-condition
of the Hoare triple brew ok is strengthen with the addition of the condition active
== TRUE.
Whenever it is necessary at runtime to verify partially proven Hoare triples,
StaRVOOrS instruments the provided Java files by adding a new parameter to the
method(s) associated to the Hoare triple(s). This new parameter is used to distinguish
different calls to the same method. This change is introduced in the refined ppDATE
specification as well. Besides, StaRVOOrS generates several files within folder the
ppArtifacts which are used to runtime verify the Hoare triples. For instance, the file
HoareTriplesPPD.java contains the implementation of the methods which are used to
verify the pre- and post-conditions of the Hoare triples. In addition, file IdPPD.java
will be used to generate the value of the new parameter added to the methods. Once
this stage is over, the terminal will look like Fig. 3.11.
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Figure 3.12: Monitor Generation
The third stage corresponds to the generation of the runtime monitor. In order
to do so, the refined ppDATE specification is translated by StaRVOOrS to a DATE
specification (file prop brew.lrv in our running example). Then, Larva is used to
generate the monitor files from the DATE. After the execution of Larva is completed,
leading to the generation of the files in the folders aspects and larva, StaRVOOrS
execution is completed as well. The terminal will reflect this, as it is illustrated in
Fig. 3.12.
3.5.5 Running the application with the generated monitor
To run the (generated) instrumented version of the program, let us call it P, together
with the monitor, one can generate an executable jar file, and then run it on a Java
virtual machine. We will use Java 1.7 to compile the Java files. However, due to
compatibility issues with Larva, when compiling the aspects one has to use the
version 1.5. Note that the aspects have to be compiled using an AspectJ compiler.
We recommend the ajc compiler. In addition, to run the jar file one has to use aj5
(like command java, but with support for AspectJ), or similar. Below, we provide a
short script explaining how to create such a jar file.
First, go inside the output directory.
cd Example/out
Second, copy the folders larva and ppArtifacts into the main folder of P.
cp -r larva CoffeeBrew
cp -r ppArtifacts CoffeeBrew
Third, create a directory named Build, and compile P using the option -target 1.7
in such a way that the compiled files are placed within Build.
mkdir Build
javac -target 1.7 $(find CoffeeBrew -name *.java) -d Build
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Next, create an executable jar file from the files in Build.
jar cfe coffeeM.jar main.CMachine -C Build .
Now, one has to weave the aspects into the jar file. In order to do so, the files in
folder aspects have to be compiled using an AspectJ compiler. Here, we use ajc. Note
that it is usually recommend to generate a new jar file when the aspects are weaved.
ajc -1.5 -sourceroots aspects/ -inpath coffeeM.jar -outjar coffeeM asp.jar
Finally, this weaved executable jar file corresponds to the compilation of P together
with the monitor. Therefore, running it would mean the one is running a monitored
version of P. To execute the weaved jar file one can use aj5 as follows:
aj5 -jar coffeeM asp.jar
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TESTING MEETS STATIC AND RUNTIME
VERIFICATION
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Abstract
Test driven development (TDD) is a technique where test cases are used to guide the
development of a system. This technique introduces several advantages at the time
of developing a system, e.g. writing clean code, good coverage for the features of the
system, and evolutionary development. In this paper we show how the capabilities of
a testing focused development methodology based on TDD and model-based testing,
can be enhanced by integrating static and runtime verification into its workflow.
Considering that the desired system properties capture data- as well as control-
oriented aspects, we integrate TDD with (static) deductive verification as an aid in
the development of the data-oriented aspects, and we integrate model-based testing
with runtime verification as an aid in the development of the control-oriented aspects.
As a result of this integration, the proposed development methodology features the
benefits of TDD and model-based testing, enhanced with, for instance, early detection
of bugs which may be missed by TDD, regarding data aspects, and the validation of
the overall system with respect to the model, regarding the control aspects.
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4.1 Introduction
Minimising bugs is a major objective in software development, but accomplishing
this objective to a satisfactory degree is often difficult. In fact, few experts are overly
surprised when bugs are found even in well-known programs or algorithms, e.g. [49].
The need of software development techniques which help programmers to spot bugs
early on is apparent.
Programmers can use several techniques which help to develop implementations
with fewer bugs. The most used technique to increase confidence in the correctness
of the developed software is undoubtedly testing. To a lesser extent formal methods
are used. They offer stronger guarantees, but they are not applied nearly as widely
as their potential suggests.
Besides the more traditional way of performing testing, test driven development
(TDD) [20] is a technique where test cases are used to drive the development of the
program. Therein, test cases form a light-weight ‘specification’ of program units,
guiding the programmer who aims at satisfying the given test-cases. Using this
technique, programmers tend to write cleaner code with good coverage for the desired
system features, as every feature is accounted with test cases. This helps limiting the
introduction of bugs.
Another testing technique is model-based testing (MBT) [91], which in turn is
part of model based development. In MBT, tests are automatically generated (also)
from model artifacts, and frequently executed to check whether the test passes or
not (after providing a checker for expected outputs, the oracle). In order to perform
MBT one must write a model from which the test cases are obtained.
In this paper we show how the capabilities of a testing focused development
methodology based on TDD and MBT, can be enhanced by integrating static and
runtime verification into its workflow. Considering that the desired system properties
can be separated into data-oriented aspects (e.g. how a method modifies the fields of
a class) and control-oriented aspects (e.g. proper flow of execution of the methods),
we integrate TDD with (static) deductive verification [9, 56], and we integrate MBT
with runtime verification [58, 63, 74]. The former integration comes as an aid in
the development, and debugging, of the data aspects, whereas the latter helps the
development, and debugging, of the control-oriented part.
Regarding the data aspects, we first define (empty) methods needed in the
classes, and we write contracts (i.e. Hoare triples) for them. Then, we write test cases
covering all contracts, and we proceed by applying TDD. (As we so far only have empty
methods, tests will in principle fail for the lack of even an initial implementation.)
After some iterations in TDD, where method implementations are developed, and
some early bugs may be discovered and fixed, we use deductive verification to formally
verify the methods. If some of the contracts cannot be (fully) verified, we generate
(potentially failing) test cases covering the parts of the implementation that could
not be proven correct, and continue by applying TDD focused on these new tests.
Then, we iterate on these steps, until the verification of the methods associated to
these contracts is saturated, i.e. we got to fully verified the methods, or the deductive
verifier has not enough information to finish the proof.
Regarding the control aspects, we start by writing a model for these aspects.
Next, we use MBT to generate test cases, and continue with the development of
the program by attempting to get a desired coverage over the model, e.g. transition
coverage. After this, we produce a monitor specification from the model, in order
to then runtime verify the overall system implementation with respect to the model.
This monitor specification can be further extended to cover aspects not covered by
the model. (In particular, forbidden behaviour is often not made explicit in models,
but very much so in monitor specifications.)
As a result of this integration, our proposed methodology features the benefits of
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using TDD and MBT, but enhanced with:
 early detection of bugs which may be missed when applying traditional TDD;
 high code coverage for the unit tests by (proof) construction;
 the validation of the overall system behaviour with respect to the model
(understood as a specification)
 the inclusion of aspects often neglected in models (and in MBT), like nested
methods calls and forbidden behaviour.
The authors have earlier made technical contributions which are used in this work,
in deductive verification [9], proof based test generation [13], and combined static
and runtime verification [11]. The corresponding tools are used, together with other
tools, in the examples we discuss (see Sec. 4.4). The proposed development process
does, however, not depend on the exact tools used in the different steps.
Structure of the paper. Sec. 4.2 provides a brief introduction to TDD, MBT, and
static and runtime verification. Sec. 4.3 presents an overview of our proposed method-
ology. Sec. 4.4 illustrates in more detail our methodology through its application in
the development of a small Java program. Sec. 4.5 elaborates on the benefits of using
our proposed methodology. Sec. 4.6 discusses related work and Sec. 4.7 concludes the
paper.
4.2 Background
In this section we briefly introduce the concepts we build upon in this work.
4.2.1 Test Driven Development
Test driven development (TDD) is a software development technique [20]. In this
technique, the test cases serve as a guide for developing the different parts (units) of
the system. Pragmatically, the test cases can be seen as (unit) specifications, however
in a limited sense, as the wanted behaviour is only given for exactly these tests, and
the programmer has to extrapolate from that herself.
Performing TDD consists of the following steps:
(i) Write test cases that initially fail;
(ii) Write code making the tests pass;
(iii) Refactor the code.
These steps are usually known as Red, Green, and Refactor, respectively. The idea
is that before implementing the methods of the system one should, first, write test
cases for all of them. Such test cases will immediately fail, as the methods are not
(properly) implemented yet. Then, one proceeds to implement the methods. The
implementation of a method is considered to be ready once its test cases succeed.
Finally, one should remove from the implementation all the duplication of code (if
any) introduced in order to make the test pass.
In general, by using TDD, programmers limit the introduction of bugs to a certain
extent. In addition, this technique presents other benefits like writing clean code,
good coverage for the features of the system, and evolutionary development.
On the negative side, developers usually complain that they do not think in terms
of tests and that it takes more time to develop the code, so it is imperative to break
such resistance to change the way they develop software. After adopting TDD though,
many programmers agree with the benefits of using it [16].
4.2.2 Model Based Testing
Unit testing focuses on writing tests which analyse the computation performed by
the unit on the data. In contrast to that, model-based testing (MBT) [91] provides
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better support for testing control-oriented aspects, e.g. the flow of execution of the
methods in the program under test. Most models that are used to generate tests for
control-oriented aspects are based on variants of finite-state machines.
In general, MBT tools can automatically generate test cases from the model which
might also contain the expected output in order to automate the decision on whether
the test passes or not [6, 90]. In addition, they may generate failing traces which
simplifies the detection of pitfalls in the program under test.
More concretely, MBT involves doing the following:
(i) Writing an abstract model (sometimes the model is annotated to capture the
relationship between tests and requirements);
(ii) Generating abstract tests from the model, which implies defining a test selection
and coverage criteria;
(iii) Generating concrete test cases, which implies the creation of an adaptor to
convert abstract tests into concrete test cases;
(iv) Executing the tests on the system under test (SUT) and assigning verdicts;
(v) Analysing the test results and taking corrective action.
Note that a fault in the test case might not necessarily mean that there is a problem
with the implementation: the verdict might be due to a fault in the adaptor code or
in the model.
Among the benefits of using MBT, it is usually mentioned [91] that it increases
the possibility of finding errors, it reduces testing cost and time (programmers spend
less time and effort on writing tests and analysing results as it generates shorter
test sequences), it improves the test quality (by considering coverage of the model
and of the SUT), it might detect requirements defects, it gives traceability between
requirements and the model, and between informal requirements and generated test
cases, and that it helps the updating of test suites when the requirements evolve.
On the negative side, among other things MBT cannot guarantee to find all
differences between the model and the implementation, it needs skilled model designers,
and it is mostly used for functional testing. Moreover, unless you keep an updated
table relating requirements with the model, you might get the wrong model from
outdated requirements. Finally it is indeed an overhead to write the model (which
might be wrong) and to develop the adaptor (which might also introduce errors).
4.2.3 Deductive Verification
In deductive verification, correctness properties of a program (unit) are captured in
logical formulae, e.g., in first-order logic, high-order logic, program logic, etc. These
formulas are then proved by deduction in a (logic) calculus [9, 56].
There are three main approaches that one may adopt to perform deductive
verification. Let us call these three approaches Proof Assistants, Program Logic, and
Verification Condition Generation.
Proof Assistants are interactive theorem provers which, in general, target some
high-order logic [28, 92]. These provers are not language-oriented. Instead, they
provide a language in which both the syntax and the semantics of the program under
scrutiny have to be described. In addition, the correctness properties have to be
modelled within the logic handled by the proof assistant. Then, one may use the
proof assistant to develop the proof of the properties.
Concerning Program Logic, Hoare Logic [66] may be the most well-known program
logic to analyse programs. Hoare logic offers both a clear notation to describe
programs and their properties, and a set of axioms and inference rules which may
be used to verify the properties [81]. In this logic, properties are described by using
Hoare triples.
In the Verification Condition Generation approach, programs are annotated with
assertions representing the desired correctness properties [71]. Then, this assertions
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may be used to generate first-order logic verification conditions which later may be
discharged by using some automatic prover [50].
A benefit of deductive program verification is that once a property (contract) for
a given unit is proven, there is a very high confidence that the method is correct
(provided the property is correct). Another advantage is that one does not need to
run the program, reducing the need to find test cases and to set or simulate runtime
environments.
One disadvantage of this technique is that it is not possible, in general, to be
applied automatically. Also, the method requires contracts of called (library) code
and loop invariants. So one can argue that it requires a highly specialised person
to do such verification, as the critics go for many other formal methods techniques.
Besides, many properties of the program cannot be proved statically and are required
to be analysed during program execution.
4.2.4 Runtime Verification
Runtime verification (RV) [58,63,74] is a technique focused on monitoring software
executions. It detects violations of properties which occur while the program under
scrutiny ‘runs’. Moreover, RV provides the additional possibility of reacting to the
incorrect behaviour of the program whenever an error is detected.
Properties verified with RV are specified using any of the following approaches:
(i) annotating the source code of the program under scrutiny with assertions [72];
(ii) using a high level specification language [78]; or (iii) using an automaton-based
specification language [10,45].
In order to perform the verification of the properties, RV introduces the use
of monitors. A monitor is a piece of software that runs in parallel to the program
under scrutiny, controlling that the execution of the latter does not violate any of
the properties. In addition, monitors usually create a log file where they add entries
reflecting the verdict obtained when a property is verified.
In general, monitors are automatically generated from the annotated/specified
properties [42, 46, 80], which is of course a big advantage. Another advantage is that
one can check also properties which are not provable statically, thus complementing
static verification. Finally, the fact of monitoring the real execution makes the
technique appealing since this particular execution, and deployment, may not have
been covered at testing time.1
The main disadvantages of this technique is that one can only capture errors that
are witnessed by current executions and cannot say much, in general, about other
runs. Depending on the context, adding a monitor adds time and space overheads
which might be prohibitive in some cases (e.g., in small devices, or when the response
time of the system is critical).
4.3 Combining Testing with Static and Run-
time Verification
In this section we provide an overview of the proposed development methodology.
As a starting point, for presentation purposes, we describe a methodology using two
styles of testing, TDD and MBT, not yet using deductive or runtime verification.
Thereafter, we enhance the methodology by integrating (static) deductive verification
and runtime verification in the workflow. A detailed example demonstrating the
usage of the methodology will be provided in the next section (Sec. 4.4).
1The monitor can also log the execution of the program in order to perform a ‘post
mortem’ analysis which could give more insights into why the error occurred.
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Figure 4.1: A testing focused development workflow.
4.3.1 A Testing Focused Development
Fig. 4.1 illustrates an abstract view of a purely testing focused workflow. Based on
the insight that the desired properties of a system can be largely divided into data-
and control-oriented aspects, we can view the methodology as consisting of two stages
focusing on data and control, respectively.
Regarding the data stage, first we define the signatures of the methods, and
provide stub implementations to enable compilation. Then, we use TDD as explained
in Sec. 4.2.1. Here, the various aspects of the desired computation on the data have
to be accounted with (unit) test cases.
Regarding the control stage, we start by writing a model focusing on the control
aspects of the system. Then, we continue developing our program by using model-
based testing, in a similar manner to how Behaviour Driven Development (BDD) [34]
is performed. BDD is an extension of TDD where one focuses on the behaviour of the
system instead of units of code. In general, every feature of the system is divided into
scenarios of the form GIVEN-WHEN-THEN, e.g. GIVEN certain condition, WHEN
some operation is performed, THEN something should happen. In [44], Colombo
et al. show how the BDD features can be written as models for model-based testing.
For instance, the scenario,
GIVEN we are in state unlogged
WHEN method log is ran successfully
THEN we are in state logged
would be represented in a model as a transition from the initial state unlogged to the
state logged, which is triggered whenever the method log is ran successfully.
In the spirit of this pattern, we continue by generating test cases which trigger
the transitions of the model, aiming at triggering each transition at least once. In
terms of BDD, this would be similar to considering a whole scenario every time we
iterate in the development cycle.
Thus, one would continue iterating on this stage until transition coverage over
the model is accomplished. Note that failing to accomplish this would probably mean
that the implementation is erroneous (assuming that the model is correct of course).
Finally, we proceed to complete the overall implementation of the system, by
implementing the system level layer(s). In the simplest case, in a stand alone,
command line application in, say, Java, this may correspond to implementing the
class containing the method main.
Once the development of the overall implementation of system is completed, we
will have an implementation that is likely to feature:
 clean code;
 good coverage over the data aspects;
 high coverage over the control aspects;
However,
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 the unit test cases only specify the wanted behaviour for some specific inputs,
not for all inputs;
 we have no information regarding the unit test coverage;
 all unit test cases need to be written by hand;
 we have no evidence that the overall system implementation fulfills the control
aspects of the desired properties.
4.3.2 A methodology integrating testing and verification
The aforementioned shortcomings of the purely testing focused methodology indicate
the potential for an improved methodology, which we present in the following.
In [10, 11], Ahrendt et al. show how runtime monitors can be optimised by
combining the use of runtime verification with deductive verification. In these works,
the authors consider the integration of data- and control-aspects in the specification,
but their separation in the verification. From that work, we inherit the overall idea
to use static and runtime verification in combination, however in a different way. In
the development process we propose here, static and runtime verification techniques
are not integrated with each other directly, but are integrated with TDD and MBT,
respectively. As a result, we obtain the workflow illustrated in Fig. 4.2.
Regarding the data stage, we start by defining the signatures of all the methods
associated to data aspects, providing a stub implementation to allow their compilation.
Next, we define contracts, i.e., properties written as pre/post-conditions (Hoare
triples), for the different methods. These contracts focus on the data aspects. We
then proceed to apply TDD, adding one test at a time, and make it pass by further
developing the implementation. Each one of this test should cover a scenario where a
contract holds, and each contract should be associated to (at least) one test.
Once we have implemented the methods, we proceed to use deductive verification
in an attempt to statically verify the implementation with respect to its contract.
For each method, this either results in (1) a closed proof, i.e. the contract is fully
verified, or (2) an unclosed (partial) proof, i.e., the contract is not (fully) verified.
In case of (1), this means that the method fulfils the contract. In case of
(2), either (i) there is a bug in the program, or (ii) the deductive verifier has not
enough information to finish the proof. Here, we can use tools like KeY [9] or
StaDy [77] to reason about whether (i) or (ii) is most likely. These tools use symbolic
execution [64, 70], KeY through the use of its feature KeyTestGen [13], and StaDy
through the use of PathCrawler [93], to generate test cases covering exactly those
executions through the method that correspond to the open proof branches. In
general, if the test case succeeds right away, this can be an indicator that the verifier
has not enough information to finish the proof. If however the test does not pass, we
modify the implementation to make the test succeed, i.e. we apply TDD. Thus, we
have a retrofitting loop between deductive verification and TDD, where deductive
verification provides new, automatically generated tests for TDD. This loop will
continue until either the verification of the method is saturated, i.e. we got to fully
verified the contract associated to the method, or the deductive verifier has not
enough information to finish the proof. Either way, we will have a test suite providing
guarantees towards a high code coverage for the unit tests. In Sec. 4.4 we will show
an example on how this retrofitting loop can detect bugs which could not be detected
right away by using traditional TDD. Also, note that we make use of deductive
verification in a much more lightweight manner than what is done traditionally.
If proofs fail due to limitations of the effort level we can put in the development
ecosystem at hand, the failed proofs are still of good use, as they are the source of
new tests.
Turning to the control stage, we start by working in the exact same manner
as described in Sec. 4.3.1. However, once we have implemented the system level
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layer, we move on to the use of runtime verification. For that, we first need to
produce a monitor specification from the model. By considering the results given
by Falzon et al. [55], we can convert the model into a monitor specification in a
quite straightforward manner. (This step could in principle be partly automated, but
is not at the moment.) We then use this specification to automatically generate a
monitor (e.g. using the LARVA tool [46]), in order to runtime verify the overall system
implementation with respect to the model. Here, we use the test cases generated with
model-based testing in the previous step as traces to guide the monitored execution.
After certain rounds of runtime verifying the overall system implementation, we
can proceed to further extend the monitor in order to cover aspects not covered by
the model. For instance, we can add new transitions to violating states to capture
forbidden behaviour. In addition, by using runtime verification we can include the
analysis of control aspects of nested method calls, as model-based testing is mainly
focused on the (almost) top level of the call stack.
Once the development of the overall implementation of system is completed, we
will have an implementation that is likely to feature:
 clean code;
 high unit test coverage (in terms of specific metrics) guaranteed by the use of
deductive verification [13];
 high test coverage over the control aspects (transition coverage on the model);
 good evidence that the overall implementation of the system fulfills the control
aspects (achieved by the use of runtime verification).
4.4 The methodology in action
In this section we describe the use the development methodology described in Sec. 4.3.2
in a running example, consisting on the (Java) development of a small bank system
where users log in to perform transactions. Below, we provide a brief description of
the system. Throughout the section, even without explicit mention, Fig. 4.2 is a good
reference for the current position in the workflow.
A repository with the whole documentation of the system, and the developed
sources, is available from [7]. The repository contains several branches covering the
steps above, e.g., branch step1 covers the first step, branch step2 covers the second
step, and so on. These versioned sources will allow the interested reader to have a
proper understanding on the work performed at each step, and to have a clear view
on how the development evolves from one step to the other.
Running Example: Bank System Our running example consists on the develop-
ment in Java of a small bank system where users log in to perform transactions. This
system has the following classes:
 Account, representing the accounts of the bank,
 Category, representing different user categories,
 DataBase, emulating a database,
 HashTable, an open addressing Hashtable with linear probing as collision
resolution,
 SystemCentral, used to keep track of centralised data,
 User: representing the users of the bank,
 UserInterface: representing the interface offered to the users in order to
interact with their accounts,
 Main.
Classes Account, Category, HashTable, and User are developed in the data stage;
whereas classes UserInterface, and Main are developed in the control stage. Note that
the classes DataBase and SystemCentral are used to emulate, only, the interaction
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/*@ public normal_behaviour
@ requires size < capacity;
@ ensures
@ (\exists int i; i >= 0 && i < capacity; h[i] == u);
@ ensures size == \old(size) + 1;
@ assignable size, h[*];
@ also
@ public normal_behaviour
@ requires size >= capacity;
@ assignable \nothing;
@ */
public void add(Object u, int key) { }
Figure 4.3: Contracts for method add.
with the database, and the centralised data for the bank. Thus, their development is
not a proper part of the running example.
On this section, we discuss the development of the classes HashTable (steps
1,2, and 3), UserInterface (step 4), and Main (steps 5 and 6). In addition, in the
presentation we mainly deal with the following data and control aspects, respectively:
(i) the set of logged user will be implemented using an open addressing hashtable
with linear probing as collision resolution (data aspect); (ii) a user has to be logged
to perform a transaction (control aspect).
4.4.1 Method Signature Definition
We start applying our methodology by defining the signatures of all the methods asso-
ciated to data aspects, providing a stub implementation to allow their compilation.2
4.4.2 Contract Definition
We then continue by defining contracts accounting for the data aspects of the system.
Here, we use the Java Modelling Language (JML) [68] to write the contracts. By
using JML one can specify both pre- and postconditions of methods calls, and
class invariants. JML contracts are annotations in the source code, preceding the
corresponding method signature.
Regarding class HashTable, Fig. 4.3 shows the contracts defined for method add,
which is used to add an object into a hashtable. The first contract corresponds to
the case where there is still room for adding a new object to the hashtable. It says
that, after adding the object, there exists an index in the hashtable where the new
object is stored. The second contract corresponds to the case where the hashtable is
full. Fig. 4.4 shows one of the contracts defined for method delete, which is used
to remove objects from the hashtable. It corresponds to the case where there is an
object in the position of the computed hash code for key. Then, the object is replaced
by null in the hashtable, the size of the hashtable decreases by one, and the removed
object is returned by the method. The objects in the other positions should remain
the same.
2See branch initial-code in [7].
130 CHAPTER 4
/*@ public normal_behaviour
@ requires key >= 0 && size > 0;
@ requires h[hash_function(key)] != null;
@ ensures \result == \old(h[hash_function(key)]);
@ ensures h[hash_function(key)] == null
@ && size == \old(size) - 1;
@ ensures (\forall int j; j >= 0 && j < capacity
@ && j != hash_function(key); h[j] == \old(h[j]));
@ assignable size, h[*];
@ */
public Object delete(int key) { }
Figure 4.4: One of the contracts for method delete.
@Test
public void test_add_1(){
int idx = hash.hash_function(3);
hash.add(new Integer(42),idx);
assertEquals(hash.h[idx],new Integer(42));
}
@Test
public void test_add_2(){
hash.add(new Integer(3),0);
hash.add(new Integer(38),2);
hash.add(new Integer(42),0);
HashTable aux = new HashTable(3) ;
aux.add(new Integer(3),0);
aux.add(new Integer(42),1);
aux.add(new Integer(38),2);
assertArrayEquals(hash.h,aux.h);
}
Figure 4.5: Test cases for method add.
4.4.3 Test Driven Development
Once the contracts are in place, we proceed to define test cases and use TDD to
implement the methods. Here, we use JUnit [26] to write and check the unit test
cases.3 For instance for method add, we may have two test cases (see Fig. 4.5). The
first covers the case where the position of the computed hash code for the object is
free, the other test covers the case where the corresponding position is occupied, i.e.,
the method should look for the nearest following index which is free.
Fig. 4.6 and Fig. 4.7 show (parts of) the developed implementations for method
add and delete. Both implementations contain bugs which are not detected by the
test cases that were used in this step. In method add, the statement i++, should
actually be inside an else branch of the if statement; and in method delete, we are
not computing the hash code of key before checking the hashtable.
Not only do the test we gave for add not reveal the bug, more generally, additional
hand-written tests are also likely to miss this bug. The only way to trigger it is to add
3All the test cases are available from [7], under the path src/test/java/bank.
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public void add (Object u, int key) {
/* code ommited for presentation */
while (h[i] != null && j < capacity) {
if (i == capacity-1) i = 0;
i++;
j++;
}
/* code ommited for presentation */ }
Figure 4.6: Part of the implementation of method add.
public Object delete (int key) {
if (key >= 0) {
if (h[key] == null) return null;
else { Object ret = h[key] ;
h[key] = null ;
size = size - 1;
return ret;
}
} else { return null; } }
Figure 4.7: Implementation of method delete.
an element (with non-zero hash) to a hashtable with exactly one free position which
is precisely at index zero. Only in this scenario, we would add the element in a wrong
position, as the index zero will be skipped during the iterations of the while (due
to the missing else), leading to have an erroneous value for the variable i whenever
the loop breaks, i.e. j reaches the value of capacity. Also the test case analysing
method delete (not given here) succeeds because the value of key coincides with its
hash code, and it is between the bounds of the hashtable. However, these bugs are
detected in later steps.
4.4.4 Deductive Verification
Contract Verification
After all the methods associated to the data aspects are implemented, we use KeY [9]
to verify them. KeY is a deductive verification tool for data-centric functional
correctness properties of Java programs. Given a Java program with JML annotations
on its methods, KeY generates formulae in Java Dynamic Logic, and attempts to
prove them. In addition, KeY comes with a user interface where users can interact
with the prover, and inspect proof trees.
Regarding the class HashTable, all of its methods are automatically verified, with
exception of the methods add and delete. In relation to method add, as it contains
a loop to look for the next available index, then KeY needs more information to
deal with its first contract, i.e. it needs a loop invariant. Thus, we introduce a loop
invariant, and run KeY one more time. Still, but now due to the bug, KeY is not
able to fully prove the contract. This time the issue is that KeY cannot prove that
the body of the loop fulfils the loop invariant. In particular, it cannot prove the
invariant i < capacity. By taking a look at the information in the proof tree, we
can realise that whenever i is set to zero in the inner if, it is immediately increased
by one afterwards. Thus, the index zero will be always skipped. After fixing this
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public Object delete (int key) {
if (key >= 0) {
int i = hash_function(key);
if (h[i] == null) return null;
else { Object ret = h[i] ;
h[i] = null ;
size = size - 1;
return ret;
}
} else { return null; } }
Figure 4.8: Fixing the implementation of method delete.
issue by wrapping the statement i++ with an else branch in the if statement, KeY
fully verifies the contract.
In relation to method delete, due to the bug KeY cannot fully verify the contract
depicted in Fig. 4.4. In order to analyse the issue, this time instead of looking at the
information in the proof tree, we proceed to generate new test cases for it covering
the issue. Note that we take this decision to show that if a user does not know how
to read a proof tree, she still can use our methodology for developing her system.
Test Case Generation
State-of-the-art deductive verification technology can be employed for more purposes
than full-fledged formal verification, like test case generation [13] and runtime monitor
optimisation [11]. In the current context, as a next step, we use KeyTestGen [13]
to automatically generate the test cases, complementing the tests which we used for
guiding the implementation in the TDD phase. Specifically, the tool generates tests
covering the cases that could not be verified by KeY. Note that, if the verification for
a certain class of initial values and inputs did not succeed, this means that either the
implementation is correct but KeY was not able to show that (with the given effort
level), or that implementation is indeed incorrect. The generated test cases help us
to distinguish these cases, and locate additional bugs.
Therefore, we run KeyTestGen including the postcondition of the contract in the
oracle. This generates the file TestGeneric0 delete.java, which contains a test case, in
this case a failing one, i.e., a counter-example for the contract.4 Its execution throws
an exception where an index is out of bounds when accessing the hashtable. We
then apply TDD again, with focus on making this new test succeed. The exception
indicates that the hash code of the key is not computed before checking the hashtable.
We fix the implementation of delete as it is illustrated in Fig. 4.8. Afterwards, KeY
fully verifies the contract.
4.4.5 Model Definition
We now move on to the control focused stage, starting by defining the model describing
the control aspects of the system.
Regarding the class UserInterface, Fig. 4.9 depicts the model representing the
following control aspect: A user should be logged to perform a transaction. We use
a modelling language where transitions have the form pre
foo|post 7→action−−−−−−−−−−→q1 q2. A
transition from state q1 to state q2 can only be taken when method foo is called in
4This file is available from [7], under the path src/test/java/bank.
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Logoutstart Login
true | login() | getUser()!=null | skip;
true | logout() | getUser()==null | skip;
true | deposit() | true | skip;
true | withdraw() | true | skip;
Figure 4.9: Model for control aspects of the system.
public boolean fooGuard(){
return state = State.Q1 && pre ;
}
@Action
public void foo() {
state = State.Q2;
adapter.foo();
assertTrue(post);
action;
}
Figure 4.10: Model transition in modelJUnit terms.
a configuration where pre is satisfied. When a transition is taken, post has to be
checked. If it holds, action has to be executed and q2 is entered. If however post
does not hold, this is considered a failure in the execution, revealing a bug in the
implementation. In terms of modelJUnit (see Sec. 4.4.6), these transitions can be
implemented as illustrated in Fig. 4.10.
4.4.6 Model-based Testing
In order to perform MBT, here we use modelJUnit [90], an extension of JUnit which
supports model-based testing. In this extension, the models are written as Java
classes, and the test cases are automatically generated from the model. Thereby, we
continue our development by writing the model from Fig. 4.9 in modelJUnit syntax,
and use the tool to automatically generate test cases, with focus on triggering each
transition of the model (at least once)5.
Once the class is fully implemented, modelJUnit is able to generate a test case
which accomplishes transition coverage over the model. Fig. 4.11 illustrates the trace
followed by this test, where the tuple (q1, foo, q2) means, “given that we are in state
q1, after executing foo we move to state q2”. Note that this trace is produced by
modelJUnit.
4.4.7 Overall Implementation
Next, we implement the method main in class Main. For simplicity, we implement
this method as a loop where the user is requested to enter the desired action, to be
executed by the corresponding method in class UserInterface. Fig. 4.12 illustrates
5The files BankAdapter.java, BankModel.java, and BankTest.java, which implement the
model are available from [7], under the path src/test/java/bank.
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done (Logout, login, Login)
done (Login, logout, Logout)
done (Logout, login, Login)
done (Login, deposit, Login)
done Random reset(true)
done (Logout, login, Login)
done (Login, withdraw, Login)
done (Login, logout, Logout)
done (Logout, login, Login)
done (Login, deposit, Login)
Figure 4.11: Trace followed by the test case accomplishing transition coverage
over the model.
switch (inputLine) {
case "deposit":
System.out.print("Enter the amount:");
amount = in.next();
aux = Integer.parseInt(amount);
f.deposit(aux);
break;
case "withdraw":
System.out.print("Enter the amount:");
amount = in.next();
aux = Integer.parseInt(amount);
f.deposit(aux);
break;
Figure 4.12: Part of the implementation for method main.
part of the (buggy) implementation for this method. As the code for calling both
deposit and withdraw is practically identical, the programmer may just copy and
paste it. The programmer may have forgotten to replace, after pasting, the call to
method deposit by a call to method delete.
4.4.8 Runtime Verification
Model Translation
Once the method main is ready, we proceed by runtime verifying that the entire
implementation fulfils the control aspects w.r.t. to (at first) the model given in Fig. 4.9.
First, by following the ideas in [55], we translate this model (Fig. 4.9) into a DATE
specification [45]. Fig. 4.13 depicts part of the obtained DATE6. For space reasons,
we have omitted the transitions and new states related to the methods deposit
and withdraw. Regarding DATE, transitions are of the form q1
e|cond 7→act−−−−−−−→ q2. A
transition from state q1 to state q2 is taken when event e occurs while the condition
cond holds. If the transition is taken, action act is executed. The most important
events are calls to, and returns from, methods, e.g., foo↓ and foo↑ (for a method
foo).
6The file prop deposit.ppd containing this translation is available in the root of [7].
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Logoutstart Login
idle in
idle out
bad login
bad logout
login()↓ | true 7→ skip
logout()↓ | true 7→ skiplogout()↑ | getUser() == null 7→ skip
logout()↑ | getUser() != null 7→ skip
login()↑ | getUser() != null 7→ skip
login()↑ | getUser() == null 7→ skip
Figure 4.13: Part of the ppDATE specification generated from the model.
Logoutstart bad
logout()↓
Figure 4.14: Extending the monitor for safety checks.
Monitor Generation
Second, we use the runtime verifier Larva [46] to automatically generate monitor
code. This code includes the Java classes implementing the monitor, and AspectJ
code to link the application to the monitor code.7
Monitored Execution
Finally, we use the trace previously produced by modelJUnit as a guide to (runtime)
check that the method main features the expected behaviour. In this particular
example, as we are dealing with a small program, we follow this trace manually, i.e.
we run the system and interact with its interface, to trigger the methods in the same
order as they are called in Fig. 4.11. Clearly, there is good potential for automating
such a step, connecting MBT tools and RV tools.
During the according execution of our program, by looking at the log file generated
by the monitor we can notice that when we attempted to execute the method withdraw,
the system called method deposit instead. Thus, we inspect the code and realise
that the case for withdraw is actually making a method call to deposit. Then, we
fix this issue by writing the appropriate call for the case of withdraw, and re-run the
trace. This time, the execution of the trace fulfils the model from Fig. 4.9.
Extending the Monitor
Once we have analysed the overall implementation of the system w.r.t. to the model,
we can extend the monitor to also cover safety properties. For instance, we can add
the transition depicted in Fig. 4.14 to express that logout is never called while the
user is not logged in. Also, we can check the integrity of the data flow through nested
method calls. Fig. 4.15 shows the implementation of deposit in UserInterface.
7The files generated by Larva, see [7], in src/main/larva and src/main/aspects.
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public void deposit(int money){
if (u != null && money > 0)
u.getAccount().deposit(money);
}
Figure 4.15: Implementation of deposit in UserInterface.
This method has an inner call to the method deposit of the class Account. Then, we
can have a monitor checking that both methods deposit are called with the exact
same argument8.
4.5 Discussion
In this section we elaborate on the benefits of integrating deductive and runtime
verification into the workflow of the methodology introduced in Sec. 4.3.2.
By integrating TDD with deductive verification, we enhance the methodology
with the following features: (i) early detection of certain bugs which are likely to be
missed by using TDD alone, e.g., the bug in the implementations delete and add
(Sec. 4.4); (ii) high (unit) test coverage—in terms of specific metrics—guaranteed by
construction.
Concerning (i), as the (unit) test cases which are used for TDD only specify the
expected behaviour for specific inputs, so it may be the case that the method has
a bug but the test cases do not cover it. Note that, in TDD, it is the tests which
guide the development of the implementation. Corner cases not covered by the tests
can easily be buggy in code developed for those tests. For instance, the bug in the
implementation of method add, described in Sec. 4.4, only occurs in a very particular
case. In these cases, the use of deductive verification helps to detect the bug, as
this verification technique analyses every possible run of the method. Even partial
verification results help to direct the developers attention towards areas of further
investigation.
Concerning (ii), test cases using symbolic execution can guarantee several kinds of
coverages. For instance, depending on how it is set up, KeYTestGen can automatically
generate test cases which guarantee either full feasible path coverage, full feasible
branch coverage, or Modified Condition / Decision coverage [13]. Note that all the
previous coverage metrics subsume statement coverage.
Regarding the integration of MBT with runtime verification, this enhances the
methodology by adding good evidence that the overall implementation of the system
fulfils the model used for MBT. As mentioned in Sec. 4.2.2, one of the disadvantages
of MBT is that it cannot guarantee to find all differences between the model and the
(overall) implementation of the system. However, by using the test cases (i.e. traces)
generated from the model as a guide, we can use runtime verification to analyse
whether the system behaves as it is described in the model.
There is room for improvement, and plenty of future work, in the proposed
integration. For instance, implementing a tool which automatically generates a
DATE specification from a modelJUnit model would improve the use of the proposed
methodology, as the users would only have to worry about writing the (initial)
monitor specification. In addition one could integrate (probably domain specific)
tools automating the runtime verification of those traces generated by the MBT tool.
For instance, one could use Selenium [8] to perform such a task on web applications.
8The file args integrity.ppd available in [7], describes a monitor verifying this property.
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4.6 Related Work
Test driven development [20] is a widely used development methodology. In the
literature, one can find many extensions for this methodology, e.g. behaviour driven
development [34]. In this paper, we have elaborated on the use of these methodologies,
and we have discussed the benefits offered by our methodology in comparison to using
this technique in isolation.
The combination of testing with either static analysis or static verification is an
active area of research, e.g. [33,47,87,89]. In general, these works aim at test case
generation for either debugging, or verifying source code. Those objectives come in
the play in our work, but integrated in a development method.
In [77], Petiot et al. present the tool StaDy. This tool applies test case generation
in combination with deductive verification in order to increase the confidence regarding
the correctness of C source code. In [13] Ahrendt et al. introduce KeyTestGen. This
tool can be used to automatically generate test cases from partial proofs developed
by the deductive verifier KeY [9] (for Java). Both StaDy and KeyTestGen can be
used in a similar manner. First, one uses deductive verification to attempt to prove
a property. If this attempt does not succeed, test case are generated for classes of
executions which were not verified. The oracles of the generated test cases check
whether the test is a counter example of the property. In our work, we make use if
this principle, by integrating it in a development method.
Another related area of research is the combination of model-based testing with
runtime verification. In [17], traces are automatically generated from nondeterministic
models by using MBT. Then, these traces are used as a guide to verify at runtime the
overall implementation of a system in order to analyse whether the system presents
a good evidence for fulfilling the behaviour described by the model. This work
accomplishes a similar integration to the one proposed in our methodology. However,
it does not explore the possibility of extending the monitor obtained from the model
to cover more properties at runtime.
In [55], Falzon et al. study the combination of test case generator QuickCheck [6]
and the runtime verifier Larva [46], by presenting a technique which extracts runtime
monitors from QuickCheck models, keeping the same semantics. This work focuses
on the use of runtime verification to check the behaviour of a system w.r.t. the model
used to generate the monitor. In our methodology, we use the ideas from this work to
chain model-based testing and runtime verification, i.e. we are using both techniques
instead of just runtime verification.
4.7 Conclusions
In this paper we presented a development methodology based on the combination
of test driven development (TDD) and model-based testing (MBT), enhanced by
the integration of (static) deductive verification and runtime verification on its
workflow. We have also elaborated on the benefits obtained from the integration
of these techniques (Sec. 4.5). The authors see the work as a contribution to
integrated methodologies which take advantage of a variety of established practices and
tools, making state-of-the-art Formal Methods profitable in Software Engineering
processes.
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CHAPTER
FIVE
INFERRING GLOBAL TRACE CONDITIONS
FROM PARTIAL LOCAL PROOFS
J. M. Chimento
Abstract
System level modelling of properties focuses on describing legal sequences of method
executions in the system from a control perspective. On the other hand, unit properties
deal with data aspects of the system, local to the execution of the methods. Although
there are works relating data and control aspects of a system, a yet quite unexplored
area is the relation between global conditions regarding the execution of system traces,
and unit properties local to the states of the model. The objective of this paper is
to contribute to filling in this gap by presenting a methodology that uses the power
of low effort, typically unsuccessful, proof attempts to verify individual transitions
in the model, in order to infer global trace conditions. Given an initial property
associated to a state of the model, this methodology starts by doing a reachability
analysis, i.e. analysing which transitions can be taken to reach this state. Next, the
methods associated to the incoming transitions are used to statically verify that these
transitions have the desired property as a postcondition. This results in (possibly)
local partial proofs for them. Then, closed-path conditions are extracted from the
partial proofs, and are backwards propagated through the states of the model. Such
conditions guarantee that, if any of these transitions is taken, a system trace fulfilling
them will lead the system towards the desired state in the model, and the initial
property will hold when that state is reached. Therefore, closed-path conditions
come as a generalisation of the idea of weakest precondition for the methods. These
steps are repeated until the initial state is reached. Finally, the property backwards
propagated to the initial state, together with a system trace going from the initial
state of the model to the desired state, which is created using the results of the
reachability analysis previously performed, represent a trace condition for the system.
Applications for the use of trace conditions include (global) test case generation, state
invariants verification, and runtime verification.
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5.1 Introduction
Having confidence in the correctness of a piece of software is essential for its deployment.
Without a doubt, testing is the most widely used technique to increase such a
confidence. In addition, one can also turn to formal methods (FM) to accomplish
the same objective. However, in spite of the fact that FM offer strong guarantees to
analyse software correctness, they are not used as broadly as their potential suggests.
An ordinary criticism against the use of FM is that it may not be easy to come
up with a formal specification to describe the behaviour of the system, and once you
do have your specification, fully verifying it may not be a simple task. In fact, failing
to prove a property could mean that either the system has an error, or the chosen
prover does not have enough information (or power) to finish the proof.
In general, at the time of analysing a property, a failed proof is discarded right
away. However, having a partial proof, i.e. a proof which does not fully verify the
property, can actually contribute a lot towards the analysis of software correctness,
even if this proof was obtained by performing a low effort verification attempt, e.g.
failing at automatically proving the property, and then not performing any interactive
step in an attempt to finish the proof.
For instance, there are tools like KeyTestGen [13], which can be used to auto-
matically generate test cases from a partial proof, in order to test the parts of the
proof which cannot be verified. These test cases can be used to deal with the issue
mentioned above. In general, if one of these test cases fails, then there is an error
in the system. Otherwise, the prover does not have enough information to finish
the proof. In addition, to check on other possible uses for partial proof one can
also refer to [10,11] regarding runtime monitors optimisation, and [38] regarding the
enhancement of the test driven development methodology.
In this work we present a methodology that uses the power of partial proofs
obtained from low effort (static) verification attempts, to infer global trace conditions
for a system. Given a model describing (part of) the behaviour of the system, and a
property pi associated to a state of this model, our proposed methodology starts by
doing a reachability analysis, i.e. an analysis to get all of the incoming transitions
to the state. Next, the methods associated to the incoming transitions are used to
statically verify that these transitions have the desired property as a postcondition,
resulting in (possibly) local partial proofs for them. Then, closed-path conditions
are extracted from the partial proofs, and are backwards propagated through the
states of the model. Such conditions guarantee that, if one of these transitions is
taken, a system trace fulfilling them will lead the system towards the desired state
in the model, and pi will hold when that state is reached. Therefore, closed-path
conditions play the role of sufficient preconditions for the methods associated to the
transitions, i.e. preconditions which come as a generalisation of the idea of weakest
precondition for the methods. These steps are repeated until the initial state is
reached. Finally, the property backwards propagated to the initial state, together
with a system trace going from the initial state of the model to the desired state,
which is created using the results of the reachability analysis previously performed,
represent a trace condition for the system.
The main contributions of this work are:
 A methodology to infer global trace conditions from partial proof of local
properties;
 The identification of applications for the inferred global trace conditions, in-
cluding (global) test case generation, runtime verification, and state invariants
verification.
Global test cases can be used for fault detection, and to guarantee global coverage
for the methods of the system from the knowledge about certain testing coverage at
a local (unit) level. Regarding runtime verification, global trace conditions can be
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used to instrument the monitor with special artefacts for guiding the execution of
the system. Finally, one use for state invariants is the analysis of explicit typestates
for objects. Sec. 5.6 elaborates on this.
Structure of the paper. Sec. 5.2 introduces the notion of partial proof, and the
power behind them. Sec. 5.3 describes the model used in this work to model system
behaviour. Sec. 5.4 introduces the notion of global trace condition. Sec. 5.5 presents
a methodology to infer global trace conditions from partial proofs. Sec. 5.6 elaborates
on how one can use our proposed methodology in the context of testing, and (runtime)
verification. Sec. 5.7 presents some case studies illustrating concrete uses of our
methodology. Sec. 5.8 discusses related work, and Sec. 5.9 concludes the paper.
5.2 The Power of Partial Proofs
We start this section by describing what a partial proof is. Then, we proceed to talk
about the power behind them.
5.2.1 Partial Proof
To talk about the power behind a partial proof, first, we have to elaborate on what
a partial proof is. Here, we will use dynamic logic (DL). DL is a modal logic for
reasoning about programs. This logic extends first-order logic with two modalities,
〈p〉φ and [p]φ, where p is a program and φ is another DL formula. The formula
〈p〉φ is true in a state s if there exists a terminating execution of p, starting in s,
which results in a state where φ holds. The formula [p]φ holds in a state s if all
the terminating executions of p, starting in s, result in a state where φ holds. For
deterministic programs p, the only difference between the two modalities is that
termination is stated in 〈p〉φ, and assumed in [p]φ.
DL formulae can be proved using deductive verification [9, 56]. On this technique
formulae are proved by deduction over a logic calculus. For instance, the deductive
verifier KeY [9] is a tool for data-centric functional correctness properties of Java
programs which, given a Java program with annotated properties written in the Java
Modelling Language (JML) [72], generates proof obligations in (Java) DL from these
annotations, and then uses a sequent calculus to attempt to verify them. Such a
calculus focuses in the use of the symbolic execution paradigm [70].
Here, we consider the use of the sequent calculus mentioned above to elaborate on
the definition of partial proof. However, we will not introduce this calculus. Instead,
we will illustrate a rather simple example on how a sequent look like, and how such
a sequent could be proved by using this calculus. Given a set of formulae Γ, the
sequent Γ ` 〈p〉φ holds if p, when starting in a state fulfilling all formulae in Γ,
terminates in a state fulfilling φ. In addition, due to the use of symbolic execution
DL has to be extended by explicit substitutions. While symbolically executing p,
its effects are gradually, starting from the front, turned into explicit substitutions.
Thereby, after some proof steps, a certain prefix of p has turned into a substitution
σ, representing the effects so far, while a remaining program p′ is yet to be run.
During the verification of p, an intermediate proof node may look like Γ ` σ〈p′〉φ.
Such a node tells us that, if Γ was true before the original program p, and σ is the
accumulated effect up to now, then φ will be true after the execution of the remaining
program p′.
As an example, consider a proof of the following DL sequent:
x > 0, y > 0 ` 〈x=y;y=x+1;x=y-x;if(y%2==0){p1}else{p2};q〉φ (5.1)
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(where p1, p2, and q are (sequences of) program statements and φ is some postcondi-
tion). Sequent (5.1) says that in each state where x and y are positive, the program
provided in the modality will terminate, and result in a state where φ holds.
The proof for the sequent above would start by, in a certain number of steps,
turning the three leading assignments into explicit substitutions, apply the first to
second one, apply the result of this substitution to the third, and perform some
simplifications, arriving at
x > 0, y > 0 ` (x← y ‖ y← y+1 ‖ x← y-x)〈if(y%2==0){p1}else{p2};q〉φ (5.2)
where (x ← y ‖ y ← y+1 ‖ x ← y-x) represents the explicit (parallel) substitution
obtained as a result from the symbolic execution of the first three statements. When
clashes occurs in parallel substitutions, as it is the case for x in (5.2), a ’right-win’
semantics is adopted in order to resolve them. Thereby, (5.2) is reduced to:
x > 0, y > 0 ` (y← y+1 ‖ x← 1)〈if(y%2==0){p1}else{p2};q〉φ (5.3)
In general, most proofs branch over case distinctions, often triggered by Boolean
decisions in the source code. Such a branching occurs by applying rules like the
following, simplified,1 if rule:
if
Γ, σ(b) ` σ〈s1 ω〉φ Γ, σ(¬b) ` σ〈s2 ω〉φ
Γ ` σ〈if b s1 else s2 ω〉φ
In our example, applying the if rule to sequent (5.3) results in splitting the proof into
two branches, with the following sequents, respectively:
x > 0, y > 0, (y← y+1 ‖ x← 1)(y%2 = 0) ` (y← y+1 ‖ x← 1)〈p1;q〉φ
x > 0, y > 0, (y← y+1 ‖ x← 1)(¬(y%2 = 0)) ` (y← y+1 ‖ x← 1)〈p2;q〉φ
Applying the substitution on the left side of either sequent results in:
x > 0, y > 0, (y+1)%2 == 0 ` (y← y+1 ‖ x← 1)〈p1;q〉φ (5.4)
x > 0, y > 0,¬((y+1)%2 == 0) ` (y← y+1 ‖ x← 1)〈p2;q〉φ (5.5)
Once all proof branches are closed, i.e. they are verified, we have a complete proof
of the root sequent. However, a proof attempt may result into a proof object where
not all the branches are closed. We refer to this kind of proofs as partial proofs. In
addition, we refer to the set of formulae in a sequent, e.g. ’x > 0, y > 0, (y+1)%2 == 0’
in sequent (5.4), as branch condition. In other words, a branch condition is a set of
formulae leading the proof to one of its branches. Moreover, if the branch condition
leads the symbolic execution of the program in the sequent towards a certain statement
in its body, then we say that such a branch condition is a path condition.
5.2.2 Partial Proofs Capabilities
In the above example, consider a partial proof where sequent (5.4) is fully proved,
but sequent (5.5) is only partially proved. From this partial proof, we can conclude
that the following modification of the root sequent (5.1) is valid:
x > 0, y > 0, (y+1)%2==0 ` 〈x=y;y=x+1;x=y-x;if(y%2==0){p1}else{p2};q〉φ (5.6)
(We added (y+1)%2==0 to the left side of (5.1), as additional assumption). This
sequent can be proven by replaying the original proof, where now both branches
1The simplified rule ignores possibles side effects or exceptions which might be caused by
b.
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q0start
q1
q2
pre1 | h | post1 | act1
pre2 | f | post2 | act2pre4 | i | post4 | act4
pre3 | g | post3 | act3
Figure 5.1: Model example
would close. The path leading to the closed proof of sequent (5.4) will replay identically.
In addition, sequent (2.3) now can be proved because the following variant of sequent
(6) can be closed immediately, due to contradicting assumptions:
x > 0, y > 0, (y+1)%2==0,¬((y+1)%2 == 0) ` (y← y+1 ‖ x← 1)〈p2;q〉φ
An interesting remark is that if we were using a perfect prover, i.e. a prover that only
returns false whenever the program under scrutiny does not fulfil the property being
analysed, then in sequent (2.4) the set of formulae ’x>0, y>0,(y+1)%2==0’, would
correspond to the weakest precondition of the program in the modality. However, in
an ordinary set up the prover may fail to close a proof branch even if the sub-goal on
that branch is valid. This may happen because of either a lack of ’proving power’, the
strategies being used, a lack of code annotations (e.g. loop invariants), or alike. Still,
even if the proof attempt fails, one can get close branches out of it. Thus, the branch
condition of a closed branch forms a sufficient precondition, which is not necessarily
the weakest precondition. Thereby, the true power behind partial proofs resides in
the possibility of finding sufficient preconditions by extracting branch conditions from
closed branches.
5.3 System Level Modelling
Before focusing our attention on trace conditions, we introduce a formalism to specify
legal sequences of methods or states, i.e. a manner to describe valid traces of the
system. Here, to model the behaviour of the system we will use a labelled transitions
system based on the ’QuickCheck’ models introduced by Falzon et al. in [55]. In these
models, transitions are of the form q
pre|foo|post|act−−−−−−−−−→ q′. A transition from state q to
state q′ is available to be taken when method foo is called in a configuration where
the precondition pre is satisfied. When a transition is available, the postcondition
post has to be checked once foo terminates its execution. If it holds, action act has
to be executed, and q′ is entered, i.e. the transition is taken. However, if post does
not hold, then this is considered a failure in the execution. In addition, pre and
postconditions may depend on system and model variables.
We assume that the arguments of the methods are implicitly included in the
transitions right next to the method name, e.g. we write foo instead of foo(x).
Besides, we assume that actions in the transitions can modify only model variables,
i.e. the model is restricted to not having any effect on the system. Formally,
Definition 27. Given a set of system variables Sys and a set of model variables V ,
a model m is a tuple (Σ, Q, t, q0) such that:
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 Σ is the set of method names.
 Q is the finite set of states.
 t is the transition relation among states in Q, where each transition is tagged
with (i) a precondition; (ii) a method; (iii) a postcondition; (iv) an action which
may change the valuation of the model variables: t ⊆ Q× condSys∪V × Σ×
condSys∪V × action×Q.
 q0 ∈ Q is the initial state.
We will write q
pre|f|post|a−−−−−−−→m q′ to mean that, given a model m whose transition
relation is t, (q,pre,f,post,a,q′) ∈ t. We omit the subscript m whenever it is
clear from the context. In addition, note that the notation condSys∪V represents the
syntactic category of boolean expressions over system and model variables.
As an example, Fig. 5.1 depicts a model consisting of three states q0 (initial
state), q1, and q2, and four transitions q0
pre1|h|post1|act1−−−−−−−−−−→ q1, q1 pre2|f|post2|act2−−−−−−−−−−→ q2,
q2
pre3|g|post3|act3−−−−−−−−−−→ q2, and q2 pre4|i|post4|act4−−−−−−−−−−→ q1, among these states.
5.4 Traces and Trace Conditions
This section introduces the notion of trace condition. In Sec. 5.4.1 we define what a
trace is, and we use traces to provide semantics for the models presented in Sec.5.3.
In Sec. 5.4.2 we introduce the notion of a trace condition. Finally, in Sec. 5.4.3 we
elaborate on the idea of backwards propagation of conditions.
5.4.1 Trace
In this work we consider that a system trace w, or simply trace, is a sequence of tuples
consisting of a valuation of (visible) system variables, i.e. mappings from variables to
values (of adequate types), a method, and a list of concrete values for its arguments.
Formally,
Definition 28. Given the set of system variables Sys, a trace w is a sequence of
tuples in ΘSys × Σ× cArgs, i.e. w ∈ (ΘSys × Σ× cArgs)∗.
Note that we characterize the set of system variables valuations ΘSys, with typical
element θ; and that cArgs represents a sequence of concrete values of adequate type
for the arguments of the method in Σ.
For instance, assuming that each method has exactly one argument, the fol-
lowing expression depicts a trace associated to the model illustrated in Fig. 5.1:
<<(θ0, h, c0), (θ1, f, c1), (θ2, g, c2)>>, where c0, c1, and c2 are actual parameters of
adequate type.
In addition, we assume that values of model variables are stored in valuations
ν, which are characterized by the set V. As mentioned in Sec. 5.3, model variables
are changed only in actions a of transitions, and that both actions and conditions in
transitions can depend on system variables as well as on model variables. Given a
condition cond, we write (θ, ν) |= cond to denote that cond is satisfied by valuations
θ and ν.
We can now define the semantics of a model by identifying how a trace generated
by the system changes its states.
Definition 29. Given a model m = (Σ, Q, t, q0), a trace w ∈ (ΘSys × Σ× cArgs)∗
shifts a monitor from configuration (q, ν) ∈ Q× V to configuration (q′, ν′) ∈ Q× V,
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written (q, ν)
w
=⇒ (q′, ν′), by induction over w:
(q, ν)
ε
=⇒ (q′, ν′) df= q = q′ ∧ ν = ν′;
(q, ν)
(θ,f,args):w
=======⇒ (q′, ν′) df= ∃ q′′, ν′′, pre, post, a ·
q
pre|f|post|a−−−−−−−→m q′′ ∧ θ unionmulti ν |= pre ∧ ν′′ = a(ν) ∧ eval(f, θ) unionmulti ν′′ |= post
∧ (q′′, ν′′) w=⇒ (q′, ν′);
(q, ν)
(θ,f,args):w
=======⇒ (q′, ν′) df= (q, ν) w=⇒ (q′, ν′) ∧ 6 ∃ q′′, v′′, pre, post, a ·
q
pre|f|post|a−−−−−−−→m q′′ ∧ θ unionmulti ν |= pre.
where the operator unionmulti denotes the union of valuations, such that θ unionmulti θ′ = {(x, val) |
(x, val) ∈ θ or (x, val) ∈ θ′}. In addition, a trace w ∈ (ΘSys × Σ × cArgs)∗ is said
to be valid if, for some q ∈ Q and valuation ν, (q0, ν0) w=⇒ (q, ν) holds, where ν0
represents the initial valuation of the model variables.
We will write a(ν) to represent the model variables valuation obtained from
the execution of action a, in terms of valuation ν. In addition, the operator eval :
Σ×ΘSys → ΘSys, given a method f and a system variables valuation θ, returns the
system variables valuation obtained after the execution of f , in terms of θ. Besides, the
previously introduced notation <<(θ0, f0, c0), · · · , (θn, fn, cn)>>, is simply syntactic
sugar to represent the trace (θ0, f0, c0) : · · · : (θn, fn, cn) : ε.
Note that a model only describes legal behaviour of a system. Therefore, the
case where there exist a transition whose precondition holds, but the postconditions
does not hold once the corresponding method terminates its execution, i.e. non legal
behaviour, it is not covered by the semantics provided in the definition above.
Finally, we say that a trace w leads a model to a state q, if w is a valid and q is
the last state reached by it. Formally,
Definition 30. Given a model m = (Σ, Q, t, q0), and a state q ∈ Q, a trace w leads
m to state q, written leadsm(w,q), if:
leadsm(w, q)
df
= ∃ ν0, ν · (q0, ν0) w=⇒ (q, ν).
5.4.2 Trace Condition
Before introducing the concept of trace condition, first, we have to introduce some
notation. The expression ϕ(x, y, · · · , z) represents a first order logic (FOL) formula
with free variables x, y, · · · , z. Similarly, the expression ϕ(x) represents a FOL formula
whose free variables are, at most, the variables in x, i.e. FreeV ars(ϕ) ⊆ x.
Now we can proceed to define trace conditions. Trace conditions are properties
which impose restrictions over a sequence of tuples consisting of methods and the list
of their arguments; and the (initial) values of the variables of the system. Formally,
Definition 31. Given a sequence <<(f0, x0), · · · , (fn, xn)>> ∈ (Σ × args)∗, a FOL
formula ϕ, the set of system variables Sys, and assuming that xi are the arguments
of method fi, i.e. fi(xi), with no overlapping names w.r.t. to the arguments of the
others methods, a trace condition is an expression of the form:
ϕ(Sys, x0, · · · , xn)•<<(f0, x0), · · · , (fn, xn)>>
We refer to ϕ(Sys, x0, · · ·, xn) as ’trace property ’, and to <<(f0, x0), · · ·, (fn, xn)>> as
’trace pattern’.
For instance, assuming that each method has only one argument of type integer,
and that the system has a variable v, then the following expression depicts a trace
condition associated to the model illustrated in Fig. 5.1:
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ϕ(v, x0, x1, x2)•<<(h, x0), (f, x1), (g, x2)>>, where ϕ(v, x0, x1, x2) =
v > 10 ∧ x0 > 0 ∧ x1 < x2.
It is not hard to notice in this example that the trace pattern consists of a sequence
of the methods of the system paired up with their arguments, and that the trace
property involves the use of all of such arguments. Thus, trace conditions impose
restrictions on traces in a non local manner, i.e. trace conditions are global to the
system as their restrictions are imposed along the whole trace.
Regarding their satisfaction, we say that a trace condition holds if there exists a
trace that models it. Formally,
Definition 32. Given a sequence <<(f0, x0), · · · , (fn, xn)>> ∈ (Σ × args)∗, and a
trace condition ϕ(Sys, x0, · · · , xn)•<<(f0, x0), · · · , (fn, xn)>>, this trace condition is
satisfied by a trace <<(θ0, f0, c0), · · · , (θn, fn, cn)>> if,
θ0 unionmulti [x0 7→ c0, · · · , xn 7→ cn] |= ϕ(Sys, x0, · · · , xn)
We will use the following notation to represent that a trace condition is satisfied by a
given trace,
<<(θ0, f0, c0), · · ·, (θn, fn, cn)>>|=tcϕ(Sys, x0, · · ·, xn)•<<(f0, x0), · · ·, (fn, xn)>>.
In addition, a trace condition ϕ(Sys, x0, · · ·, xn)• << (f0, x0), · · ·, (fn, xn)>> is
sufficient for a state q of a model m, and a FOL formula φ local to q, if it is satisfied
by any trace <<(θ0, f0, c0), · · · , (θn, fn, cn)>>, such that this trace leads m to q, and
φ is modelled by θ0. We will refer to these kind of trace conditions as sufficient trace
conditions. Formally,
Definition 33. Given a model m, a state q of m, and a FOL formula φ local to q, a
trace condition ϕ(Sys, x0, · · ·, xn)•<<(f0, x0), · · · , (fn, xn)>> is sufficient for q and φ
if:
∀ <<(θ0, f0, c0), · · ·, (θn, fn, cn)>> ·
<<(θ0, f0, c0), · · ·, (θn, fn, cn)>>|=tcϕ(Sys, x0,· · ·, xn)•<<(f0, x0), · · ·, (fn, xn)>>
⇒ leadsm(<<(θ0, f0, c0), · · ·, (θn, fn, cn)>>, q) ∧ eval(fn, θn) |= φ
Thereby, a sufficient trace condition guarantees that state q will be reached in m,
and that φ will be fulfilled when that occurs.
Regarding applications, trace conditions can be used in the context of testing,
runtime verification, and static verification. In this work, we only focus on applications
that are benefited from the use of our trace conditions inference methodology. In
particular, inferred trace conditions are used for generating global test cases, guiding
the execution of the system while monitoring properties, and analysing the use of
explicit typestates for objects. Sec. 5.6 elaborates on each one of these applications
in detail.
5.4.3 Backwards Computation of Trace Conditions
The main contribution of this work is the inference of global trace conditions from
local partial proofs. Given a system, a model m describing its behaviour, the set
Sys of system variables, and a FOL formula ϕ0(Sys), local to a state q of m, we
want to compute conditions from the (partial) proof of ϕ0, and backward propagate
them through m, in order to generate trace conditions for the system. Such trace
conditions have to lead the execution of the system towards reaching q, in a manner
that ϕ0 will be fulfilled when q is reached, i.e. they will be sufficient trace conditions
for q and ϕ0.
From a trace condition perspective, ϕ0 can be seen as ϕ0(Sys)•<<>>. Remember
that we will perform a backwards computation of the trace condition. Thus, we start
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the computation in state q, i.e. the state to be reached. Thereby, no methods have
been considered as part of the sequence in the trace condition yet.
Now let us assume the existence of the transition q′
pre0|f0|post0|a0−−−−−−−−−−→m q. Then,
we can use a verifier to generate a sufficient precondition (see Sec 1.3.2) for method
f0 from a local (partial) proof of ϕ0.
Such a precondition will be (possibly) described in terms of both the system
variables and the arguments of f0. Thus, we represent it as the FOL formula
ϕ1(Sys, x0). Thereby, the previous trace condition can be changed to ϕ1(Sys, x0)•<
< (f0, x0) >>. Such a trace condition means that if we are in state q
′, ϕ1 holds, and
method f0 is executed, then we will reach state q in a set up where ϕ0 is fulfilled.
By applying a reasoning in state q′ alike the one above, assuming the existence of
a transition q′′
pre1|f1|post1|a1−−−−−−−−−−→m q′, we can get the trace condition ϕ2(Sys, x1, x0)•<
< (f1, x1), (f0, x0) >>. This trace condition means that whenever we are in state q
′′,
ϕ2 holds, and methods f1 and f0 are ran successively, then we will reach state q in a
set up where the property ϕ0 is fulfilled.
Hence, we can continue applying a similar reasoning multiple times until reaching
the initial state of the model. This will result in the generation of a trace condition
ϕn(Sys, xn−1, · · · , x1, x0)•<< (fn−1, xn−1), · · · , (f1, x1), (f0, x0) >>. Similar to what
we have described above, this trace condition means that if we are in the initial state
of m, ϕn holds, and all methods fi are ran successively following the order established
by the sequence in the trace condition, then we will go through all the intermediate
states of the model until reaching state q. Such state will be reached in a set up
where the property ϕ0 is fulfilled. Thus, we inferred a trace condition which, under
the assumption that ϕn holds for some trace, is a sufficient trace condition.
Note that in the previous computation we have not considered the possibility of
having loops in the model. In sec. 5.5, we elaborate on how one can deal with models
containing loops when backwards propagating conditions trough their states.
5.5 Inferring Trace Conditions
In this section we propose a backwards computation methodology to infer (sufficient)
global trace conditions from partial verification of a FOL formula of local method
calls. This methodology consists of the following three stages: Reaching Transitions
Analysis, Backwards Reachability Tree Computation, and Trace Condition Inference.
In short, in the first stage we extract information from the model about the reachability
of its states. This information is used in the following stage, in addition to sufficient
preconditions extracted from (partial) deductive proofs, to compute a backwards
reachability tree. Finally, in the last stage the backwards reachability tree is analysed
in order to infer trace conditions for the system. Below, first, we provide an intuitive
example for the use of our methodology. Then, we describe each one of the stages
mentioned above in detail.
5.5.1 Example
In this example we will consider the model illustrated in Fig. 5.1, assuming that
each method has exactly one argument xi, where i is the name of the corresponding
method, that the system has only one variable var, that we want a FOL formula
ϕ0(var) to be fulfilled when reaching state q2, and that each loop in the model can
be traversed only once.
To begin with, we extract the reachability information from the model and
generate the following mapping it, representing the incoming transitions of the state
provided as argument:
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Figure 5.2: Backwards reachability tree computation example
it(q2) = { q2 pre3|g|post3|act3−−−−−−−−−−→ q2, q1 pre2|f|post2|act2−−−−−−−−−−→ q2 }
it(q1) = { q2 pre4|i|post4|act4−−−−−−−−−−→ q1, q0 pre1|h|post1|act1−−−−−−−−−−→ q1 }
it(q0) = { }
Basically, mapping it says that both state q1 and q2 have two incoming transitions,
and that the (initial) state q0 has none.
Next, we compute the backwards reachability tree (BRT). Let us assume that
Fig. 5.2 depicts the result obtained from this computation, by allowing only one
iteration for the loops in the model. In this figure, nodes contain their corresponding
state (in the model), and the FOL formula to be fulfilled when reaching them, i.e.
either the initial trace property, or a condition backwards propagated to the state.
Moreover, transitions are of the form node2
foo−−→ node1, meaning that the current
state in node1 can be reached from the current state of node2 when method foo is
executed. In addition, we assume that, as explained below, during the computation
of this BRT, dashed (red) transitions were filtered, and the dotted (blue) transition
was pruned. This, led to removed the nodes in gray from the tree.
The construction of this tree starts by setting up the root for the BRT. The root
consists of a node with current state q2 (target state), and FOL formula ϕ0. We will
label this node by the tuple (q2, ϕ0). A similar representation will be used for the
other nodes. Note that, for simplicity, we have omitted the arguments of the property
in the description of the node.
Then, from the mapping it we know that q2 could be reached from q1 running f,
and from itself by running g (loop transition). Thus, we proceed by trying to verify the
Hoare triples {true} f(xf ) {ϕ0(var)} and {true} g(xg) {ϕ0(var)}. Let us assume that
the failed (low effort) verification attempt of each one of the previous Hoare triples
results in the generation of the sufficient preconditions ϕ1(var, xf ) and ϕ2(var, xg)
for methods f and g, respectively. Thus, the nodes (q1, ϕ1) and (q2, ϕ2) are created,
and added to the BRT with transitions (q1, ϕ1)
f−→ (q2, ϕ0) and (q2, ϕ2) g−→ (q2, ϕ0).
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Note that one node will be created for each extracted sufficient precondition. For
instance, while being in node (q1, ϕ1), if the proof of {true} h(xh) {ϕ1(var, xf )} has
two closed branch conditions, then, as illustrated in Fig. 5.1, we create a node for
each extracted sufficient precondition, e.g. ϕ3 and ϕ4.
We iterate over similar steps for computing the rest of the BRT. Still, it is worth
mentioning two more scenarios: transition filtering, and both transition and state
pruning.
Regarding transition filtering, we have to do this whenever adding the transition
to the BRT would generate a trace condition whose trace pattern would perform
an extra iteration through a loop in the model. For instance, if in node (q2, ϕ2)
we consider the transition for method g, then the loop transition associated to this
method would be traversed twice. However, we have assumed that loops can only be
traversed once. Thus, that transition has to be filtered.
Regarding pruning, whenever the computation of a branch in the BRT finishes
in a node whose current state is not the initial state of the model, that node has
to be pruned from the BRT. In addition, we have to go up traversing the branch
removing nodes and transitions until either reaching a node whose current state is
the initial state, or the node has more than one incoming branch. For instance, let
us consider the node (q1, ϕ7), which can be reached in the BRT by traversing the
following sequence of nodes: <<(q0, ϕ0), (q1, ϕ1), (q2, ϕ5), (q1, ϕ7)>>. On this node,
we assume that the only method with a closed branch condition is i. However, as
executing this method would trigger an extra traversal of a loop in the model, the
transition associated to this method has to be filtered. This means that no transitions
are available to reach the current state of the node. Thus, as the current state of
node (q1, ϕ7) is not the initial state, this state is pruned. This leads to pruning the
transition (q1, ϕ7)
f−→ (q2, ϕ5). Finally, as the node (q2, ϕ5) has a bifurcation, the
pruning is over.
Finally, we analyse the generated BRT in order to infer trace conditions from
it. By doing depth-first search in the BRT, we can obtain the following sequence of
nodes:
<<(q0, ϕ3), (q1, ϕ1), (q2, ϕ0)>>
<<(q0, ϕ4), (q1, ϕ1), (q2, ϕ0)>>
<<(q0, ϕ11), (q1, ϕ10), (q2, ϕ8), (q2, ϕ5), (q1, ϕ1), (q2, ϕ0)>>
<<(q0, ϕ9), (q1, ϕ6), (q2, ϕ2), (q2, ϕ0)>>
Then, as explained in Sec. 5.5.4, by considering these sequences of nodes, the following
trace conditions can be inferred, respectively:
ϕ3(var, xh, xf )•<<(h, xh), (f, xf )>>
ϕ4(var, xh, xf )•<<(h, xh), (f, xf )>>
ϕ11(var, xh, xg, xi, xf )•<<(h, xh), (f, xf ), (g, xg), (i, xi), (f, xf )>>
ϕ9(var, xh, xf , xg)•<<(h, xh), (f, xf ), (g, xg)>>
In conclusion, we went from having a FOL formula ϕ0(var) local to the state q2, to
have four trace conditions imposing global restrictions, i.e. the trace property over
trace patterns.
5.5.2 Reaching Transitions Analysis
We start applying our methodology by extracting information from the model re-
garding how to reach each one of its states. Let us assume that we have a model
m = (Σ, Q, t, q0). Then, basically, for each state q ∈ Q, we want to know which
are the transitions leading to it. The information extracted from the model will be
represented with a mapping of signature rt : Q→ 2Transition, such that,
rt(q) = {q′ pre|foo|post|act−−−−−−−−−→m q | q′ ∈ Q, q′ pre|foo|post|act−−−−−−−−−→m q ∈ t}
5.5. INFERRING TRACE CONDITIONS 151
Node = {
parent : Node ,
children : Set <Node >,
initial : State
current : State ,
property : Property ,
method : Method * List <Args >
iter : Int
}
Figure 5.3: Record Node used to represent backwards reachability trees
5.5.3 Backwards Reachability Tree Computation
In this stage, we proceed to compute the BRT. Given a model m, and two of its
states q and q′, a BRT to get from q to q′ corresponds to a tree structure where each
path from the root of the tree to its leaves represents a reversed path through the
states and transitions of m to get to state q′, starting in state q. In other words q is
in the leaves of the tree, and q′ is in its root. We start computing the tree from a
(root) node representing q′, i.e. the state which we want to reach, and each branch
goes on until arriving at a (leaf) node representing q, i.e. the state where the path
starts. Hence, the BRT denomination for this tree.
To perform such computation we will use record Node, which is (abstractly)
depicted in Fig. 5.3. This record can be used as a tree structure, where parent points
to the parent of the node, and children is the set of all the children of the node. In
addition, field initial is used to keep track of the initial state of the model, field
current represents the state of the model associated to the node, field property
represents either the FOL formula to analyse in the root, or the backtracked (branch)
condition to the node, field method represents the method (and its arguments) that
has to be executed to reach its parent, and field iter represents the allowed amount
of iterations over loops in the model.
Having said this, we proceed to elaborate on the computation of the BRT.
Algorithm 1 represents its whole computation. Given a state initial, i.e. the state
where the paths start, a state toreach, i.e. the state to be reached at the end of the
paths, a FOL formula ϕ associated to toreach, and the integer iterations, i.e. the
amount of iterations that each loop can be traversed on a path, this algorithm starts
computing the BRT by creating its root. Here, nil represents absence of data, i.e.
the root of the tree has neither a parent, nor method associated to it. Once the root
is defined, function brt is applied to it, and finally the computed BRT is returned.
Note that the application of function brt is technically the actual computation of the
BRT.
Separating the creation of the root from the computation of the body simplifies the
whole computation of the BRT. Below, we provide two pseudo algorithms illustrating
different versions of function brt: one where the models do not have any loops, i.e.
Algorithm 2, and one where the models may contain loops, i.e. Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 2 starts by using the mapping rt to get the reachability information
for the current state of node, i.e. from which states in the model the node.current
can be reached. These results are stored in the set reachable.
Then, for each transition tr on this set we proceed by attempting to verify whether
the method in tr establishes the FOL formula node.property. This can be simply
done by trying to prove the Hoare triple {true} tr.method {node.property}. A Hoare
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Algorithm 1: Backwards Reachability Tree
Input: State initial, State toreach, Property ϕ, Int iterations
Output: Backwards reachability tree
begin
root ←− Node { nil, ∅, initial, toreach, ϕ, nil, iterations }
return brt(root)
Algorithm 2: brt (No Loops Version)
Input: Node node
Result: Backwards reachability tree computation
begin
reachable ←− rt(node.current)
for tr ∈ reachable do
conditions ←− verify(node.property, tr)
if conditions = ∅ then
continue
newNodes ←− makeNodes(conditions)
addChildren(node, newNodes)
map brt node.children
return
triple {pi}m {pi′} means that, if m is invoked and pi holds at the time of its invocation,
then pi′ should be satisfied upon termination of the execution of m. Here, we assume
that method verify represents the call to a deductive verifier. This method receives
as arguments the property to be verified, i.e., node.property, and the transition to
be analysed, i.e., tr, and returns a set of sufficient preconditions for the method
tr.method. Note that one could also use the pre and postconditions in tr, to refine the
triples. This is the reason why verify receives the whole transition as an argument,
instead of just receiving the method associated to it.
The previous verification attempt will result into either a complete, or a partial
proof, from which one should extract closed branch conditions, i.e. branch conditions
associated to closed branches of the proof. These closed branch conditions, in conjunc-
tion to the precondition of the Hoare triple, correspond to a sufficient precondition
for tr.method. These results are stored in the set conditions.
Next, we analyse whether the set conditions is empty or not. In the affirmative
case, there are no sufficient preconditions that we can use to compute the BRT. In
that case, we proceed to analyse the following element in reachable. Otherwise, we
have sufficient preconditions which can be used in the BRT computation. For each
one of these conditions a new node has to be created, and added to the set of children
of node. Each one of these nodes will belong to a different branch of the BRT. We
assume that the operator makeNodes takes care of creating a set with all the new
nodes from the set of conditions provided as an argument to it; and the operator
addChildren receives node and a set of nodes newNodes as arguments, and adds
newNodes into the set of children of node.
Finally, once all the elements in set reachable are analysed, function brt, is
applied to all the children of node to proceed with the computation of the BRT.
The computation of (each branch of) the BRT will continue until the initial state
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Algorithm 3: brt (Loops Version)
Input: Node node
Result: Backwards reachability tree computation
begin
candidates ←− rt(node.current)
reachable ←− filter(candidates, node.iter)
if reachable = ∅ then
prune(node)
return
for tr ∈ reachable do
conditions ←− verify(node.property, tr)
if conditions = ∅ then
continue
newNodes ←− makeNodes(conditions)
addChildren(node, newNodes)
map brt node.children
return
of the model is reached. In this case, as there are no loops in the model, the initial
state cannot be reached from any other state. Thus, it is not possible to continue
backwards propagating properties. Therefore, the computation terminates.
Regarding Algorithm 3, it corresponds to an extension of Algorithm 2 which takes
into account the possibility that a model may contain loops.
To begin with, this algorithm uses the mapping rt to get the reachability in-
formation for the current state of node. However, as it may be the case that by
considering certain transitions, the model would exceed the allowed amount of iter-
ations when traversing the loops, the reachability information has to be filtered to
prevent this issue from ever happening. Thereby, the information stored in reachable
now corresponds to the filtered reachability information for the current state of node.
We assume that operator filter receives as an argument the set of transitions to be
analysed, i.e., candidates, and discards the appropriate transitions.
Next, we proceed to analyse if the set reachable is empty, or not. In the affirmative
case, all of the possible transitions to reach the current state of node were filtered.
Therefore, we stop computing the branch of the BRT associated to node. However,
as the current state of all the leaves of a BRT has to be the initial state, we may
have to start removing nodes from the branch until reaching either (I) a node whose
current state is the initial one, or (II) a node which has a bifurcation, i.e. it is part of
another path. We assume that operator prune takes care of this task. This operator
receives as an argument the node to be removed from the BRT, i.e., node, and it
removes this node and all is predecessors until reching either scenario (I) or (II).
Then, the remainder of this algorithm continues alike Algorithm 2. Note that the
computation of (each branch of) the BRT will continue until any of the following four
scenarios occurs: (i) the initial state of the model is reached and there are not loops
in the model; (ii) the initial state of the model is reached and there are loops in the
model, but the initial state cannot be reached from any other state; (iii) a node has
to be pruned and the initial state is reached while pruning ; or (iv) a node has to
be pruned and its father has more than one child. In (i) and (ii) the computation
terminates because it is not possible to continue backwards propagating properties
154 CHAPTER 5
through the model. In (iii) the computation terminates because the initial state is
reached, and a trace condition can now be generated for that branch of the BRT. In
(iv) the computation terminates because the pruning of nodes reaches a point of the
BRT where the father of the node has more than one child, i.e., the father should not
be removed from the BRT as it is part of another path. Thus, the pruning stops.
5.5.4 Trace Condition Inference
Finally, once we have computed the BRT, one can use a depth-first search (DFS)
algorithm to get sequences of nodes representing paths from the root of the tree to
its leaves.
Let us assume that the sequence of nodes <<nk, · · · , n0>> was obtained by using
DFS on the BRT, and n0 is the root of the tree. Then, this sequence represents
a path from the state initial to state toreach, in a set up where ϕ holds when
toreach is reached. In particular, if we think in terms of trace conditions, the
sequence <<nk.method, · · · , n1.method>> corresponds to the trace pattern, and nk.phi
represents the trace property, which has to be initially fulfilled in order to, later, reach
the chosen state while satisfying ϕ. Thus, from the previously obtained sequence of
nodes, we get the following trace condition:
nk.phi•<<nk.method, · · · , n1.method>>
In addition, as all the backwards propagated conditions through the model were
sufficient preconditions, if this trace condition is satisfiable, i.e. nk.phi, then we can
conclude that it is actually a sufficient trace condition.
5.6 Applications
In this section we elaborate on possible applications for our proposed methodology
(see Sec. 5.5) in the context of testing, and (runtime) verification.
5.6.1 Global Test Case Generation
Testing is an area where proofs can be used to (automatically) generate unit test
cases from a formula. In general, some prover which applies the symbolic execution
paradigm [70], e.g. deductive verifier KeY [9], is used in an attempt of verifying the
formula. Then, test cases can be (automatically) generated for each branch of the
proof.
By following a similar proof-based approach, if we consider a FOL formula as the
initial formula in our methodology, then we can infer trace conditions and use them
to (automatically) generate global test cases for a particular run of the system. Thus,
we can go from generating test cases focused on a system unit, e.g. testing a method,
to generating test cases focused on a system component, e.g. testing the interaction
between different methods of the same object.
Let us come back to the example introduced in Sec. 5.5.1. To generate global
test cases from the trace conditions ϕ9(var, xh, xf , xg)•<<(h, xh), (f, xf ), (g, xg)>>,
we could generalise the manner in which KeyTestGen [13] automatically generates
unit test cases from proofs.
Considering the trace property ϕ9 as a test data constraint, i.e. a constraint which
must be satisfied by the initial data to be generated for the test case, we start by
generating concrete data satisfying it. This concrete data corresponds to a first order
interpretation of ϕ9. KeyTestGen finds such interpretations with the help of Z3 [50].
The next step corresponds to the generation of the oracle from ϕ0 (i.e. the initial
formula). As ϕ9 was obtained through backwards propagation, we already know
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that if the initial data satisfies it, then ϕ0 will be fulfilled when state q2 is reached.
Therefore, one could conclude that it is enough to create a trivial oracle for the test
case, i.e. an oracle that returns always true. However, creating the actual oracle from
ϕ0 works as a sanity check for the test cases. In particular, whenever the provided
model does not describe the whole behaviour of the system, including an actual
check for ϕ0 as oracle for the test case could help us to detect unexpected issues (see
Sec. 5.7.2).
Finally, the test case is created in two stages: preamble, and execution of the
methods. The objective of the preamble is to reproduce the initial state of the first
order interpretation. Here, all the necessary Java objects are created, and the different
program variables and fields are initialise with concrete data. Regarding the execution
of the methods, an executable environment is created to run all of the methods in
the trace pattern, e.g. <<(h, xh), (f, xf ), (g, xg)>>.
Therefore, the successful generation and check of such a test case would guarantee
that it is possible to get an initial configuration for the system, whose execution
would lead to state q2 in a set up where ϕ0 is fulfilled. Thus, the generated test case
offers guarantees for a whole execution of the system, i.e. it is global.
Regarding the use of global test cases, one may consider using the knowledge
about certain testing coverage for the methods of the system at a local (unit) level to
guarantee a global coverage. For instance, let us assume that the execution paths
p1, p2, and p3, guarantee full path coverage for a certain method foo. In addition, if
the initial values used to test foo fulfil a condition pi1, then the execution path p1
is traversed. Similarly, condition pi2 leads to the traversal of p2, and pi3 leads to the
traversal of p3. Then, by considering any of the previous conditions as the initial
formula in our methodology, if we succeed to generate trace conditions from every
condition, then the set of all the inferred trace conditions guarantees that there exists
system traces such that every execution path for foo will be traversed when reaching
the appropriate state in the model. Thus, our methodology guarantees a full global
path coverage, provided a full unit path coverage was accomplished.
Another possible use for global test cases is fault detection. Basically, we can
use as initial formula in our methodology a comparison of a field against an invalid
concrete value. Then, succeeding to infer a trace condition from that formula would
mean that there is an error in the system, given that there exists a trace (pattern)
leading the execution of the system towards the desired state, but when it is reached
the field under scrutiny has an invalid value assigned to it. Later, by analysing the
global test case generated from the infer trace condition one can analyse the system
globally, looking for the fault.
5.6.2 Runtime Verification
Runtime verification (RV) [63,74] is a technique concerned with the runtime monitoring
of software executions. It detects violations of properties that occur while the program
under scrutiny is executed. One downside of this technique is that it introduces some
overhead to the execution of the system which, in some cases, may cause trouble,
e.g. when the response time of a system is critical and the added overhead delays it.
In addition, when RV is used before system deployment in order to analyse certain
system behaviour, one has to come up with appropriate (system) traces to monitor.
In [55] Falzon et al. show how to translate a model like the one we have introduced
in Sec. 5.3 to a runtime monitor specification. By following these ideas, we can generate
a runtime monitor which checks the desired initial FOL formula when reaching the
appropriate state in the monitor by following a trace pattern.
In addition, when analysing an interactive application, by considering the trace
conditions inferred with our methodology, the monitor can be instrumented with
artefacts for guiding the execution of the system. For instance, when reaching a
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state in the automaton, the monitor could add an entry in a log suggesting which
methods would be recommended to run next. Basically, it would suggest to run any
of the methods for which a sufficient precondition was backwards propagated to that
state. Thereby, following the monitor suggestions would be the same as traversing
a trace pattern. Thus, the execution of the system is led by the monitor towards
reaching a desired state. Hence, guided RV would simplify the task of coming up
with appropriate (system) traces for monitoring the system when using RV before
system deployment.
5.6.3 State Invariants Verification
The previously described applications allow us to check whether there exists an
execution of the system such that a FOL formula ϕ is fulfilled whenever certain state
q of the model is reached. However, it would also be interesting to know whether ϕ is
fulfilled for every single execution of the system reaching q, and as long as the model
resides in q, i.e. whether ϕ is a local state invariant.
By extending Algorithm 3 in our methodology (see Sec. 5.5) with an analysis
of invariability for ϕ, we can statically verify whether this FOL formula is a state
invariant or not. Here, by invariability we mean that the execution of any of the
methods in the system is not going to interfere with the truth value of the FOL
formula while residing in a certain state of the model.
Basically, we start by inferring trace conditions from a BRT computed considering
the invariability analysis. Next, if the trace patterns of all the these trace conditions
cover every path in the model, i.e. we can get from the initial state to state q in every
possible manner, and every trace pattern holds initially for every (system) trace, then
ϕ is a state invariant, as we can generate test cases from the trace conditions which
guarantee that ϕ is fulfilled when q is reached, the invariability analysis guarantees
that the methods of the system are not going to interfere with ϕ truth value while
being on q, and q can be reached from the initial state through every possible path.
One possible use for state invariants could be the analysis of explicit typestates for
objects [52, 86]. Typestates are properties of objects which describe valid sequences
of methods calls. Basically, typestates can be interpreted as automata which describe
the legal behaviour of the instances of an object regarding the appropriate manner in
which the methods of the object can be called.
Some applications add explicit additional fields to their specifications in order to
describe and analyse typestates, e.g. Mondex [88]. Thereby, if the behaviour described
by the provided model coincides with the behaviour described by the typestates, then
the value of the field used to control the typestate should be fixed in each one of
the states of the model. Thus, an equality comparison between the field controlling
the typestate and its appropriate (concrete) value should be a state invariant of the
corresponding state in the model, as their value should always coincide.
Note that checking for invariability may not be an easy task. One would have to
analyse all of the methods of the system, to know which methods may interfere with
the system variables. Then, if the property to be analysed in certain node depends
on system variables, one would have to check whether it is possible to run one of
the interfering methods in the current state of the node. If so, then the property
cannot be considered a state invariant, as its system variables could be modified while
residing in that state.
5.7 Evaluation
This section depicts concrete examples on the use of our methodology, regarding the
applications introduced in Sec. 5.6. Here, we will consider the analysis of two Java
5.7. EVALUATION 157
∀ sender : ConPurse,
awaiting fromstart
parties initialised
money deducted
end transaction
m.label == StartF & m.id == sender.name & m.cpd != null & m.cpd.name != name
& logIdx < exLog.length | sender.start from | ret == SUCCESS | skip
m.label == Req & m.id == sender.name & checkSameTransaction(m)
& transaction.value <= balance | sender.req | ret == SUCCESS | skip
m.label == Ack & m.id == sender.name & checkSameTransaction(m) |
sender.ack | ret == SUCCESS | skip
Figure 5.4: Model for sender purse in Mondex
applications: Mondex, and FiTS. All the files and sources used in the examples below,
with the exception of FiTS sources that are available in [76], can be found in [4].
5.7.1 Mondex Case Study: Global Test Case Generation
Mondex is an electronic purse application for smart cards products [2], which has
been studied as a verification benchmark problem since 2006 [95]. It essentially
consists of a financial transaction system which supports transferring funds between
electronic purses, i.e. accounts. Whenever a person makes a transaction, electronic
money is taken from their purse and transferred to the target purse. Regarding the
transactions, they are performed following a multi-step message exchange protocol:
(1) the source and destination purses should (independently) register with the central
fund transferring manager; (2) await a request to deduct funds from the source purse;
(3) await a request to add the funds to the destination purse; and finally (4) an
acknowledgement is sent to indicate that the transfer took place before the transaction
ends.
In this work we will use the implementation of Mondex introduced in [10]. It
consists of a Java implementation which runs on a desktop computer, instead of
a Java Card implementation for smart cards. A minor difference between these
implementations is that in the Java version some methods return values in order to
indicate whether their output is normal or erroneous, instead of raising exceptions
alike the Java Card implementation.
In particular, we will focus on analysing the behaviour of a sender purse. ConPurse
objects represent the state of an electronic purse. These objects offer several meth-
ods which are used to perform the different transactions. For a sender purse, we
should consider only methods (i) start from operation, (ii) req operation, and (iii)
ack operation. Method (i) is used to start taking part on a transaction; method (ii)
is used to reply to a money request, i.e. send the money to the destination purse; and
method (iii) is used to finish the participation in the transaction once the destination
purse acknowledges that it has received the transferred money. In addition, these
objects have a field status, which is used to keep track of the overall status of a
purse during a transaction.
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Nr Hoare triple Path condition
{m a.label==Ack &
m a.id==sender.name &
checkSameTransaction(m a)}
1 ack(m a) status == 3
{status == 4}
{m r.label==Req &
m r.id==sender.name &
checkSameTransaction(m r)
& transaction.value <=
balance}
2 req(m r) status == 1
{status == 3}
{m sf.label==StartF &
m sf.id==sender.name
& m sf.cpd != null &
m sf.cpd.name != name &
logIdx < exLog.length}
nextSeq != 32767
& status == 0 &
m sf.cpd.name >= 1 &
m sf.cpd.nextSeqNo >= 0
3a start from(m sf) & m sf.cpd.value >= 1
{status == 1} & m sf.cpd.value <= balance
{m sf.label==StartF &
m sf.id==sender.name
& m sf.cpd != null &
m sf.cpd.name != name &
logIdx < exLog.length}
nextSeq >= 32767
& status == 0 &
m sf.cpd.name >= 1 &
m sf.cpd.nextSeqNo >= 0
3b start from(m sf) & m sf.cpd.value >= 1
{status == 1} & m sf.cpd.value <= balance
Table 5.1: Backwards reachability tree computation
Let us consider the model depicted in Fig. 5.4. This model, which is based on the
specification provided for Mondex in [10], describes the behaviour of a source purse:
first the purse starts its participation in a transaction, then it deducts the requested
money from its balance and transfers it to the source purse, and finally it receives an
acknowledgement confirming that the (deducted) money was transferred successfully.
Trace Condition Inference
As mentioned before, the field status is used to keep track of the overall status of a
purse on a transaction. Therefore, whenever the state end transaction is reached in
the model, status should store the value corresponding to a successful termination of
a transaction, i.e. 4 for a sender purse. Then, we use the provided model, considering
state end transaction and the property ’status == 4’, to apply our methodology in
order to infer global trace conditions.
The first stage corresponds to the computation of the mapping it consisting of
the reachability information extracted from the model. For space reasons, and due to
the fact that for the model in Fig. 5.4 reachability is straightforward, we omit the
description of this mapping here.
Next, we move on to the computation of the BRT by following Algorithm 1 with
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arguments awaiting from, end transaction, status == 4, and 0, as the initial state,
the state to reach, the FOL formula, and the allowed number of loop iterations,
respectively. State end transaction can only be reached from state money deducted
with a transition associated to method ack. Therefore, we could proceed to analyse
the Hoare triple {true} ack(m a) {status == 4}. However, the transition associated
to ack has a precondition describing desired properties for the appropriate execution
of this method on state money deducted, i.e. the message corresponds to method
ack, the message is for the sender purse, and the message corresponds to current
transaction. Hence, we use this information to refine the previous Hoare triple as
follows:
{m a.label==Ack & m a.id==sender.name & checkSameTransaction(m a)}
ack(m a)
{status == 4}
To attempt to verify this Hoare triple, first, we write it as a JML contract. Then,
we annotate it in the Java sources. Finally, we run KeY on the annotated code. Note
that, for the time being, every step performed in the previous verification attempt
is developed manually. However, they can be automated. We will deal with the
automation of these steps in future work (see Sec. 2.12).
Such a verification results in one open branch, and one closed branch from which
the path condition ’status == 3’ is extracted. Thus, we backwards propagate this
condition to state money deducted, and we continue with the computation of the BRT
from that state.
In total, we perform three backward propagations of conditions through the model
when computing the BRT. Table 5.1 describes the Hoare triples which were analysed
during the whole backwards propagation process, and the path condition(s) extracted
from the proofs at each step, i.e. the (sufficient) precondition to be backwards
propagated. Note that the number in the first column indicates the order in which
the Hoare triples are analysed, and that in the case of method start from, the proof
results in two close branches, i.e. the table has one entry for each close branch (3a
and 3b).
Once the BRT is computed, we proceed to compose trace conditions from it.
Assuming that ϕ3a and ϕ3b represent the path conditions in row 3a and 3b from
table 5.1, respectively, the following trace conditions are inferred:
ϕ3a(status,nextSeq,m sf)•<<(start from, m sf), (req, m r), (ack, m a)>>
ϕ3b(status,nextSeq,m sf)•<<(start from, m sf), (req, m r), (ack, m a)>>
Then, we proceed to use these trace conditions to generate global test cases.
Global Test Case Generation
From the trace conditions above we can write one test case per trace condition using
JUnit [26]. In particular, we have written these test cases using as a base a test
case automatically generated by KeyTestGen [13]. Fig. 5.5 illustrates part of such
test cases. They consist of a preamble where the necessary data for the test cases
is created and initialised, a block of code where the methods in the sequence of the
trace condition are executed, and a call to the oracle to check whether the test is
successful or not. Note that all the written test cases can be found in [4].
Regarding the preamble, we have to create and initialise an instance of a ConPurse
object to play the role of sender purse on the test case. Such an instance has to
fulfil the initial FOL formula, i.e., the path conditions backwards propagated to
the initial state of the model. In our test cases, object ConPurse self corresponds
to this instance. In addition, for the arguments m sf, m r, and m a of the different
methods, we create and initialise (concrete) data Data.m sf, Data.m r, and Data.m a,
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//Preamble
short name = (short)1;
ConPurse _o1 = new ConPurse(name);
_o1.balance = (short)42;
ConPurse self = (ConPurse)_o1;
//Execution of sequence of methods in trace condition
java.lang.Throwable exc = null;
try {
self.start_from_operation(Data.m_sf);
self.req_operation(Data.m_r);
self.ack_operation(Data.m_a);
} catch (java.lang.Throwable e) {
exc=e;
}
//Calling the test oracle
assertTrue(testOracle(exc,self));
Figure 5.5: Part of a test case generated from a trace condition
protected ArrayAccounts accounts;
public int openSession() {...}
public void closeSession(int sid) {...}
public void depositTo(String acc_nr_dt, int amount_dt) {...}
public void withdrawFrom(String acc_nr_wf, int amount_wf) {...}
Figure 5.6: Part of the UserInfo class
respectively, having into account the refined preconditions for the test data constraints
(see Sec. 5.6.1).
Regarding the execution of the sequence methods, it is performed within a
try-catch block, as it could happen that an exception is thrown during the execution
of the methods when the test case is run. Variable exc can be used to check which
kind of exception has occurred.
Finally, we write the call to the oracle, which works as a sanity check. This
oracle checks whether the property ’status == 4’ is fulfilled after the execution of
the sequence of methods. Both test cases are successful.
It is important to remark that, even though we have manually created all the
cases, it is possible to automate their generation. We consider developing a tool
which integrates this automation as future work.
5.7.2 FiTS Case Study: Runtime Verification
FiTS (a Financial Transaction System) [76] is a minimalistic implementation of a
system which emulates the standard behaviour of a financial transaction system,
where users can have several accounts and use them to deposit or withdraw money.
Basically, the FiTS implementation can be divided in two parts: a front-end
providing the operations which both the administrator and the users of the system can
perform; and a back-end where the user and account information database is handled.
In addition, it is important to remark that several bugs were intentionally introduced
on FiTS, as this system is meant to be a verification benchmark. In fact, FiTS
has been used as a verification benchmark in the 3rd international Competition on
Runtime Verification (CRV), held on 2016 as part of the 16th international conference
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∀ u:UserInfo,
logoutstart login
checkBalances() | u.openSession | . . . | skip
checkBalances() | u.closeSession | . . . | skip
checkBalances() & amount > 0 | u.depositTo | . . . | skip
checkBalances() & amount > 0 | u.withdrawFrom | . . . | skip
Figure 5.7: Part of the model for the back-end operations of the users
on Runtime Verification (RV’16).
In this work, we analyse the behaviour of the class UserInfo, which is part of the
back-end of the system. This class represents the information database of the users by
storing objects of the class UserInfo. These objects depict the state of a particular
user. Fig. 5.6 illustrates the signature of the methods, and a field of interest for this
case study. Field accounts represents the set of open accounts of the user; whenever
a user logs in the system, method openSession is called to open a new session for the
user; whenever a user logs out from the system, method closeSession is called to
close the previously opened session for the user; whenever a user deposits money from
an external source into her account, method depositTo is called to deposit the money
in the appropriate account; and whenever the user pays a bill (i.e. an external money
account), method withdrawFrom is run to withdraw the money from the appropriate
account.
We had to introduce some minor adaptations to FiTS implementation, in order
to make the source code readable by the deductive verifier KeY at the time of
computing the BRT. For instance, as KeY cannot handle generics we replaced the use
of the classes ArrayList<UserSession> and ArrayList<UserAccount> by our own
implemented classes ArraySessions and ArrayAccounts, respectively. These two
new classes, which were fully specified and verified to increase the confidence in their
use, offer the same functionalities than the ones used in the original types, without
losing any generality on the implementation. In addition, to avoid dealing with type
casting manipulations and unboxing (i.e. unwrapping) of objects in the different
proofs, the type of the fields next account and next session id was changed from
Integer to int.
Let us consider the model illustrated in Fig. 5.7. This model depicts a standard
property of financial transaction system. A user can only pay a bill or deposit money
from an external source, if she has logged in the system, i.e. methods depositTo
and withdrawFrom can only be run between a use of openSession and closeSession.
Note that for space reasons, as they are not of use in the computation of the BRT, we
have omitted here the actual postconditions of the different transitions, and written
“. . .” instead.
Trace Condition Inference
To infer trace conditions for the system applying our methodology we consider the
following FOL formula in state login: “After accessed, none of the accounts of a user
can have a negative balance”. Formally,
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Nr Hoare triple Path condition
{checkBalances()}
1 openSession() true
{checkBalances()}
{checkBalances() & amount dt > 0}
2 depositTo(acc nr dt,amount dt) true
{checkBalances()}
{checkBalances() & amount wf > 0}
3 withdrawFrom(acc nr wf,amount wf) true
{checkBalances()}
Table 5.2: Backwards reachability tree computation
∀ int i ; i >= 0 & i < accounts.size ; accounts.set[i].balance >= 0
In the rest of this section, we represent this property as method checkBalances().
The application of our methodology starts by computing the reachability infor-
mation mapping rt from the model. Below, we describe the mapping obtained:
it(login) = { logout checkBalances()|u.openSession|. . .|skip−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ login,
login
checkBalances() & amount dt > 0|u.depositTo|. . .|skip−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ login,
login
checkBalances() & amount wf > 0|u.withdrawFrom|. . .|skip−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ login }
it(logout) = { login checkBalances()|u.closeSession|. . .|skip−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ logout }
Next, we compute the BRT following Algorithm 1 with arguments logout, login,
checkBalances(), and 1, as the initial state, the state to reach, the FOL formula,
and the allowed number of loop iterations, respectively. By considering the map entry
rt(login), we analyse with KeY the refined Hoare triples depicted in the second
column of Table 5.2. All these Hoare triples are fully verified by KeY. Thereby, the
(path) condition true is backwards propagated to state logout, and we continue with
the computation of the BRT. From this moment on, every backwards propagated
condition will correspond to the condition true, and every analysed Hoare triple will
be fully verified.
In total there are 32 backwards propagations of conditions, leading to the com-
putation of a BRT consisting of eleven branches, where 33 transitions were filtered
for exceeding the limit in the amount of loop traversals. From this BRT, 11 trace
conditions can be inferred. Here, we will only focus in the following one:
true•<<(openSession, ()), (closeSession, sid), (openSession, ()),
(depositTo, acc nr dt, amount dt), (withdrawFrom, acc nr wf, amount wf)>>
Then, we proceed to generate a runtime monitor from the provided model, in
order to runtime verify property checkBalances when reaching the appropriate state
by following the trace pattern of the inferred trace condition.
Runtime Verification
In order to use the previously inferred trace conditions for runtime verification, first,
we use the translation described in [38], which is based on ideas from [55], in order
to translate the model in Fig. 5.7 to a runtime monitor specification described as
a DATE [45]. DATEs are finite state automata whose transitions are of the form:
event | condition 7→ action, where event is a system event, i.e. entering or exiting a
method, that triggers the transition, the condition is checked and must hold in order
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to trigger the transition, and the action is a piece of code to be run when taking the
transition (after checking the condition).
Once the model is translated to a DATE, we use this translation as an input
for the runtime verifier Larva [46]. This tool automatically generates a runtime
monitor from the provided DATE. Such a monitor will be able to track the sequence
of methods in the trace conditions, and check whether the desired FOL formula is
fulfilled when reaching the appropriate state.
Next, we run the methods in the sequence of the trace condition, in parallel to
the runtime monitor. In order to do so, we create a file with a main method where
we set up a user and an empty account for her, and we recreate a run which traverses
the appropriate sequence of methods, i.e. openSession, closeSession,
openSession, depositTo, withdrawFrom. On this run, after opening a session for the
second time, if we deposit 500 Euros, and next we pay to someone 495 Euros, then
withdrawing the money from the account leaves the account in 5 Euros, i.e. property
checkBalances holds when the state in the monitor associated to state login in the
model is reached.
It is important to remark that, if class UserInfo is used in isolation, the fact
that true is the backwards propagated trace property for every trace condition, and
that all the transitions in the model are traversed by the trace pattern, would mean
that there is no need to runtime verify checkBalances, as every possible execution
of the system will fulfill it. However, whenever some of the code units of the system
interact with each other, e.g. methods of a unit making (inner) calls to methods
in another unit, one code of unit can introduce unexpected issues in the other one,
e.g. data manipulation of an object in the front-end can push one of its fields out of
the expected boundaries for it in the back-end. Thus, one should always consider
generating the corresponding runtime check for the FOL formula under scrutiny, as
they will detect these unexpected issues.
Let us come back to the example above, but now, instead of running the methods
of class UserInfo in isolation, we also consider the execution of the whole system in
parallel to the monitor in order to analyse the selected trace condition.
Due to the fact that the methods in the trace pattern are all part of the back-end
of the system, they are not directly called in an execution. Instead, we have to focus
in using the methods in the front-end which will make inner calls to the methods of
interest from within their bodies, i.e. methods in the front-end are interacting with
methods in the back-end.
The methods in the front-end are provided by the class Interface. Here,
we use the methods USER login, USER logout, USER depositFromExternal, and
USER payToExternal, as these methods make inner calls to the methods openSession,
closeSession, depositTo, and withdrawFrom, respectively. Therefore, after setting
up the user and an empty account for her, we proceed to run the following sequence
of (front-end) methods, corresponding to the trace pattern of the selected trace
condition, whose methods are all in back-end: USER login, USER logout, USER login,
USER depositFromExternal, USER payToExternal.
At the time of running the previous sequence, if we deposit 500 Euros, and next
we pay to someone 495 Euros, then the monitor detects a violation of property
checkBalances while being at state login, when method USER payToExternal is run.
Hence, something must be wrong in method USER payToExternal before the inner
call to withdrawFrom is performed.
By inspecting USER payToExternal implementation, we notice that a fee is charged
to the 495 Euros before the withdrawal of money. This causes the total amount
of money to be transferred to go over 500 Euros. However, when checking if the
balance of the account is enough for the transaction, this check is performed against
the 495 Euros without the fee charge. Thereby, due to this erroneous check, the
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method makes the inner call to method withdrawFrom with an amount higher than
the balance of the account. Thus, property checkBalances is violated.
In conclusion, even though the methods of class UserInfo work fine in isolation,
the manipulation of data in the front-end may cause a violation of the property of
interest. However, by checking the FOL formula with the runtime monitor, we were
able to spot the bug in FiTS which lead to the property violation when analysing the
inferred trace condition. Thus, in spite of the fact that it may seem not necessary
to do it, generating a runtime check for the FOL formula under scrutiny is able to
detect a bug at runtime.
5.7.3 Mondex Case Study: State Invariant Verification
From the results obtained in Sec.5.7.1 we know that property ’status == 4’ is
fulfilled whenever state end transaction is reached by following the trace patterns of
the inferred trace conditions. In addition, we know that the trace patterns traverse
all of the possible paths in the model, and that each trace property holds initially, as
the values initially assigned to their corresponding data satisfied them. Let us now
analyse the invariability of this property.
The only methods which can modify the different fields of a sender purse are
start from operation, req operation, and ack operation. In addition, as state
end transaction is reached whenever a transaction is over, none of these methods can
be executed in that state. Thus, property ’status == 4’ is a state invariant in state
end transaction.
Furthermore, while being at state money deducted, the only method which may
modify a sender purse is ack operation. Such a modification will only occur whenever
the previous method is successfully executed. However, when this successful execution
terminates, the model will be in a different state, i.e. end transaction. Thereby,
property ’status == 3’ is a state invariant in that state. Similarly, considering the
successful execution of method req operation, property ’status == 1’ is a state
invariant in state parties initialised.
In addition, as mentioned before in Sec.5.7.1, field status is used to keep track
of the overall status of a purse on a transaction. Therefore, this field can be used as
a typestate in the specification of the methods. In particular, in the case of a sender
purse, whenever either state parties initialised, money deducted, or end transaction is
reached in the model, status should store the value 1, 3 or 4, respectively.
Thus, the state invariants described above can be used to prove the explicit use
of field status as a typestate, due to the fact that the expected values for status
in the different states of the model match the values used in the comparisons of the
state invariants.
As a remark, the state invariants above can be used, for instance, to improve
the results obtained in [10], regarding the verification of a specification for Mondex
written in ppDATE. Basically, a ppDATE consists of a labeled transition system,
whose states may include functional properties regarding the methods of the system
under scrutiny, described as Hoare triples. Thereby, if a FOL formula is a state
invariant, then it can be used to refine all of the preconditions of the Hoare triples
residing in the appropriate state of the ppDATE.
Regarding the work in [10], from a total of 26 Hoare triples, only 2 were fully
verified. The remaining 24 were partially verified. In particular, the partially verified
Hoare triples do not talk about the value of field status, as the automaton in the
ppDATE takes care of controlling that the methods are executed in the right order,
according to the transaction protocol. However, by refining the preconditions of
these partially verified Hoare triples with the appropriate knowledge about the state
invariants from our previous analysis, all of them would be fully verified. Thus, by
considering the use of the state invariants none of the Hoare triples would have to be
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verified at runtime, whereas in [10] the 24 partially verified Hoare triple are runtime
verified.
5.8 Related Work
We are not aware of any other work which we can be directly compared to the full
extent of the work presented here. Still, we can relate the different concepts used in
our work to the state of the art.
The main concept used here is partial proof, as they work as a conduit to backwards
propagate conditions through the model.
In [10,11], Ahrendt et al. use partial proofs to refine ppDATE specifications, in
order to optimise the runtime monitors extracted from them using the StaRVOOrS
tool. As a result, only the branches which were not closed will be verified at
runtime. Alike StaRVOOrS, our methodology can be used for runtime verification.
However, this tool does not consider the backwards propagation of condition through
the states of the ppDATEs, and it runtime verifies open branches, whereas our
methodology focus on the use of the closed ones. In [13] Ahrendt et al. present
KeyTestGen. This tool automatically generates test cases from proofs of formulas
developed by KeY. In particular, KeyTestGen offers a test case generation mode
which automatically generate test cases from partial proofs, considering only open
branches. Our methodology can also be used to generate test cases. However, we
generate global test cases for a whole execution of the system, whereas KeyTestGen
generates unit test cases for particular methods. In [38], Chimento et al. use partial
proofs to enhance the application of test driven development (TDD). In particular,
partial proofs obtained from the deductive verification of properties are used to
(automatically) generate test cases for the open branches, provinding new test cases
for TDD. This increases the confidence in the correctness of the developed software,
as these new test cases will cover the execution of the parts of the methods which
might be in conflict with the property under scrutiny. In spite of the fact that [38]
focus on software development and the applications of our methodology, at least for
the time being, only focus on software verification, both works consider the use of
the open branches in partial proofs as part of their application.
Another concept which is fundamental for our work is the combination of verifica-
tion techniques, in particular, using symbolic execution as a means to combine static
and dynamic verification. In the this work, we have combined deductive verification
with both testing and runtime verification. Regarding related work, we have already
mentioned StaRVOOrS and KeyTestGen above, which combine (static) deductive
verification with runtime verification, and testing, respectively. In addition, one can
refer to any of [59,60,77,87].
In [59], Ge et al. present DyTa. This tool uses the results obtained during a
static verification phase for guiding the application of dynamic symbolic execution.
As a result, test cases which can be used to detect potential defects in the system
under test are generated. In [60], Godefroid et al. introduce SAGE. This tool focuses
on the generation of test cases for x86 binaries using dynamic symbolic execution.
In [77], Petiot et al. introduce the tool StaDy. This tool applies test case generation
in combination with deductive verification to increase the confidence about the
correctness of C programs. In [87], Tillman et al. present Pex, a white-box testing
tool to generate test cases for .NET programs. The applications for our methodology
show that our work can be used to combine deductive verification with either runtime
verification, or testing, whereas all the works previously listed only offer one particular
combination of techniques.
Regarding the inference of traces from models, more precesily the inference of
trace patterns, one can always relate to model-based testing tools like modelJUnit [90],
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or QuickCheck [6]. In spite of the fact that these kinds of tools can infer traces,
neither the previously mentioned tools, nor any other model-based testing tool (to
the best of our knowledge), support backwards propagation of conditions through
the states of the model.
A very interesting relation to our work is that sufficient preconditions come as a
generalisation of the weakest preconditions introduced by Dijkstra [53]. In our work
we compute sufficient preconditions from partial proofs. Such preconditions would
correspond to the weakest precondition of the methods if we were using a perfect
prover, i.e. a prover that closes a proof whenever the program under scrutiny fulfils
it. However, when using an ordinary prover one may not be able to prove certain
branches of a valid property. This may occur due to the lack of ’proving power’, the
strategies being used, a lack of code annotations (e.g. loop invariants), or alike. In
this cases, a sufficient precondition represents a set of initial states which, if fulfilled,
will lead the program to a state where the postcondition is fulfilled. Still, this set
does not cover the correct execution of all the parts of the program, e.g. it does
not cover the parts of the program associated to open branches. Thus, a sufficient
precondition is not necessarily the weakest precondition of the program. Anyhow,
sufficient preconditions are enough for our methodology, as we focus on the execution
of the parts of the methods associated to close branches in a proof, and not necessarily
on every possible execution of the method (as it would be the case for a weakest
precondition).
5.9 Conclusion
In this paper we present a new methodology which uses the power of partial proofs
local to the transitions in a model, obtained from low effort verification attempts, in
order to infer global trace conditions which impose restrictions over the execution of
the system. This methodology backwards propagates sufficient preconditions through
the states of the model until reaching the initial the state. Then, the sufficient
precondition propagated to the initial state, and the path followed from the state
containing the local property under scrutiny to the initial state, together form the
inferred trace condition.
It is important to stress again that the sufficient preconditions extracted from
partial proofs come as a generalisation of the weakest precondition of the methods
under scrutiny, as they are associated to close branches of the proof of a property,
but not necessarily to its full proof.
In addition, working with sufficient preconditions grants the possibility of inferring
trace conditions even when performing low effort verifications attempts. For instance,
it is enough to get one closed branch out of several branches to infer a trace condition.
Thus, once a branch is closed, one can proceed with the application of our methodology,
ignoring the rest of the open branches.
We also describe applications for the use of the inferred trace conditions. These
applications include (global) test case generation, runtime verification, and state
invariants verification. Therefore, this work advances the state-of-the-art of both
static and dynamic verification.
This work also reports on the application of the proposed methodology in two case
studies: Mondex, an electronic purse application; and FiTS, a financial transaction
system. The former was selected because previous work by the authors of this article
in this case study motivated the initial ideas on trace conditions inference. The latter
was selected because it is a verification benchmark which purposely includes several
bugs in its code. Therefore, it provides a relevant scenario for the application of our
methodology.
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As a future work, we are planning to implement a complete tool chain which will
(automatically) apply our methodology in its full extent, whereas, at the moment,
the different tools used to develop our case studies are connected manually. In
addition, we consider the possibility of introducing some code annotations in order
to modularise the inference of trace conditions. For instance, let us assume that
a system is divided into several layers of application, e.g back-end and front-end.
Then, given that we already know some sufficient preconditions for certain methods
in a particular layer, e.g. back-end, we can annotate them in the source code to lift
those results to another layer, e.g. the front-end. This can be of a great aid to infer
sufficient preconditions describing necessary conditions to go from one layer of the
system to another one.
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